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

Crossing Into Darkness

The Houthi militia behind the scenes of organizations and false peace lobbies

Prepared by
Dr. Abdulqader Alkharraz

FraudWiki

2025 June

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Acknowledgments

My sincere thanks and gratitude to everyone who contributed to uncovering the facts and helped provide the necessary data. I also thank everyone who reviewed this book and enriched it with their valuable comments.

Documenting history and facts is essential in shaping our understanding of the present and building an informed future for future generations. By collecting and analyzing data, we provide a clear and accurate picture of events and facts.

Thanks to everyone's efforts, we can ensure that history is not forgotten and that the facts remain alive, serving as a reference for future generations. Your efforts and cooperation were pivotal in completing this work, and we look forward to further collaboration in the future.

"Memory cannot be bought, justice cannot be postponed, and .history cannot be falsified"

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General Introduction

Yemen has long been a stage for complex conflicts interwoven with regional and international interests, but what lies beneath is even more significant. Behind the apparent scene of war, subtle threads of influence are being shaped, managed from the backrooms of international organizations and "peace" platforms, where narratives are crafted and events are rewritten to serve specific parties.

In this context, the Houthi militia emerges as one of the most prominent actors adept at manipulating truths and leveraging international community tools to reproduce their legitimacy and strengthen their grip on power. This book, " ***Crossing into Darkness: The Houthi Militia Behind the Scenes of Organizations and False Peace Lobbyists***,," opens a window onto one of the most dangerous facets of the conflict in Yemen: the invisible networks linking the Houthis to UN and international organizations, and how these connections are used not only to prolong the war but also to undermine opportunities for just and comprehensive peace.

Through a detailed analysis of the Houthi secret organization's methods, we explore how this group has infiltrated international institutions, taking advantage of gaps in the global system. We also highlight how false peace lobbyists serve as tools to justify the presence of the Houthis and enhance their influence in the political arena.

In today's world, where humanitarian and political crises increasingly overlap, it is crucial to understand the factors influencing the complex Yemeni reality. This book presents reliable and accurate research findings compiled from our previous publications and reports released via the FraudWiki platform, shedding light on the dangerous role played by certain individuals associated with the Houthi group within international financial and humanitarian institutions, either directly or indirectly. This information has not only raised community awareness but also had direct impacts on international policies, leading to sanctions from the Security Council and U.S. sanctions on several individuals and entities included in the chapters of this book, in addition to forming international committees to investigate corruption in international funding provided in the name of humanitarian aid to Yemen during the war.

Methodology

Our methodology in this book is based on a comprehensive and multidimensional analysis. It relies on our previous reports over the years, gathering and analyzing reliable data, and using both quantitative and qualitative analysis methods to understand how the Houthis influence international narratives. Specific cases embodying these dynamics will be studied, providing clear insights into Houthi strategies and the services offered by members of the Houthi secret organization within international organizations, funds, false peace lobbyists, and highlighting key figures in the Houthi security and intelligence system and their roles and threats.

Objectives

This study aims to achieve several key objectives:

1. **Uncover Hidden Truths**: Highlighting how the Houthis use international organizations as tools to enhance their influence.
2. **Analyze Strategies**: Studying the methods employed by the Houthi militia to manipulate global narratives.
3. **Raise International Awareness**: Providing a deeper understanding of the challenges facing security and peace in the region and urging the international community to take effective steps to address these threats.
4. **Provide Recommendations**: Offering practical suggestions to counter the Houthi influence in international organizations and to enhance genuine peace efforts.
5. **Document History**: Documenting events and facts related to the Houthis to serve as a reference for future generations, establishing solid evidence for accountability, contributing to preserving collective memory, and promoting justice in the future.

Structure of the Book

This book consists of three main parts divided into six integrated chapters, covering various aspects of the Houthi influence on the international stage. References and sources are allocated according to each section, allowing readers to delve into topics of particular interest.

The importance of this book lies in the context of the complex conflict in Yemen since 2015, where concerns about the Houthi group's impact on international financial and humanitarian institutions are increasing. The book reviews, through its various chapters, the roles of individuals linked to the Houthis and how they exploit their positions to advance the interests of this group, reflecting a real threat to the integrity and neutrality of institutions aimed at providing humanitarian support amid escalating crises. Each chapter addresses a specific issue, from revealing influential individuals within international organizations to analyzing their impact on policies and funding, culminating in a study of the Houthi security and intelligence apparatus and its effect on the humanitarian situation. Additionally, the concept of international narrative engineering and how the international community has aligned with false peace lobbyists and targeted research as tools to legitimize the Houthis is discussed.

The book addresses how these figures have used their positions to enhance Houthi interests, threatening the integrity of international institutions and undermining humanitarian efforts aimed at alleviating the suffering of the Yemeni people. It also examines the impact of corruption and mismanagement on international financial flows and how these conditions have been exploited to distort the image of the legitimate government and present the Houthis as a de facto authority.

Through this book, we seek to issue an urgent call for accountability for those involved in corruption, whether at the level of organizations, the legitimate authority, or the Houthi militia, and to ensure transparency in the management of international aid while reducing Houthi influence in institutions aimed at supporting the Yemeni people. The failure of the international community to address these issues makes it necessary to reevaluate current policies and work towards restoring the Yemeni state and the rights of its citizens.

In the first Part, which includes the first and second chapters**,** we find that **The first chapter** presents increasing concerns about the presence of individuals linked to the Houthi group within international financial and humanitarian institutions. These individuals, who hold influential positions within the World Bank, the

International Monetary Fund, and organizations claiming to advocate for human rights, use their positions to promote Houthi interests, threatening the integrity of these institutions. The chapter focuses on six key individuals identified through open-source research, detailing how they exploit their positions to channel resources and information in favor of the Houthi militia while utilizing lobbying platforms and coordinating public relations and propaganda. It also highlights the negative impact of these activities on humanitarian aid access, which lacks effective intervention from relevant government entities, necessitating action to ensure integrity, transparency, and accountability for international institutions, as well as for corrupt individuals within the legitimate government and holding the Houthi militia accountable.

The second chapter continues this analysis in detail, focusing on several other prominent figures associated with the Houthi group who play pivotal roles in international and local institutions in Yemen. It examines how these individuals serve Houthi interests and their influence on institutional decisions, exploring their functional roles and familial ties, with examples of their impact on international project funding. The chapter discusses the roles of individuals in the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Sana'a (UNOCHA), the World Bank in Washington, UNICEF, and the Geneva Centre for Security Governance, and how they facilitate Houthi interests. It highlights conflicts of interest, resource mismanagement, manipulation of narratives, and information direction, urging action to hold the involved parties accountable and ensure transparency in aid management.

The second Part, comprising the third and fourth chapters, aims to provide an analysis of the Houthi security and intelligence apparatus, based on reliable information and sources collected over the years. The data has been verified up to the end of 2023, also relying on open sources. The Houthi militia has established a security and intelligence apparatus as a means to bolster its authority and control over the areas it governs. This apparatus collects information about allies and opponents, making it crucial to understand its structure and operational methods to assess the threats posed by the militia to local, regional, and international security. The Houthi militia is characterized by the rotation of individuals in key positions, which helps maintain operational security and conceal its strategies. This regular turnover creates an impression of stability while ensuring the protection of sensitive information and illicit operations, such as arms smuggling, recruitment, and money laundering.

Moreover, the Houthi security and intelligence apparatus significantly affects the work of international organizations in Yemen. The Houthi influence can interfere with relief and humanitarian assistance efforts, as working in Houthi-controlled areas requires adaptation to the security apparatus's requirements, limiting organizations' ability to operate freely and effectively. Additionally, some organizations and their personnel align with this apparatus's demands and serve the militia. This section will spotlight the names and roles of key individuals within the apparatus and some entities associated with it, as well as their impact on the security and humanitarian landscape in Yemen, including issues of abduction, torture, arms smuggling, and recruitment in international wars.

In **the third Part,** we find in it the **fifth chapter**, we will examine the concept of international narrative engineering and how the international community has aligned with false peace lobbyists and targeted research as tools to legitimize the Houthis and undermine state-building and governance in Yemen, posing questions about the impact of these dynamics on the Yemeni scene. Additionally, the chapter addresses the humanitarian dimensions of the crisis, highlighting corruption and mismanagement as key factors hindering the effectiveness of international funding. Yemen has been experiencing a severe humanitarian crisis since 2015 due to ongoing conflict, leading to deteriorating economic and social conditions, increased poverty, and shortages of food and medicine. International funding is a key tool for addressing this crisis; however, it faces significant challenges such as corruption, mismanagement, and a lack of transparency, limiting its effectiveness in alleviating the suffering of the Yemeni people.

International funding to Yemen amounted to approximately $32 billion between 2015 and 2024, with the majority going to UN agencies such as the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which have directly and indirectly supported the Houthi militia, in addition to hundreds of millions of dollars in funding from the European Union for projects under the guise of peace and justice. However, networks and research entities are presented as independent but actually support the Houthi agenda, contributing to redefining the Houthis as a legitimate political movement. These entities (such as the **Mwatana Foundation, the Sana'a Center, and DeepRoot**, among others) have manipulated facts and issued misleading reports, granting the Houthis unwarranted political cover. The international community has become complicit in the crisis, adhering to a negotiation track that divides power with the Houthis, ignoring that they are part of an Iranian expansionist project that seized power in Yemen by force. In this context,

international reports serve as a tool to reshape the scene, disregarding national voices and supporting the interests of lobbyists linked to the Houthis.

Finally, **the sixth chapter** discusses how leaked security data has been used to distort the image of the legitimate government, revealing the extent of misinformation and data manipulation and how this contributes to enhancing the Houthis' image as a stable authority—a misleading portrayal that hinders efforts to build peace in Yemen. The leaked incident data from organizations during the period from 2022 to 2023 poses a concern for the legitimate government in Yemen. Analyses show that the purpose of this data is to distort the image of legitimacy and justify the continued presence of certain organizations under Houthi control, engaging in information manipulation. The analyzed data includes a disclosure of 404 security incidents, prepared by the Yemen Humanitarian Coordination Office, and appears to be submitted annually without review by the legitimate government, necessitating verification of its accuracy and coordination of protective measures.

This data aligns with reports from organizations working in peace that distort facts and manipulate information, reinforcing the Houthis' image as a party ready for peace while portraying the legitimate areas as unstable. This trend sends a false message to the world that legitimate areas are chaotic, making it easier to exploit these conditions to gather funds for specific institutions. This report provides an analysis of these leaked data and suggests measures to counter these risks.

The significance of this book lies in the fact that it is not merely a professional analysis, but a call to action. By providing reliable and comprehensive information, the book aims to raise international awareness about the threats posed by the Houthis and calls for effective action to hold those involved accountable and ensure transparency in aid management. Understanding these dynamics is key to effecting real change in the Yemeni situation and rebuilding the state in a manner that achieves justice and stability. This study is based on reliable data and sources to uncover the hidden dimensions of the conflict in Yemen, raising questions about the international community's role in addressing these complex challenges. Join us on this journey into darkness as we unveil hidden truths, document history, and present the threats facing security and peace in the region.

Part One

Chapter One

Houthi Secret Organization in International Organizations and Funds

Investigation on the Relatives of Houthi Leaders in International Organizations

Houthi Secret Organization in International Organizations and Funds

Introduction

This chapter one reviews growing concerns about the presence of individuals closely associated with the Houthi leadership in Yemen within international financial and humanitarian institutions. These individuals, who hold influential positions in these organizations, use their positions to promote and defend Houthi interests, posing a threat to the integrity and neutrality of these institutions.

The chapter focuses on six key people identified through open-source research, who play important roles in international institutions, requiring increased scrutiny and response from relevant organizations. The chapter details how these individuals are using their positions to serve the Houthi agenda through:

- Provide inside information,
- Directing financial resources,
- use of pressure lobbying,
- coordination of public relations and publicity.
- In addition, the chapter highlights the impact of these activities on humanitarian access and undermines transparency and accountability in international processes.

What is surprising when researching is that these individuals have been operating since the beginning of the war in Yemen without any role in exposing them or confronting them and stopping them by the concerned authorities in the legitimate government, which is responsible for dealing with international organizations and funds, and mainly includes:

- Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
- Ministry of Water and Environment
- Ministry of Social Affairs
- Ministry of Finance
- Prime Minister's Office.

The current situation requires intervention from the Presidential Council to correct the work of these entities and ensure accountability. There is also a need for urgent action by the relevant authorities, whether security or specialized, to guarantee the integrity and impartiality of international institutions and to counter the influence of the Houthis within them.

1.1. Members of the Secret Organization (First Group)

1. First person: Fouad Ali Al-Kohlani

Fouad Ali Al-Kohlani is currently a Senior Advisor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and advises the IMF Managing Director [1, 2]. His promotion to this senior advisory role warrants examination. The documents show that he previously served as Commercial Attaché at the Yemeni Embassy in Washington, D.C. from 2007-2011. [3]

More worryingly, Fouad Ali Al-Kohlani's father serves as assistant defense minister for the Houthi [4] group, which has been embroiled in a violent conflict with the legitimate Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition since 2015. In addition, most members of the extended Kohlani family hold leadership positions within the Houthi movement.

During the IMF's 2021 meeting with Yemeni Finance Minister Bin Breik [5], Fouad was present in his role to provide advice to the Director of the International Monetary Fund, raising legitimate concerns about conflicts of interest and potential bias. The IMF must address how a senior advisor oversees matters directly related to the legitimate government while it is in conflict with Fouad's father's extremist organization. Fouad's influence on IMF policy and decision-making processes concerning Yemen requires deeper review.

2. The second person: Safaa Ali Qasim Almoayad

Safaa Almoayad serves as a poverty and equity advisor at the World Bank [6, 7], a position that once again brings potential conflicts of interest. Her London-based cousin Ahmed Al-Moayad speaks out actively as a media representative for the Houthis [8], while her sister Nada is married to the owner of Prodigy, which is known to have provided support to the Houthis [9].

The nature of Safaa Al-Moayad's relationship with Fouad Al-Kohlani in terms of first- or second-degree relatives requires clarification, as any family ties would exacerbate conflicts of interest issues. Safaa allegedly helped Prodigy secure World Bank contracts, presumably benefiting her extended family and the Houthis. The World Bank must respond to these circulating allegations.

Attached is one of the documents of the Supreme Council for Relief of the Houthis regarding the emergency cash transfer project for Yemen funded by the World Bank and the assignment of Prodigy to evaluate

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
Ministry Of Planning & International Cooperation

Office:

Date: Nos:

مرفق 6

السيد/ ممثل منظمة اليونيسيف

بعد التحية :

الموضوع/ تسهيل تنفيذ شركة برودجي سيستمز للتقييم السريع لمستوى الفعالية المؤسسية والقدرة التشغيلية لصندوق الرعاية الاجتماعية في اليمن

بالإشارة إلى خطابكم رقم (291) بتاريخ 9 تشرين 2016م والذي تفيدون به أن مقدمتم وبالتعاون مع وزارة الشئون الاجتماعية والعمل وصندوق الرعاية الاجتماعية بصدد إجراء تقييم سريع لمستوى الفعالية المؤسسية والقدرة التشغيلية لصندوق الرعاية الاجتماعية .

وعليه .. نود الافادة بأنه تم مخاطبة الصندوق ومحافظي المحافظات وكذلك مكاتب وزارة التخطيط والتعاون الدولي بالمحافظات لسرعة اتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة لتذليل الصعاب أمام العاملين من شركة برودجي وتسهيل مهامهم.

هذا للعلم والإحاطة ..

وتفضلوا خالص تحياتنا

فؤاد عبدالله الكحلاني

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www.mpic-yemen.org

3. Third person: Angham Hassan Al-Shami

Angham Al-Shami holds a senior media position in the IMF's Communications Department [10, 11, 12]. Among her relatives are individuals who hold prominent positions within the Houthi security apparatus in Yemen [13].

Prior to joining the IMF, Angham served as Deputy Commercial Attaché at the Yemeni Embassy in the United States from 2009 to 2011,[14] under the direct supervision of Fouad Al-Kohlani, who was also a commercial attaché and then became the IMF's Senior Advisor in Washington.

Analysis of her digital footprint suggests that she may have implicitly supported Houthi propaganda efforts on social media during the peak of the conflict in Yemen [15]. Attached are the references to one of her accounts on platform X during the conflict, which was subsequently closed later.

Here, the IMF must address how such a politically connected person was appointed to a strategic communications role without following due legal procedures to vet potential conflicts. Her work requires a review of any dissemination of Houthi positions that undermine the IMF's independence and neutrality.

4. Fourth person: Ahmed Al-Shami

Ahmed Al-Shami serves as a spokesman and economic advisor to the Houthi militia [16, 17] while serving as executive director of the Arab Organization for Human Rights [18], ostensibly a neutral advocacy body registered in the United States. Evidence shows that this organization served as a façade facilitating Houthi engagement with international bodies such as the United Nations.

Al-Shami facilitates meetings and provides statements that help the Houthi cause through his dubious human rights and cooperative work group, the Arab Organization for Human Rights, known as "ARWA", registered in America in 2016 in Washington State [19, 20]. It also maintains close ties with other entities in the West that support Iran-backed propaganda.

He attends the meetings of the Human Rights Council in Geneva through this interface, and holds multiple meetings with members of parliaments in America, Britain and the European Union [21, 22, 23], and works closely with the UN envoy to Yemen through his representation of this organization despite being an official spokesman for the Houthis, which shows an exciting contradiction and international and international cover-up.

UN agencies and participating organizations must respond to allegations of engagement of parties with clear allegations of loyalty to one side of Yemen's ongoing internal conflict. These partnerships threaten the principles of neutrality and transparency and block humanitarian access.

Al-Shami also participates with a number of institutions that have been previously warned, which are considered soft hands for the Houthis in the West, such as DeepRoot for Raafat Al-Akhali, who faces legal

charges of infidelity from justice and refusal to attend the Marib court, and we note multiple activities with them in America and Europe and enter him on behalf of his American human rights organization, and also within the training courses for the Hikmat program of Al-Akhali's wife, Abeer Al-Mutawakel [(24)], as well as workshops and meetings [(25)] These institutions are working to embellish the image of the Houthi militia in the West, and here it is clear that they are linked to figures affiliated with the Houthi militia, and this shows hidden cooperation through various activities.

5. Fifth person: Muhammad Al-Wazir (has a name that may be nom de guerre Muhammad Reda Al-Wazir)

A Houthi leader for international coordination, and a founding partner with Ahmed Al-Shami of the Arab Organization for Human Rights "Arwa ARWA" [(previous reference 22)], where, as we mentioned earlier, they established it in America in Columbia County, Washington in 2016, and this center or organization is one of the soft Houthi hands and the face of public relations for the Houthis in America and within international organizations, whether in Warba or America. Among the relatives of the Houthi leaders is Ismail Ibrahim Al-Wazir, Deputy Minister of Justice of the Houthis [(26)]

Mohammed Al-Wazir participated in many meetings of the Human Rights Council in Geneva on behalf of the organization, as well as in partnership with an organization called the Iraqi Development Organization (IDO) and with the support of an organization called Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) [(27)].

In fact, in one of the meetings, coordination was arranged for Abdelqader Al-Murtada, a Houthi leader and the head of the prisoner file for the Houthis, to deliver a speech at the Human Rights Council via a recorded video on the internet [(28)], Al-Murtada is considered one of those responsible for torturing prisoners in Houthi militia prisons, with numerous testimonies from released prisoners confirming they were tortured by Abdelqader Al-Murtada [(29)]. This is a serious issue, involving corruption and the empowerment of a war criminal, as well as bias and manipulation against the legitimate government and the international community. Through this American human rights organization, which acts as a cover for the Houthis, Mohamed Reza Al-Wazir and Ahmed Al-Shami have managed to hold numerous meetings and facilitate the participation of Yemeni civil society organizations that support the Houthis in Geneva meetings, including the Insan organization [(previous reference 28)].

6. Sixth person : ARWA Activities Coordinator in Geneva (Yousra Al-Harazi)

Speaker and coordinator of activities in Geneva, Switzerland for the Arab Organization for Human Rights (ARWA) affiliated with Mohammed Reda Al-Wazir and Ahmed Al-Shami, US Houthi leaders. [(30)]

It also delivers speeches at the Human Rights Council in Geneva on behalf of the organization and other parties that follow, support or share them, but with a different name, such as the Iraqi Development Organization Iraq Development Organization (IDO) as well as Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) [(see previous reference 27)]

As mentioned earlier, Mohammed Reda Al-Wazir and Ahmed al-Shami participate in many meetings of the Human Rights Council in Geneva on behalf of the organization, while at the same time they are Houthi leaders with American citizenship, and of course along with Yousra Al-Harazi.

Overall, these cases demonstrate the strategic priority of infiltrating influential international platforms by placing sympathetic family members in positions of influence with conflicting interests. Their roles provide avenues for allocating resources, exerting pressure on soft power, and normalizing a rebel group that controls Yemen's capital through violence.

There is a need for robust reforms to strengthen ethical frameworks and prevent the political exploitation of international institutions. All organizations employing such individuals should conduct independent investigations to ensure neutrality and restore affected public trust. The humanitarian needs of the Yemeni people must take precedence over any political agenda. Additionally, the legitimate government and the Presidential Council must reconsider the representatives of legitimacy in international organizations and hold accountable those who covered up the presence of such individuals and how they contributed to supporting the Houthi militia throughout the war.

1.2. How they serve the militia

During the period (2015-2023), Yemen received up to $ 31 billion in humanitarian aid due to the war from international donors through international organizations and funds, but this figure unfortunately did not benefit the Yemeni people and was receiving crumbs from it, as well as expired or spoiled food, in light of large operational budgets for international organizations and their partners exceeding 50% in many projects, in addition to the clear complicity of these organizations with the Houthi militia, which enabled the Houthis to control all joints Projects related to these financings and benefiting from them and taking different percentages and manipulating the exchange rate of the Yemeni currency in partnership with these organizations and this service continued throughout these past years.

Here are some ways the individuals mentioned in the chapter can serve the interests of the Houthi militia through their roles in international organizations:

1.2.1. Providing inside information and advising:

Individuals can provide the Houthis with inside information and advise them on the policies and positions of employers, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United Nations. This helps the militia navigate interactions and opportunities for engagement and influence.

1.2.2. Directing Financial Resources:

These individuals may redirect financial resources from donor-funded projects and contracts to Houthi-linked individuals and companies such as Prodigy. This practice drains funds earmarked for humanitarian aid.

1.2.3. Use of pressure lobbying:

They can use their platforms to lobby unintended partners within the UN and NGOs, advance a narrative that legitimizes the Houthis as a governing authority, and softens their rebellious character.

1.2.4. Coordination of Public Relations and Publicity:

With the help of media and communications staff, these individuals can coordinate PR and publicity efforts. This would spread Houthi talking points while undermining the legitimate government.

1.2.5. Facilitation of meetings and participation:

They can facilitate the meetings and participation of individuals and other entities allied with the Houthis in UN and NGO operations and mechanisms, helping to expand the militia's international networks.

1.2.6. Audit deviation:

These individuals may divert scrutiny away from Houthi abuses and human rights abuses through biased advocacy and selective framing of issues that favor the militia's political agenda.

1.2.7. Undermining humanitarian access:

If involved in the implementation of the project, it could undermine humanitarian access and intervention monitoring, creating opportunities for revenue misappropriation, arms smuggling, and other illicit activities.

1.2.8. Utilization of Organizational Resources:

They can use organizational resources and travel privileges for purposes beyond their official responsibilities, such as intelligence gathering and logistical coordination.

1.2.9. Pressure regulators:

Finally, they may pressure organizations employing relatives to take positions aligned with Houthi interests. This can be done through implicit threats related to the safety of employees if their demands are not met.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this investigation uncovered deeply troubling evidence that individuals closely associated with the Houthi leadership were able to infiltrate key positions within important international humanitarian and financial organizations.

The presence of such politically affiliated Houthi militia personnel who serve in these roles fundamentally undermines the principles of independence, impartiality, and impartiality that these institutions are designed and relied upon to support. It creates legitimate doubts about the ability of international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and UN agencies to make objective and impartial assessments and decisions on Yemen.

If left unaddressed, this situation risks normalization with a rebel terrorist militia by abusing the multi-party programs of respected actors. It allows strategic political interests to replace the principles of justice, accountability and mitigation of civilian harm.

Moreover, the potential channels of Houthi influence over policies and resource flows provided by these conflicting roles raise serious questions about whether the humanitarian and protection priorities of the vulnerable Yemeni people are at risk to serve an armed terrorist group's political agenda.

Prompt and transparent investigations should be conducted to conduct a thorough review of possible misconduct, biases, and disputes in these cases. Strong reforms are also needed to close exploited gaps and prevent future position infiltration of organizations through rigorous examination of conflicts of interest and abuse of influence and functions. The actors of the legitimate government should reconsider their representatives in international organizations, funds and focal points, and conduct an audit and accountability for those who participated or covered such behavior, which negatively affected the legitimacy representing the Yemeni people.

Overall, restoring credibility and focusing on alleviating the suffering of Yemenis in accordance with humanitarian principles requires international organizations to take serious measures to ensure that their independence is never tarnished for political purposes. The consequences of inaction or poor response can further damage global humanitarian action at a time when integrity and trust are more vital.

Chapter TWO

Houthi Secret Organization in International Organizations and Funds

Introduction

Attached to the first chapter, this is a second chapter of a report that deals with a detailed analysis of a number of prominent Houthi figures who play pivotal roles in international and local institutions in Yemen, with a focus on the ways in which these figures serve the Houthi militia, as well as their influence on the decisions and policies of the institutions in which they operate. We willreview job roles, family relationships, and concrete examples of their influences on international funding and projects.

The chapter addresses the role of a number of personalities, one of the figures in the Public Relations and Communication Department at the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs in Sana'a (**UNOCHA**), where he facilitates communications, meetings and messages with UN organizations and local institutions, which promotes the interests of the Houthis in issues such as the Safer ship and the receipt of the alternative ship Nautica, and enables them to finance, employ relatives and coordinate for the benefit of the militia in projects. It also highlights two figures working to improve the image of the Houthis in the West through the They coordinate activities and reports with Mwatana and international human rights organizations to issue reports that distort legitimacy, in addition to participating in defending the Houthis in the meetings of the Human Rights Council in Geneva.

The chapter explores the role of a figure who acts as an audit and governance specialist at the World Bank, colluding with the Houthis to cover up financial corruption and manipulation of evidence, enabling them to obtain significant funding and manipulate the currency exchange rate on projects. It also addresses the role of a figure who oversees UNICEF's water, sanitation and sanitation projects, coordinating with the Houthis and corrupt people to implement ineffective and corrupt projects.

Finally, the chapter discusses the role of a figure working at the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, where he holds meetings and meetings with European ambassadors and the UN envoy, provides internal information and advice to them, facilitates meetings and participates in international conferences, and organizes conferences and meetings related to Yemen tribes and directs them to serve Houthi interests in a hidden way.

This chapter aims to highlight the conflicts of interest and misuse of international resources by these figures, and their impact on the humanitarian and economic situation in Yemen, while calling for measures to hold those involved accountable and ensure transparency in the management of international aid and projects.

2.1. Members of the Secret Organization (Second Group)

1. Seventh Person: Najib Ali Hassan Al-Mansour

Najib Ali Hassan Al-Mansour is the Director of Public Relations and Communications at the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Sana'a [33, 34, 35]. His role includes overseeing all communications, meetings, and messages, including those with international organizations and local institutions, and communicating with Sharia officials. The information we have obtained raises significant concerns about potential conflicts of interest and the safety of operations within the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in Sana'a.

Concerns center on the fact that some of al-Mansour's relatives hold prominent positions within the Houthi leadership. Specifically, Yasser Abdul Karim al-Mansour, who is mentioned as the head of the Houthi-affiliated General Investment Authority [36], was previously an accountant at Total in Sana'a. The main concern is that Najib al-Mansour is using his position at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to benefit the Houthi militia. Such as facilitating the replacement of the Safer with Nautica Keeping the two ships as an environmental threat to Yemen and the world in the hands of the Houthis, as well as facilitating the provision of funds, and enabling the Houthi militia to obtain two bombs in the middle of Yemeni territorial

waters and threatening the environment and Yemeni citizens. This is in addition to employing relatives in United Nations institutions and the Office of the United Nations Humanitarian Representative in Yemen, and working to coordinate projects and transfer data and information for the benefit of the Houthi militia.

The Department of Relations and Liaison at the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) plays a critical role in coordination and cooperation, both internally and externally. If this administration is infiltrated, it could undermine the entire operations of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Yemen in favor of the Houthi militia. Al-Mansour's involvement in serving the interests of the Houthi militia could mean dishonesty and abuse of his position for personal or militia gain.

A crucial question arises as to whether legitimacy officials are aware of Mansour's actions and affiliations. If not, this raises serious questions about oversight and accountability within the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and associated governmental and non-governmental bodies. The situation also indicates corruption and conflicts of interest within the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). It is important to determine whether the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has ignored these issues or whether there is any internal investigation. In addition, we have already published information on the Frodwicki platform about the doctorate degree that Al-Mansour obtained from a fake university [37], which further calls into question his credibility and qualifications for his position.

In summary, it is necessary to address several key concerns and questions: whether legitimacy officials are aware of al-Mansour's actions and affiliations with the Houthi militia; whether OCHA conducted any internal investigations into potential conflicts of interest and corruption related to al-Mansour and his relatives; the impact of al-Mansour's actions on overall humanitarian efforts and the integrity of OCHA's operations in Yemen; and whether OCHA verified al-Mansoor's educational qualifications; Under the claim that he holds a fake doctorate. Addressing these concerns is vital to ensure the transparency, accountability and effectiveness of humanitarian operations in Yemen. The situation calls for a thorough investigation and corrective action if necessary to maintain the integrity of the mission and operations of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

2. Eighth Person: Amiruddin Jahaf

3. Ninth Person: Ayman Al-Mansour

Amiruddin Jahaf [38] and Ayman al-Mansour, through Ensan [39], play an active role in promoting the Houthi agenda locally and internationally. This entity is closely linked to the Houthis and works to enhance their image in the West. Their efforts are in line with the activities and reports issued by Mwatana Organization led by Radhia Al-Mutawakel [40, 41]. Mwatana's reports often distort the legitimacy of the Yemeni government and reinforce the Houthi narrative. Jahaf and al-Mansour also coordinate their activities with the Arabic Organization for Human Rights, which is headed by Ahmed al-Shami and Mohammed al-Wazir.

In 2019, Ayman Al-Mansour participated in the 40th session of the Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva [42], defending the Houthis and condemning the Yemeni government. The event also included a speech by Abdul Qader Al-Murtada, a war criminal known for his involvement in the torture of prisoners, in which he addressed the Council via the Internet, in cooperation and coordination with Mohamed Reda Al-Wazir, founder of the Arabic Organization for Human Rights (**ARWA**).), whose name was mentioned in the report of the first part of this series of the secret organization of the Houthis in international organizations and funds.

Amir al-Din Jahaf, in addition to his role in Insan, is also a prominent Houthi leader. [See reference 38] It uses the organization as a front to promote the Group's goals under the guise of humanitarian and civil society work. Despite being detained in Marib earlier, Jahaf was released, continuing his activities unabated.

Ayman al-Mansour has a family relationship with Najib Ali al-Mansour, Director of Relations, Communication and Outreach at the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs (**UNOCHA**) in Sana'a. This relationship raises additional concerns about potential conflicts of interest and the extent of Houthi influence within international organizations. Najib Ali al-Mansour's involvement in humanitarian affairs, as mentioned earlier, further complicates the narrative, suggesting a potential network of influence that benefits the Houthis internally and externally.

There are also links to Amir al-Din Jahaf and activities through **the DeepRoot Foundation** and the Hikma program, which follows Raafat Al-Akhali and his wife Abeer Al-Mutawakel as well as Alaa Qassem, where **DeepRoot is** one of the soft hands of the Houthi militia, which opposed the classification of the Houthi militia as a terrorist group during the period of US President Trump. Unfortunately, this institution is practicing its activities in the areas of legitimacy and received million dollar funds in the name of peace and justice, and what is surprising is that its director Raafat Al-Akhali refuses to abide by the law that He claims and refused to attend the Marib court and is currently being tried as a fugitive defendant from justice and was informed through a number of judicial announcements on page 9 of the official September 26 newspaper [43]

Together, Al-Jahaf and Al-Mansour play an important role in promoting the Houthi cause, hiding their true intentions under the forefront of legitimate humanitarian efforts and international advocacy. Their actions and affiliations highlight the complex interplay between local conflicts and international diplomatic efforts, raising doubts about the integrity of some humanitarian and human rights organizations working in Yemen.

4. Tenth Person: Waleed Hamoud Ali Al-Najjar

Waleed Hamoud Ali Al-Najjar is an Audit and Governance Specialist in Public Financial Management at the World Bank in Washington [44, 45]. He is also responsible for writing project proposals and reviewing and issuing audited financial reports on project implementation in Yemen. However, his role carries a major conflict of interest, as his father, Hamoud Ali Al-Najjar, is a member of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank in Sana'a, which is affiliated with the Houthis [46]

Auditing international NGOs is critical to preventing corruption and fraud. However, some corrupt auditors collude with international organizations operating in Yemen and with the militia to cover up the looting of funds, allowing them to evade accountability for the misuse of public funds. In such cases, auditors become false witnesses, supporting the practices of Houthi militia members by manipulating evidence and fabricating financial statements without execution. Real audit procedures.

Vetting officials of international organizations loyal to the Houthi dynasty play a crucial role in this process. They are working tirelessly to expose the corruption of these organizations while at the same time covering up the Houthis' continued looting of aid funds. When there is a conflict of interest, these reports become tools to cover up corruption and ensure that funds continue to flow to the Houthi militias.

Waleed al-Najjar's involvement seems to be in line with this pattern, as it serves the interests of his father's Houthi militia. Examples of World Bank projects in Yemen, whether in agriculture or education, reveal that these funds went directly to the militias through UN organizations, and this is a major violation in addition to not entering through the Central Bank of the legitimacy in Aden, not to mention the manipulation of the currency exchange rate, which was calculated in these projects from 250 riyals to the dollar, while these projects seemed Some in 2015 and some in 2017 and continued to work for the Houthis until after 2021. [47, 48, 49, 50, 51]

Waleed al-Najjar is accused of covering up this corruption, either by reviewing or writing fabricated audit reports for international organizations operating in Yemen and the Houthi militia. His actions ignore the suffering of the Yemeni people, and hide the manipulation and looting of humanitarian aid funds, whether through huge operational budgets or by covering the manipulation of the currency exchange difference between the areas of legitimacy and the areas controlled by the militia, in addition to covering The Houthi

militia looted and seized tens of billions of dollars of money given to Yemen. This example highlights the broader issue of hacked audits, which enable the ongoing misappropriation of international aid by corrupt entities affiliated with the Houthi militia.

5. Eleventh Person: Ahlam Almutawakel

Ahlam Almutawakel has been working as UNICEF's Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Programme Officer since 2016 [52, 53 and 54] In this role, she oversees all WASH projects in Yemen, which have an annual budget of sometimes up to $200 million [55, 56]. Aden and the emergency sewage plant in Marib.

Al-Mutawakel's communications raise significant concerns about conflicts of interest and corruption. She has family ties to Taha Al-Mutawakel, the Houthi Minister of Health [57], and Radhya Al-Mutawakel, owner of the pro-Houthi Mwatana Foundation. In addition, Abeer Al-Mutawakel, Director of the Hikma Program and wife of Raafat Al-Akhali, Director **of DeepRoot**, who we have previously discussed in previous reports for his prominent role in serving the Houthi militia, in addition to the Deputy Chairman of the Anti-Corruption Commission of the Houthis Redan Al-Mutawakel [58] He is a relative of Ahlam as well as a brother of Redan Al-Mutawakel, and sources report his role in covering the corruption of UNICEF in many cases related to the corruption of water projects and health facilities associated with UNICEF.

Under the supervision of Ahlam Al-Mutawakel, the water and sanitation sector supports various projects run by the Houthis from Sana'a, including the Urban Cities Project linked to the Ministry of Water and Environment.

The minister of this ministry in the legitimate government is Tawfiq al-Sharjabi. The salaries of some of his close aides, as well as some employees in Aden, were found to be paid in dollars by Houthi sources in Sana'a. This has been reported since 2020 [59], and includes figures such as Munir al-Aghbari, Sharjabi's private secretary, and Arwa al-Hammadi, director of the Aden Urban Cities Project, whose salary is also paid from Sana'a. In addition, Tawfiq Al-Sharjabi was Undersecretary of the Ministry and used to go secretly to Jordan and give approval to the United Nations Special Plan for Water and Sanitation without the knowledge of the minister in the period (2017-2018).

6. Twelfth Person: Khaldoon Mohamed Al-Wajeeh Bakahail

Khaldoun Mohamed Al-Wajeeh Bakahil, a former student of Mohammed Azzan, founder of the Houthi Believing Youth Organization [60], is the Strategic Advisor and Senior Coordinator for Yemen at the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)[61, 62]. Bakhil's contacts with the Houthi leadership are extensive and significant [63]. He is also married to the daughter of Ahmed al-Kahlani, [64], who is the brother of Ali al-Kahlani, the Houthis' assistant defense minister. In addition, he is associated with Fouad al-Kahlani, senior adviser to the International Monetary Fund in Washington, and his uncles include prominent figures from the Hamdani family, such as Taha and Abdulhadi al-Hamdani [65].

Bakahil's background includes preparing him from a young age to support the Houthi cause, although presenting himself under a different guise to avoid suspicion. This connection was highlighted recently when his teacher Mohamed Azzan, founder of the Believing Youth Organization, appeared at a seminar in Jordan in

May 2024, organized by **DeepRoot**, led by Raafat Al-Akhali and his wife Abeer Al-Mutawakel, in partnership with the European Union and Alaa Qassem from Resonate Yemen [66], and this is not the first time that **DeepRoot**, organized and engaged with Houthi leaders, referred in the first part of this series to a seminar held with Ahmed Al-Shami, a Houthi leader and member of the Houthi Economic Committee, and DeepRoot Al-Shami appeared as the director of the Arabic Organization for Human Rights.

In his role at the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (**DCAF),** Bakahil meets with European ambassadors, the UN envoy, and even the Iranian ambassador to the IAEA [67, 68, 69, 70]. These meetings ostensibly serve multiple purposes, including coordinating public relations and publicity, facilitating strategic meetings, and providing internal advice and useful information to the Houthi group.

Furthermore, through the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (**DCAF),** Bakahil organizes conferences related to Yemeni tribes, which are often held in Switzerland [71] or Germany. These meetings are suspected of involving undeclared activities in support of Houthi interests. The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) **also has** partnerships with organizations such as **DeepRoot**, the Sana'a Centre for Strategic Studies, and the European Peace Institute (**EIP**), raising further questions about the extent of their involvement in Houthi-related activities.

There are significant concerns about the legitimacy and awareness of the Yemeni government and international stakeholders about these details. The fact that Khaldoun Bakhil, with his deep ties to the Houthi leadership, holds an important position at the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (**DCAF**) and participates in influential meetings, raises questions about potential collusion and oversight failures. It seems unlikely that European and American sources are unaware of Bakahil's background and affiliations, given his history with the founder of the Believing Youth Organization. This situation requires careful scrutiny to ensure that international aid is not undermined and that covert efforts to support Houthi agendas are not undermined by such individuals.

2.2. How did these elements use their influence and presence in international organizations to serve the Houthi militia?

These elements have strategically exploited their influence and presence within international organizations to support the Houthi militia through various complex means. Their positions allowed them to shape contacts and influence UN projects as well as influence and exploit the UN envoy to exert pressure on legitimacy, providing the Houthis with increased opportunities to secure support and assistance. Moreover, they have actively worked to improve the image of the Houthis in the Western world by cooperating with international human rights institutions and allying with organizations that I defended the Houthis in international forums. This concerted effort aims to portray the Houthis as legitimate and persecuted, promote international sympathy and support for their cause, and facilitate access to funding.

2.2.1. Formation of telecommunications and UN projects for the benefit of the Houthis

One of the mechanisms used by these elements included exerting influence on international communications and projects. Specifically, their positions within the Public Relations and Communications Department of the UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs in Sana'a have given them an important role in shaping UN communications and projects to align with Houthi interests. By capitalizing on their positions, they promoted the Houthi agenda, manipulated information reaching international bodies, and played a major role in improving the Houthis' image before the international community. In addition, they have facilitated Houthi access to humanitarian aid, ensuring it reaches them even at the expense of those most in need.

2.2.2. Enhancing the image of the Houthis in the Western world

Another way these elements have sought to advance the Houthi cause is by improving their image in the West. They established organizations in Western countries and participated in joint activities and reports with international human rights institutions. In intensive cooperation with organizations defending the Houthis in international forums, they aimed to improve perception of the Houthis as legitimate and oppressed. These concerted efforts have succeeded in mobilizing international sympathy and support for the Houthi cause.

2.2.3. Manipulation of financial audit and corruption coverage

These elements used tactics related to financial auditing and corruption cover-up. Notably, the World Bank's audit and governance specialist played a pivotal role in concealing financial corruption, manipulating reports on behalf of the Houthis , and covering up the corruption of international organizations in Yemen that participate and support the Houthis. As a result, this illegal exploitation has harmed funded projects and undermined Its intended objectives.

2.2.4. Misallocation of funds in the water and sanitation sector

In the area of funding, particularly in the water and sanitation sector, a UNICEF staff member played an important role in facilitating access to and monitoring of funds. Unfortunately, this official's involvement in coordination with the Houthis and corrupt individuals has led to the misallocation of funds allocated to water and sanitation projects. As a result, many of these projects have failed to achieve their desired goals due to the transfer of funds to the Houthis.

2.2.5. Hidden support and priority for the Houthi perspective in international coordination

A strategic advisor and senior coordinator for Yemen at the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCSG), which has close ties to the Houthi militia, has strengthened the Houthi position through undisclosed means. This person has used his role in international meetings and conferences to support the militia and promote its agenda in global forums. These measures have contributed significantly to strengthening the position of the Houthis and supporting them in the international arena. In addition, through the joint work between the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance **(DCAF**) and the European Peace Institute (**EIP), it** is necessary to look at the suspicious and security questionnaires distributed by the European Institute for Peace to the population and displaced persons in the legitimate areas through a project related to climate change. The European Institute's advisers loyal to the Houthi militia, such as Hisham al-Omeisy and Suad al-Salahi, should also be investigated.

2.3. UN envoy and failure to address Houthi violations

The UN envoy has always been complicit with the Houthis either by silence and failure to address the many violations committed by the Houthis. These violations include preventing the legitimate government from exporting crude oil, waging an economic war against legitimacy leading to a significant devaluation of the national currency, preventing the circulation of the national currency, and engaging in actions that have caused monetary division. The UN envoy's lack of response to these issues raises questions about his neutrality and commitment to addressing Houthi violations.

The role and efforts of the members of the Houthi secret organization are evident in international organizations and funds, where they exercise their roles to alleviate the suffering of the Houthi group. A clear example of this influence was also highlighted by the urgent letter sent by UN envoy Hans Grundberg to pressure legitimacy to stop the Central Bank's actions against their "spoiled son," the Houthis. This clearly shows how international influence is used to intervene in financial policies in favor of the Houthi movement, and highlights the significant role that pro-Houthi people play within global organizations in supporting and promoting Houthi interests.

United Nations
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

الأمم المتحدة
مكتب المبعوث الخاص للأمين العام للأمم المتحدة إلى اليمن

فخامة الدكتور رشاد العليمي
رئيس مجلس القيادة الرئاسي

10 تشرين/نوفمبر 2024

فخامة الرئيس،

أكتب إليك مجدداً هذا بأعلى درجات الاستعجال والقلق بشأن القرار الذي اتخذه البنك المركزي اليمني مؤخراً رقم 30 لعام 2024 الذي يقضي بتعليق تراخيص ستة بنوك وما تتبعه من تواصل مع البنوك المراسلة ونظام سويفت التي سيفضي في وقت وصول تلك البنوك إلى البنوك المراسلة ونظام سويفت.

إنني أقدر ما تتحمله الحكومة من مظالم اقتصادية منذ وقت طويل أكثرها ظهوراً وقف صادرات النفط الخام، لكنّ هذه القرارات الصادرة مؤخراً بشأن البنوك سوف توقع الضرر بالاقتصاد اليمني وتضاعف على اليمنيين البسطاء معاناتهم في كل أنحاء البلاد، وقد تؤدي إلى حظر التصنيف الذي قد يتيح مناخ إلى التمويل المصرفي.

من هنا، تقديراً لتكريس ضغوط إضافية خطيرة على الاقتصاد اليمني، ولمساعدة في الجهود الرامية لإطلاق الحوار، أحث الحكومة اليمنية والبنك المركزي اليمني على تأجيل تنفيذ هذه القرارات، على الأقل إلى نهاية شهر أغسطس/آب، كما أود أن أطلب إليكم إبلاغ هذا التأجيل إلى جميع البنوك المراسلة ونظام سويفت وتوجيههم بتأجيل أي إجراءات قد يكون لها تأثير سلبي في هذه البنوك المعنية.

أحثكم أيضاً على دعم البدء بحوار تحت رعاية الأمم المتحدة بين الأطراف اليمنية لمناقشة التطورات الاقتصادية التي وقعت مؤخراً في اليمن بهدف حلها بما يصب في مصلحة جميع اليمنيين وبما ينسجم مع الغاية والروح المشتركة للالتزامات التي اتخذت الأطراف اليمنية عليها، وسوف يرسل مكتبي إلى المستشارين المعنيين ضمن الحكومة اليمنية وكذلك ضمن البنك المركزي اليمني تفاصيل أكثر حول هذا الحوار بما فيها جدول الأعمال.

إنني أعول على دعمكم الكامل لضمان المضي قدماً بهذا الحوار لما فيه من مصلحة اليمنيين كافة والمحافظة على خارطة الطريق، كما أنني أتواصل مع أنصار الله أيضاً للحصول على التزامهم بهذا الحوار.

وتقبلوا فخامتكم فائق الاحترام والتقدير.

هانس غروندبرغ
المبعوث الخاص للأمين العام للأمم المتحدة إلى اليمن

نسخة:
محافظ البنك المركزي اليمني، البنك المركزي-عدن

In the current context, the swift actions of UN envoy Hans Grundberg to save the Houthis from decisions taken by the internationally recognized central bank resemble the actions of his predecessor, Martin Griffiths, who rushed to save the militia from losing the city of Hodeidah and its port in 2018. They have worked through the presence of some of the elements mentioned earlier, such as Ahmed Al-Shami, who works closely with the Office of the UN Envoy in forming and exerting pressure through it on the legitimacy and in the interest of the Houthi militia, and the latest example of this is the letter of the UN envoy to the legitimacy several days ago requesting the suspension of the procedures of the Central Bank in Aden [(72)]. This raises concerns about complacency by both the United States and the international community, as the Houthi militia's actions should have received more attention and scrutiny much earlier.

One of the most important basic points in the codes of conduct and ethics of the United Nations organizations, which must be avoided and written a commitment to that when hiring is what is related to conflict of interest, fraud and exploitation of the position [(73)], and here unfortunately all these wrong and unethical behaviors are represented by those who have been mentioned in this chapter for the second part as well as in the first part with the clarity of their support for the Houthi militia in light of the silence of the international organizations in which they work, but went beyond that to exert pressure from Before these organizations, as well as the UN envoy, the legitimate government must implement the agendas of the Houthi militia and intervene in its favor in order to alleviate it with the arguments of the humanitarian paper, which the United Nations does not remember except when the Houthi militia is in a crisis situation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this analysis highlighted the harmful roles played by many key individuals in facilitating the interests and agenda of the Houthi militia through their positions within international organizations and bodies. Instead of maintaining neutrality and integrity, some have exploited their roles to the militia's advantage and obscured its abuses. Their actions have directly undermined the integrity and objectives of institutions such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and development programmes. Close ties with the Houthi leadership also call into question whether neutral

humanitarian priorities are prioritized over partisan political goals. Such behavior threatens to severely damage aid effectiveness and trust in interventions.

Financial manipulation has exposed further concerns about diverting donor funds away from the targeted beneficiaries. This means that there are significant oversight lapses in recruitment, staff control and conflict of interest safeguards. The practices of these elements together indicate the deliberate infiltration of international mechanisms and their selection in ways that have strengthened the position of the Houthis. Urgent thinking is warranted to prevent the recurrence of these vulnerabilities from being exploited at the expense of the population.

It is clear that the lenient positions of UN agencies have allowed Houthi liaison networks to continue unchecked for a long time, enabling the Houthis to continue their futile war against the Yemeni people.

Looking to the future, it is necessary to take concrete steps to confront the recurrence of such crimes, maintain impartiality in practice in international institutions and restore the initiative to the legitimate Government. The interests of the Yemeni people should be the compass in all reform efforts and future justice for the Yemeni people suffering from this protracted disaster.

This also requires the presidency and the legitimate government to open the door for accountability and accountability for ministers and ministries concerned with dealing with international organizations, whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its ambassadors, as well as the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, the Ministry of Water and Environment, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and the Ministry of Human Rights, and also work to hold accountable the civil society institutions that appeared in this report and the previous report and work in areas of legitimacy such as DeepRoot . And Resonate Yemen, Sana'a Center and Mwatana, and contributes to supporting the militias and participating with figures loyal to the Houthis in organizing many international events in addition to their support for the Houthis by mobilizing efforts to reject and cancel decisions that may lead to the classification of the Houthi militia among the terrorist groups, always invoking the "humanitarian situation of the Yemeni people."

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4	https://www.26sep.net/index.php/local/58584-2023-06-10-17-38-57
5	https://www.pmo-ye.net/post/1013
6	https://live.albankaldawli.org/ar/event/2023/ending-gender-based-violence-10-year-retrospective
7	https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099013503152313290/p1778260aba0620db0af78080c35c07432d
8	https://x.com/ahmd725971/status/1799557304657862816
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10	https://www.imf.org/ar/News/Articles/2024/01/23/pr2421-omn-imf-executive-board-concludes-2023-article-iv-consultation-with-oman
11	https://www.linkedin.com/in/angham-al-shami-33521915/
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13	https://www.alyoum8.net/posts/93787
14	https://www.linkedin.com/in/angham-al-shami-476a1415/
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19	https://arwarights.org/unhrc
20	https://www.salary.com/research/company/arabian-rights-watch-association-overview
21	https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/9358080/labour-mp-anti-semitism-storm/
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30	https://thewallwillfall.org/2016/03/18/yemen-saudi-led-coalition-destruction-of-heritage-and-history/
31	احد روابط حملة #لن_نصمت #وين_الفلوس التي تناولت سلسلة أقارب قادة الحوثيين في المنظمات الدولية على **الفيسبوك** (**facebook** : https://www.facebook.com/share/p/kkYjF7PxhMgnMH4x/?mibextid=oFDknk)
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36	https://www.21sep.net/110064/
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38	https://www.almasirahnews.com/71834/
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41	https://www.mwatana.org/reports-cat/reports
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44	https://blogs.worldbank.org/ar/team/w/wlyd-alnjar
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47	https://ewsdata.rightsindevelopment.org/files/documents/29/WB-P150129_86Ov1La.pdf
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49	https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/302021469158916195/2015-bedpii-auditors-report-and-financial-statements
50	https://www.gafspfund.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/PAD2319-PAD-P162659-PUBLIC-for-RVP-FINAL-CL.pdf
51	https://documents.albankaldawli.org/ar/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/424591468320724806/2014-audit-report-second-basic-education
52	https://www.zoominfo.com/p/Ahlam-Al-mutawakel/-1176445881
53	https://www.facebook.com/mc.yemen.gov/posts/pfbid0Hn1ciUsmoRWvKYA1o6DnpoaSuJj9E7ovZzdMXqsvzBY12zy1jSVKe9yCF1HAiprWl

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57	https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3348789.htm
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73	https://www.unhcr.org/media/unhcr-code-conduct-and-explanatory-notes

Part Two

Chapter Three

Power and Camouflage in The Houthi Security and Intelligence Service (HSIS)

"Structural and Strategic Analysis of Roles and Threats"

Introduction

This chapter aims to provide a perception and analysis of the security and intelligence Service of the Houthi militia based on information and documents collected over several years from reliable sources dedicated to serving Yemen. The data submitted until the beginning of 2023 was audited **and also tracked via open sources on websites and campaign publications such as** (#لن_نصمت #وين_الفلوس), **as well as reviewing previous reports of the FraudWiki** platform to the subject ensuring accuracy and reliability in the context of the complex situation facing the country.

The Houthi militia is one of the main armed factions in Yemen, having established its own security and intelligence apparatus as a means of consolidating its power and asserting control over the areas it governs and after carrying out numerous information-gathering operations and surveys to identify loyalists and opponents. This requires understanding the structure and operational modalities of this service and is critical to assessing the threats posed by militias to local, regional, and international security.

It is important to note that the Houthi militia often rotates personnel in key positions to maintain operational security and camouflage. This practice is essential to prevent the disclosure of its strategies and reduce the risk of infiltration or intelligence gathering by rival factions or external entities. By systematically changing the roles of key individuals, the militia creates an impression of stability and authority while ensuring that sensitive information remains protected., in addition to camouflage to ensure that individuals or transnational companies affiliated with it that engage in illegal activities such as arms smuggling and recruitment in international wars are not tracked.

This chapter will shed light on the names and roles of some individuals within the Houthi security and intelligence apparatus, and provide insight into their backgrounds, relationships, and operational activities. Each section will address how these individuals contribute to the militia's overall strategy, as well as the repercussions of their actions on the security landscape in Yemen and beyond and the issues of forced abductions, torture, and killings.

3.1. Overview of the Houthi Security and Intelligence Service

The Houthi militia established its own security and intelligence apparatus in 2016, in response to the escalating conflict and the need for a coherent security apparatus. This initiative marked an important step in the militia's efforts to consolidate its authority and assert control over the territory it occupies in Yemen. This represents an important step in its efforts to consolidate its authority and enhance its operational capabilities. This agency was created in response to Yemen's increasingly complex and volatile political landscape.

3.1.1.Initial processes and structure

Initially, the Houthi Security and Intelligence Service **HSIS** operated under a veil of secrecy. The militia issued decisions through the so-called Revolutionary Committee, which was formed to centralize power and streamline decision-making processes. This approach allowed the Houthi leadership to maintain tight control over intelligence operations while minimizing the risk of exposure to external and internal adversaries.

The Houthi security and intelligence apparatus is a critical element of the militia's strategy to consolidate control and overcome the challenges posed by a multifaceted conflict. Through a combination of secrecy, personnel rotation, and strategic alliances, the militia aims to enhance its operational capabilities while managing perceptions both domestically and internationally. Understanding the dynamics within this apparatus, particularly the roles of key figures and the creation of companies that follow the militia abroad through individuals affiliated with the militia and the security apparatus and their connections.Centers or councils established at home such as the Supreme Council for Humanitarian Affairs (**SCAMCHA**) or the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (**HOCC),** as well as their affiliations with organizations such as the Arab Organization for Human Rights (**ARWA**) or Ensan Organization, are essential to understanding the broader implications of the Houthi militia's actions in Yemen and beyond.

3. 1.2. Unification of security services

In 2019, the militia took another step by merging all existing security agencies, such as political security and national security, under the authority of the NISS. With these other agencies remaining in their structure and functions but under the authority of the Security and Intelligence Service and people being transferred from one location to another within this structure, this unification reflects the militia's strategic approach to strengthening its control over the security scene in Yemen. The analysis process ofmerging different security functions into one agency illustrates several implications:

1. **Central Command Structure**: By integrating the various security agencies, the Houthi militia has created a centralized command structure that allows for more effective decision-making and resource allocation. This simplification enables the militia to respond quickly to security threats and coordinate its operations more efficiently.
2. **Enhanced surveillance and intelligence capabilities**: Standardization facilitates a comprehensive approach to intelligence gathering and surveillance. With the consolidation of multiple security functions, the militia can more effectively monitor potential threats, including dissent among the population and the activities of rival factions.
3. **Improved operational coordination**: The concentration of security operations promotes better coordination between different units. This integration ensures rapid intelligence exchange and action, thereby enhancing the overall effectiveness of security measures.
4. **Strategic resource management**: Integration allows for a more strategic allocation of resources, including personnel, technology, and finance. The militia can deploy its forces based on the threats assessed, increasing its operational effectiveness.

3.1.3. Modes of operation

The Houthi security and intelligence service uses different operational methods to achieve its objectives , and by looking at this and anticipating the methods, we find the following:

- **Intelligence** gathering: Using both human and signal intelligence, the device collects information on potential threats, including monitoring communications and conducting surveillance on individuals and groups.
- **Surveillance and monitoring**: The service has developed extensive surveillance capabilities to monitor dissent, using technology and human resources to track activities and individuals deemed a threat.
- **Interrogation and coercion**: The militia is notorious for using aggressive interrogation tactics and intimidation tactics to extract information from detainees, reflecting its ruthless approach to maintaining control.
- **Coordination with other actors**: The Houthi militia often cooperates with other organizations and entities to enhance its intelligence capabilities and expand its influence, both domestically and internationally.

The structural analysis and operations of the Houthi security and intelligence service illustrates a sophisticated and strategic approach to governance and security. By uniting the various security services and empowering key individuals in their ranks, the militia is consolidating its control over the territory it occupies. Understanding the dynamics within this service, including the roles and operational modalities of key figures, is essential to understanding the broader implications of the Houthi militia's actions in Yemen and the surrounding region.

3.2. Organizational Structure of the Houthi Security and Intelligence Service

The Houthi security and intelligence apparatus is organized into a hierarchical structure that allows for the efficient management and coordination of various security operations. This structure aims to facilitate both internal and external intelligence activities, and to ensure that the militia is able to respond effectively to threats and maintain control over the territory it occupies. Through the documents we obtained, we have tried to develop a vision of the main organizational structure of the Authority, both at the level of leadership, agents and consultants (**Document 1**), as well as to develop a vision for the departments, departments (**Document 2**) and divisions of the Authority.



Document 2: Designing a structure for the departments in the security and intelligence apparatus of the Houthi militia (by sorting documents and data)



Document 1: Designing the command structure in the security and intelligence apparatus of the Houthi militia (through sorting documents and data)

3. 2.1. The main components of the structure

1. **Leadership Team**:

   At the top of the hierarchy is a leadership team consisting of senior officials responsible for overall strategic decisions. Included in the agency's head, deputy, Undersecretaries and consultants, this team usually includes individuals with strong loyalties and ties to the movement's leader, as well as military backgrounds and experience in intelligence operations.

2. **Operational Divisions**:

   The Security and Intelligence Service is divided into several operational sections, each of which is entrusted with specific responsibilities related to intelligence gathering, surveillance, enforcement, foreign operations, espionage, and political parties and organizations, etc. We have classified the first part of the main departments into 20 departments initially (**see document 2**) and come under them small departments and then divisions, and the main sections include the following:

   - **Internal intelligence operations**: Monitor internal threats, including opposition and potential opposition activities within Houthi-controlled territory.
   - **Foreign intelligence operations**: focuses on gathering information on foreign adversaries and international developments that may affect the strategic interests of the militia. In addition to working to create commercial entities that constitute a cover for the actions of the outlaw militia.
   - **Counterintelligence**: Engaging in measures to prevent infiltration and espionage by rival factions or foreign intelligence agencies.
   - **Surveillance operations**: Conduct surveillance of key individuals, opposition movements, and other potential threats to Houthi control.
   - **Political Parties and Organizations:** Collecting information about the political activities of international and local parties, organizations and organizations, including their plans, strategies, and orientations. Monitoring activities and reporting to act according to the analysis of information, and this may include recommending abductions of individuals in parties, organizations, independent activists or the media.

3. 2.2. Main Persons

1. AbdulHakim Hashem Ali Al-Khiwani

- Head of the Security and Intelligence Service of the Houthi militia with the rank of major general, and he is one of the leaders who are very loyal to the leader of the Houthi group
- His first official appearance appeared through a decision of the militia's Revolutionary Committee No. 207 dated July 2016, where he was appointed as Deputy Minister of Interior (**Document 3**), and this is the same time that the Security and Intelligence Service was secretly formed and he was the head of the service from that secret period until its announcement in 2019.
- It seems that the appointment to the Ministry of Interior was a cover operation carried out by the militia so that al-Khaiwani could form the apparatus and select individuals loyal to the militia, whether in the Ministry of Interior or other agencies.



الجريدة الرسمية العدد الرابع عشر (الجزء الرابع) الصادر بتاريخ ٢٦/ شوال/١٤٣٧هـ الموافق ٢٦/ يوليو/٢٠١٦م

قرار رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا رقم (٢٠٧) لسنة ٢٠١٦م

بتعيين نائب لوزير الداخلية

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا،

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية،

وعلى الإعلان الدستوري الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٥/٢/٦م عن اللجنة الثورية العليا.

وعلى القانون رقم (١٥) لسنة ٢٠٠٠م بشأن هيئة الشرطة.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري بالقانون رقم(٢٢) لسنة١٩٩٢م بشأن المعاشات والمكافآت للقوات المسلحة والأمن وتعديلاته،

قـــــــــرر

مادة(١) يعين اللواء / عبدالحكيم هاشم علي الخيواني نائباً لوزير الداخلية.

مادة(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر بمقر اللجنة الثورية العليا بالقصر الجمهوري – بالعاصمة صنعاء

بتاريخ ٢٢/ شـــوال /١٤٣٧هـ

الموافـق ٢٧ / يوليـو /٢٠١٦م

Document 3: Decision to appoint Abdulhakim Al-Khaiwani as Deputy Minister of Interior by the Houthi Revolutionary Committee in 2016

2. Abdulqader Ahmed Qasim Al-Shami

- AbdulQader Al-Shami was appointed as deputy head of the agency and the rank of major general in 2016 secretly and then appeared publicly with the announcement of the formation of the agency in 2019, and there is recent information that he was transferred to another job or assigned to a task in addition to his work
- AbdulQader Al-Shami is believed to be related to the entity formed by the Houthi militia in February 2024 and named the Humanitarian Operations **Coordination Center (**HOCC) [(1)], along with Ahmed Hamed, director of the office of Mahdi Al-Mashat, who is named head of the militia council, **and HOCC is** the responsible entity when ships are threatened in the Red Sea.
- There are many relatives of AbdulQader Al-Shami who work in international organizations, which may have a role in recruiting them to serve the militia, whether obtaining information or by directing funds or working to beautify the militia in the West, including Angham Al-Shami, the liaison officer of the International Monetary Fund in Washington, as well as Ahmed Al-Shami, director of the Arab Organization for Human Rights, which is one of the hands of the Houthis in the West and its office in America and in partnership with Mohammed Reda Al-Wazir And those whom we mentioned in the reports of the secret organization of the Houthis in international organizations and funds [(2 and 3)] and how it also made it easy for Ahmed Al-Shami to appear as a neutral person from institutions such as **DeepRoot** for Raafat Al-Akhali as well as **the Hikma program** for Abeer Al-Mutawakel, wife of Al-Akhali.

3. Ahmed Muhammad Yahya Hamed (Abu Mahfouz):

- Ahmed Hamed is the director of the office of Mahdi al-Mashat, head of the Houthi militia's political council since they took control of Sana'a until now.
- Ahmed Hamed first appeared in an official decision of the militia in 2016 as a member of the Media Committee of the Political Council by Decree No. 17 of 2016 (**Document 4**).
- He is considered the de facto ruler of the militia and the representative of the leader of the Houthi group, and he is the main supervisor of all councils and committees formed by the Houthis, and he is considered the main supervisor of the Supreme Council for Humanitarian Relief (**SCAMCHA**) of the Houthi militia, which was recently abolished and the international cooperation sector was included in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (**Document 5**) and this aims to obliterate all corruption and operations in which **(SCAMCHA**) participated during the last period
- He is also the first official, according to various sources, for the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (**HOCC)** with AbdulQader Al-Shami.

The Humanitarian Operations **Coordination Center (HOCC**) is responsible for threatening ships in the Red Sea, and it also coordinates with maritime companies that seem to take royalties to ensure that they are not hit even if they have nothing to do with what they claim, and as we mentioned in **the report of the sinking of the #الباخرة_روبيمار** in April 2024 [(4)] that the Houthi militia has deals with international mafias, whether to dump hazardous waste at sea or sink ships that are expirible, and here is another deal related to insurance, so The militia created this entity or center and made an official formula for it to be able to communicate with companies and organizations and make deals under its cover.

Among the tasks of this center (**HOCC**) is "to abide by Islamic teachings and comply with international humanitarian law and other relevant international laws and conventions in a manner that does not conflict with the interests of the Republic of Yemen or harm them." **.... Is this true and did the militia adhere to this statement?**

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة الخارجية والمغتربين
دائرة المراسم

الرقم: ١٤/٥٠/٢٩٩٥
التاريخ: ٢٠/٤/١٤٤٦هـ
الموافق: ٢٠٢٤/١٠/٩م

تُهدي وزارة الخارجية والمغتربين للجمهورية اليمنية أطيب تحياتها إلى مكتب المنسق المقيم للأمم المتحدة والبرامج والوكالات العاملة تحت مظلة الأمم المتحدة ومكتب المبعوث الخاص للأمين العام للأمم المتحدة إلى اليمن ولجنة اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر والمنظمات الدولية الحكومية وغير الحكومية العاملة بصنعاء:

وتود الإشارة إلى أن القرار الجمهوري رقم (10) لسنة 1446هـ بشأن تحديد الأهداف والمهام والاختصاصات العامة والهيكلية التنظيمية الرئيسية لوزارة الخارجية والمغتربين، بتوجيه تم إلغاء المجلس الأعلى للإدارة وتنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية والتعاون الدولي، وتم انتقال قطاع التعاون الدولي إلى وزارة الخارجية والمغتربين، باعتبار الوزارة هي القناة الوحيدة للتواصل.

كما تود الإشارة إلى قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (8) لسنة 1441هـ بشأن القواعد الحاكمة لعمل الأمم المتحدة والوكالات والبرامج والصناديق التابعة لها والمنظمات الدولية العاملة في الجمهورية اليمنية، هي كالتالي:-

أولاً: باللغة العربية:

1. إلتزام كافة المنظمات العاملة في الجمهورية اليمنية بما نص عليه الدستور اليمني وعلى وجه الخصوص المادة الثالثة منه والتي تنص على أن (الشريعة الإسلامية مصدر جميع التشريعات).
2. احترام قواعد السلوك وخصوصية المجتمع اليمني وعاداته وتقاليده.
3. أن تكون المساعدات المقدمة من المنظمات وفقاً لاحتياجات البلاد والمناطق الأشد تضرراً وفقاً للحالات الطارئة.
4. عدم تجاوز أي منظمة للأولويات والأهداف المعتمدة والنطاق الجغرافي المسموح به الذي يحدد عمل المنظمات الدولية والمؤسسات ذات العلاقة بالأمم المتحدة وصلاحها.
5. تنظيم التعامل والتخاطب مع كافة المنظمات فيما له علاقة بالإشكالات التي يمكن أن تطرأ وكذا الملاحظات حول عملها عبر وزارة الخارجية والمغتربين، والتأكيد على إلتزام الحكومة اليمنية بالمواثيق والمعاهدات الدولية الموقع عليها وبالأخص ما يتعلق بالحقوق الممنوحة للأمم المتحدة ومنظماتها وبرامجها ووكالاتها وبما لا يتعارض مع المصلحة العليا للبلاد.

ثانياً: باللغة الإنجليزية:

1. Commitment of all organizations operating in the Republic of Yemen to what is stipulated in the Yemeni Constitution, especially Article 3, which states that (Islamic Sharia is the source of all legislation).
2. Respecting the rules of conduct and the privacy of Yemenis society, its customs and traditions.
3. That the aid provided by organizations be in accordance with the needs of the country and the most affected areas according to emergency situations.

Document 5: Circular canceling (**SCAMCHA**) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Houthi militia to international organizations in Yemen in October 2024



الجريدة الرسمية العدد الثامن عشر الصادر بتاريخ ٢٨/ ذو الحجة/١٤٣٧هـ الموافق ٣٠/ سبتمبر/٢٠١٦م

قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١٧) لسنة ٢٠١٦م
بشأن تشكيل اللجان الإستشارية التخصصية للمجلس السياسي الأعلى

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى:
بعد الإطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.
وعلى الإتفاق السياسي الموقع بين أنصار الله وحلفائهم والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وملحقاته بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م.
وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.
وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.
وبعد موافقة المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

قـــــــــرر

المادة (١): تشكل لجان إستشارية تخصصية للمجلس السياسي الأعلى على النحو التالي:

أولاً: اللجنة الإستشارية الاقتصادية، وتشكل من الأخوة التالية أسماؤهم:

١- د. عاتق سالم الأحول ٢- صالح علي صالح شعبان
٣- أحمد عبدالعلي أحمد الشامي ٤- د. قائد عائض العميثلي
٥- حسن عبدالله يحيى الصعدي ٦- أمين إسماعيل الشيباني

ثانياً: اللجنة الإستشارية السياسية، وتشكل من الأخوة التالية أسماؤهم:

١- عبدالملك عبدالله محمد العجري ٢- يحيى محمد السياغي
٣- مجاهد مجاهد القهالي ٤- يونس هزاع الشيباني

ثالثاً: اللجنة الإستشارية الإعلامية، وتشكل من الأخوة التالية أسماؤهم:

١- أحمد محمد يحيى حامد ٢- طارق محمد الشامي
٣- عبدالله علي صالح صبري ٤- أحمد الحبيشي

- ١٢ -

Document 4: Decision to appoint Ahmed Hamed as a member of the media committee of the Houthi militia in 2016

4. **AbdulSalam Salah Ahmed Fleita**

- AbdulSalam Salah Ahmed Fleita is an important player in the militia's external operations. He is the official spokesman of the militia abroad and their representative in international negotiations and meetings (**Document 6**)
- While his civil name is registered, he uses the code name **Mohamed AbdulSalam** for operational security. (**Document 7**) It also coordinates the supply of funds or weapons to the militia and smuggles it through multiple networks and companies under the cover of commercial, investment and transport companies, assisted in organizing by Ahmed Shami and AbdulMalik Al-Ajri.
- His responsibilities include:
  - **Coordination with key figures**: Close cooperation with Hassan al-Kahlani and Abdulwahid Abu Ras (external operations of the Security and Intelligence Service) as well as Ahmed al-Shami to align Houthi interests abroad. This cooperation enhances the militia's ability to manage its international relations and operational objectives.
  - **Intelligence and logistics**: Assist in the logistical planning of operations that may take place outside Yemen, and ensure the smooth flow of resources and information to support Houthi objectives.

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة الداخلية
مصلحة الجوازات والهجرة والجنسية
الإدارة العامة للتخطيط والإحصاء والمعلومات
مركز المعلومات

صالحة بيانات لـ جواز سفر عادي برقم 08505000

محل الإصدار	صنعاء	تاريخ الإصدار	2015/05/13
حالة الوثيقة	سارية	تاريخ الانتهاء	2021/05/13
رقم الطلب	0024000210382	تاريخ الطلب	2015/05/13
نوع الطلب	تجديد	رقم الاستمارة	5073338

نوع الهوية	جواز سفر عادي
رقم الهوية	2050912
محل الإصدار	صنعاء
تاريخ الإصدار	2011/05/18
تاريخ الانتهاء	
نوع الوثيقة السابقة	جواز سفر عادي
رقم الوثيقة السابقة	52050912
اسم وفي الأمر	

الاسم	عبد السلام صلاح احمد
اللقب	فليته
الجنس	ذكر
الديانة	---
تاريخ الميلاد	1987/04/02
محل الميلاد	أرض - صنعاء
اسم الأم	فاطمة محمد أحمد
الجنسية	يمنية
الحالة الاجتماعية	متزوج

Document 7: Civil Registry of AbdulSalam Salah Ahmed Fleita

قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٢٩٩) لسنة ٢٠١٨م
بشأن تشكيل الوفد الوطني لمشاورات جنيف

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى،
بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.
وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين الحضور
والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.
وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي
وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٩
مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.
وعلى موافقة رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى.
وبعد التشاور مع القوى الوطنية المواجهة للعدوان.
وبما تقتضيه المصلحة الوطنية العليا.

قرر

مادة (١) يشكل الوفد الوطني لتمثيل الجمهورية اليمنية في مشاورات جنيف
النحو التالي:
١- عبدالسلام صلاح أحمد فليته
٢- جلال نفلي علي الرويشان
٣- خالد سعيد محمد الديني
٤- عبدالملك عبدالله محمد الحجري
٥- غالب عبدالله مسعد مطلق
٦- حميد رمضان أحمد عاصم
٧- سليم محمد نعمان المقدشي
٨- إبراهيم عمر سالم حجري
٩- مشاك نصر محسن عنوي
١٠- عبدالمجيد ناجي قائد الحنشي
١١- عبدالملك حسن نفلي الحجري
١٢- يحيى علي صالح نوري
مادة (٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره ويشر في الجريدة الرسمية.
صدر برئاسة الجمهورية - بالعاصمة صنعاء
بتاريخ ٢٢ / ذي الحجة /١٤٣٩هـ
الموافق ٣ / سبتمبر /٢٠١٨م

Document 6: Decision to appoint AbdulSalam Fleita as head of delegation at the 2018 Geneva meetings

5. **Abdulwahid Naji Mohammad Abu Ras**

- One of the Houthi leaders who do not appear much and his work is surrounded by high secrecy, and since the beginning of the formation of the Security and Intelligence Service in 2016 he was appointed Undersecretary for Foreign Operations Affairs
- Abu Ras, who is in charge of external operations, plays a crucial role in coordinating the Houthi militia's activities beyond its borders. His responsibilities may include:

- **Intelligence** gathering: Gather information on foreign adversaries and potential allies to inform Houthi strategies.
- **Cross-border operations**: Managing operations that extend to neighboring areas, particularly in the Horn of Africa, where militias are known to engage in arms smuggling and other illicit activities. Such as drug trafficking and even secret coordination operations to dismantle the diplomatic front of the Yemeni embassies abroad affiliated with the legitimacy
- **Networking**: Establish contacts with international actors that may support the Houthi agenda or facilitate operational capabilities.

– Under the management of Aburas comes the Department of Foreign Operations, which is run by Hassan al-Kahlani, and it is likely that al-Kahlani became an undersecretary instead of Aburas to devote Abu Ras to organizing operations in the Horn of Africa.

6. Hassan Ahmed Hassan Al-Kehlani

– As overseeing external operations, Kahlani's position is vital to managing the militia's international engagements. Currently, it is likely that he became an undersecretary of the Security and Intelligence Service for foreign operations instead of Abdul Wahid Aburas, and in 2019 he was awarded by the militia the Order of Courage by Resolution No. 174 **(Document 8**) with Hassan Al-Marrani, one of the undersecretaries of the Security and Intelligence Service.

– His involvement in external operations includes:

- **Arms** procurement: Coordinate the acquisition of weapons and military supplies through illicit networks.

- **Drug trafficking**: Oversee links to drug smuggling operations that may finance Houthi military activities.
- **Operational planning**: Develop strategies for carrying out operations abroad, ensuring that they align with the militia's broader military and political objectives.
- **Coordination with individuals in international organizations and funds:** International coordination processes are based on external operations through individuals within these organizations to cover the crimes of the militia or facilitate the arrival of funds or provide them with information and beautify the militia, and as we mentioned in the reports of the secret organization of the Houthis in international organizations and funds there are members of relatives of Houthi militia leaders who occupy senior positions and are relied upon, including Fouad Ali Al-Kahlani (previous reference 2) He is the Senior Consultant of the International Monetary Fund and is a relative of Hassan Al-Kahlani and also Fouad'S father is one of the militia leaders and the assistant of the Houthi defense Minister

– Hassan Al-Kahlani, as we mentioned, is likely to be currently an agent of the agency for external operations and was previously the director of the agency's branch at Sana'a airport, and also in 2020 he was appointed the staff of the third region of the militia, and a lot of information indicates that he is in Iran, in addition to that he attended with AbdulSalam Fleita as well as Abdul Malik Al-Ajri one of the rounds of negotiations in Riyadh. Recently, Al-Kahlani was placed on the US Treasury sanctions list (5)



الجريدة الرسمية العدد الثامن عشر الصادر بتاريخ ١/ صفر/١٤٤١هـ الموافق ٣٠/ سبتمبر/٢٠١٩م

قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١٧٤) لسنة ٢٠١٩م

بشأن منح وسام الشجاعة

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى:

بعد الإطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الإتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين انصار الله وحلفائه والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري بالقانون رقم (٤١) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الأوسمة.

وعلى القانون رقم (٦٧) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة في القوات المسلحة والأمن.

ولما قاموا به من دور بطولي وتقديراً لشجاعتهم ومواقفهم وصمودهم وذودهم عن الوطن وسلامة أراضيه.

قـــــرر

مادة (١) يمنح الأخوة الضباط التالية أسماؤهم وسام الشجاعة وعددهم (٤):

١- اللواء/ الحسن علي عامر المراني.

٢- اللواء/ حسن أحمد حسن الكحلاني.

٣- العميد / مبخوت علي سالم طعيمان.

٤- العميد / حسن إسماعيل علي المؤيد.

مادة(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة الجمهورية – بالعاصمة صنعاء

بتاريخ ٢٤ / محرم /١٤٤١هـ

الموافق ٢٤ / سبتمبر / ٢٠١٩م

Document 8: Resolution to award Hassan Al-Kahlani and Al-Hassan Al-Marani the Order of Al-Shajaa from the Houthi militia

7. **Amer Ali Amer Al-Marani and his brother Al-Hassan and Mutlaq Al-Marani**

When the political and national security services were merged with the **HSIS**, some leaders changed in their positions, but the structure of the structure seems to have remained the same, and people from Military Intelligence were transferred to the service, so through the documents and data that were available, their transfers can be tracked from one location to another, such as Amer Al-Marrani.

- Amer Al-Marani was in Military Intelligence and was assigned as part of the team to investigate the killing of Saleh Al-Samad, head of the political council of the Houthi militia in April 2018 (**Document 9**)
- Then he was appointed in October 2019 as governor of Al-Jawf (**Document 10**), and in April 2021, another governor of Al-Jawf was appointed in his place and he was appointed Minister of Transport, and currently he was transferred to a new position that appears within the agency, which is a major general within the militia.
- His brother Al-Hassan Ali Amer Al-Marani (Civil Registry **Document 11**), It was falsely rumored that he was killed in Al-Jawf and who was appointed in 2018 as an undersecretary of the agency for internal security affairs, and before that he was appointed by the militia as an undersecretary for political security, which was merged with the Security and Intelligence Service, and he was the head of the investigation team into the killing of Al-Samad in April 2018 (**Document 12**), and he was also given the medal of the Houthi militia in September 2019 with other people (**previous document 8**), including Hassan Ali Hassan Al-Kahlani

- His brother Mutlaq Amer Al-Marrani is likely to be currently an agent of the Internal Security Agency for Internal Security Affairs instead of his brother Al-Hassan, and Mutlaq is included in the Security Council sanctions list since September 2022 [6]



الجريدة الرسمية العدد الثامن الصادر بتاريخ ١٤/ شعبان/١٤٣٩هـ الموافق ٣٠/ ابريل/٢٠١٨م

٦- العميد / عامر علي عامر المراني الاستخبارات العسكرية

مادة (٢) يتولى الفريق القيام بفتح تحقيق سريع وعاجل في حادثة استهداف رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى ومرافقيه اثناء تواجده في محافظة الحديدة يوم الخميس الموافق ٢٠١٨/٤/١٩م من قبل طيران العدوان والرفع بنتائج التحقيق في أقرب وقت ممكن.

مادة (٣) للفريق في سبيل إنجاز ما كلف به الاستعانة بمن يراه.

مادة (٤) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية

صدر برئاسة الجمهورية - بالعاصمة صنعاء

بتاريخ ١٤ / شعبان /١٤٣٩هـ

الموافق ٣٠ / إبريل /٢٠١٨م

Document 9: The decision to appoint Amer Al-Marrani to the investigation committee into the killing of Saleh Al-Samad, then Al-Marrani was in Military Intelligence



الجريدة الرسمية العدد الثامن الصادر بتاريخ ١٤/ شعبان/١٤٣٩هـ الموافق ٣٠/ ابريل/٢٠١٨م

قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٤٤) لسنة ٢٠١٨م

بشأن تشكيل فريق للتحقيق في استهداف رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى الشهيد/ صالح علي الصماد ومرافقيه

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى:

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين أنصار الله وحلفائهم والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

وعلى القانون رقم (١٣) لسنة ١٩٩٤م بشأن الإجراءات الجزائية.

وعلى القانون رقم (١٢) لسنة ١٩٩٤م بشأن الجرائم والعقوبات.

وعلى القانون رقم (٤٠) لسنة ٢٠٠٢م بشأن المرافعات والتنفيذ المدني.

وبناءً لما تقتضيه المصلحة العامة.

قـــــــرر

(المادة ١) يشكل فريق للتحقيق في حادثة استهداف رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى الشهيد / صالح علي الصماد ومرافقيه من الأخوة التالية أسماؤهم:

العميد/ الحسن علي عامر المراني	وكيل جهاز الأمن السياسي	رئيسا
اللواء/ حسن أحمد الهيج	محافظ محافظة الحديدة	عضوا
اللواء/ حسن أحمد محمد قباس	وكيل مساعد للأمن الجنائي	عضوا
العميد/ فؤاد محمد حسين جراوش	الأمن السياسي	عضوا
العقيد/ أحمد صلاح مشقي	مدير جهاز الأمن القومي	عضوا

-٥-

Document 12: Decision to appoint Hassan Al-Marrani as head of the investigation team into the killing of Saleh Al-Samad in 2018

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة الداخلية
مصلحة الجوازات والجوازات والجنسية
الإدارة العامة للتخطيط والإحصاء والمعلومات
مركز المعلومات

صفحة بيانات لـ جواز سفر عادي برقم 03861263

محل الإصدار	صنعاء	تاريخ الإصدار	2010/04/21
حالة الوثيقة	غير صالحة	تاريخ الانتهاء	2016/04/21
رقم الطلب	012000003018168	تاريخ الطلب	2010/04/20
نوع الطلب	تجديد	رقم الاستمارة	2537680

الإسم	الحسن علي عامر	نوع الهوية	بطاقة شخصية آلية
اللقب	المراني	رقم الهوية	01010097447
الجنس	ذكر	محل الإصدار	الأمانة
المهنة	طالب	تاريخ الإصدار	2006/05/17
تاريخ الميلاد	1989/01/01	تاريخ الانتهاء	2016/05/16
محل الميلاد	اليمن - الجوف	نوع الوثيقة السابقة	جواز سفر عادي
إسم الأم	فاطمة سعيد علي طليان	رقم الوثيقة السابقة	02939490
الجنسية	يمنية	اسم ولي الأمر	
الحالة الإجتماعية	أعزب		

المدير العام / القنصل

Document 11: A copy of the civil registry of Hassan Marrani



الجريدة الرسمية العدد التاسع عشر الصادر بتاريخ ٦/ صفر/١٤٤١هـ الموافق ١٥/ أكتوبر/٢٠١٩م

قرار جمهوري رقم (١٠٦) لسنة ٢٠١٩م

بتعيين محافظ لمحافظة الجوف

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى:

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين أنصار الله وحلفائهم والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

وعلى القانون رقم (١٩) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة المدنية ولائحته التنفيذية.

وعلى القانون رقم (٤) لسنة ٢٠٠٠م بشأن السلطة المحلية ولائحته التنفيذية.

وعلى القانون رقم (٣) لسنة ٢٠٠٤م بشأن مجلس الوزراء.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٥٦) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تشكيل حكومة الإنقاذ الوطني وتسمية أعضائها وتعديلاته.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (٢٣) لسنة ٢٠٠١م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية لوزارة الإدارة المحلية.

وعلى عرض وزير الإدارة المحلية.

قـــــــرر

(المادة ١) يعين الأخ / عامر علي عامر المراني محافظا لمحافظة الجوف.

(المادة ٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة الجمهورية - بالعاصمة صنعاء

بتاريخ ٧ / صفر /١٤٤١هـ

الموافق ٦ / أكتوبر / ٢٠١٩م

Document 10: Decision to appoint Amer Al-Marrani as Governor of Al-Jouf in 2019

8. Qasim Ahmed Qasim al-Hamran (Abu Ahmed)

- Qassem Ahmed Qassem Al-Hamran was in the Security and Intelligence Service and is still hidden, and the militia appointed him in July 2019 as Deputy Minister of Local Administration (**Document 13**), and he is one of the most loyal leaders of the leader of the Houthi group and is considered one of the first generation,
- Qassim al-Hamran was responsible for the secret field surveys of the Houthis in a number of governorates in 2013, which were aimed at collecting information on loyalists and opponents of the Houthi group, and his name appeared in the survey files for Al-Bayda governorate, and it is clear according to the data and structure in force in some documents that Al-Hamran was a supervisor and governor of Al-Bayda secretly in 2013. (**Documents 14 and 15**)
- Sana'a University gave Qasim Ahmed Al-Hamran a doctorate degree in February 2022 [(7)] This also shows the militia's targeting and distortion of education in Yemen and the fact that its leaders obtain higher degrees that they do not deserve.
- Relatives of Al-Hamran and his nephews as well, including 7 who are present in the **HSIS** and have positions within the departments and departments of counter-terrorism, investigations, the economic department and ports (such as AbdulHakim Al-Hamran, Ibrahim Al-Hamran, AbdulRahim Al-Hamran, Taha Al-Hamran, AbdulMalik Al-Hamran) and there is the director of the **HSIS's** branch in Saada, Hassan AbdulRahim Qasim Al-Hamran.

Document 15: From the 2013 Houthi Surveys File The Secret Work Structure of the Houthi Militia in Al-Bayda Governorate

Document 14: From the 2013 Houthi surveys file, Qassim Ahmed Qasim Al-Hamran, supervisor of Al-Bayda Governorate



Document 13: Decision to Appoint Qassim Ahmed Qassim Al-Hamran as Deputy Minister of Local Administration of the Houthi Militia 2019

9. Qasim Qasim Ahsan Ali Al-Hamran(Abu Kawthar)

- Qasim Qasim Ahsan Ali Al-Hamran is a relative of Qasim Ahmed Al-Hamran, and is currently the commander of the militia's support and support brigades, which were formed in 2020 and Al-Hamran appeared in 2022 as the commander of these battalions and was given the rank of major general.[(8),]

- The Support and Support Brigades are a jihadist formation of the militia and are built as a reserve force entrusted with combat missions on fronts that are not limited in geographical scope. It has adopted a slogan for itself in which symbols of sectarian ideology are sanctified, adapted from the slogans of entities affiliated with Iran and groups loyal to it. Its formation is part of the formation of other ideological forces established by the militia over the past years as parallel forces under its kinetic composition and linked to its leader.
- Al-Hamran moved between several organizational and leadership positions, from deputy head of the militia's executive office until the end of 2019, then supervisor and deputy minister of education for the militia in 2021, and then appeared in 2022 as commander of the militia's support and support battalions.
- Also, Sana'a University gave Qasim Qasim Al-Hamran a doctorate degree in December 2023 (9)

10. Ahmed AbdulAli Ahmed Al-Shami

- Ahmed Al-Shami holds American citizenship, and as soon as the Houthi militia took control, he returned from America and was appointed in 2016 as a member of the Economic Committee of the Houthi militia by Resolution No. 17 (**document 16**). He was also considered one of the official spokespersons of the militia in many international television interviews (10)
- He is considered the special commercial coordinator for the business and companies that belong to the militia and AbdulSalam Fleita, arranging for them, coordinating for their

registration in countries outside Yemen, coordinating with the individuals who own these companies, which are engaged in illegal activities such as smuggling weapons and many equipment to the Houthi militia, in addition to working on the control of the militia's subsidiaries over many commercial sectors such as medicines, spare parts, etc., as he holds American citizenship, he moves to Europe from Britain, Switzerland and Germany to America and even the east Asia, also used as a cover for the American Human Rights Center, which is affiliated with him and Mohamed Reda al-Wazir, the "Arab Organization for Human Rights (**ARWA**)" registered in America. (11)

- Through tracking and as we mentioned in the reports of the secret organization of the Houthis in international organizations and funds (previous reference 2 and 3), Ahmed Al-Shami shows himself as a neutral person and his cooperation in that institutions work with organizations (such as **DeepRoot** , Hikma Program for Raafat Al-Akhali and Abeer Al-Mutawakel) and participates and attends international meetings as the director of the Arab Organization for Human Rights (**ARWA**) (12) In doing so, he also works close to the UN envoy to Yemen. This, in turn, plays an influential role in directing the policies and decisions of the UN envoy in favor of the Houthi militia, and it is possible to mention the example of the pressure exerted by the UN envoy to stop the procedures of the Central Bank in Aden in July 2024.



قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١٧) لسنة ٢٠١٦م
بشأن تشكيل اللجان الإستشارية التخصصية للمجلس السياسي الأعلى

المجلس السياسي الأعلى:

بعد الإطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الإتفاق السياسي الموقع بين انصار الله وحلفائهم والمؤتمر الشعبي العام ومشتقاته بتاريخ ٢٨/٧/٢٠١٦م.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٦/٨/٢٠١٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته .

وبعد موافقة المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

قـــــــــرر

(١) تشكل لجان إستشارية تخصصية للمجلس السياسي الأعلى على النحو التالي:

أولا: اللجنة الإستشارية الاقتصادية، وتشكل من الأخوة التالية أسماؤهم:

١- د. عاتق سالم الأحول
٢- صالح علي صالح شعبان
٣- أحمد عبدالعلي أحمد الشامي
٤- د. قائد عائض العميثلي
٥- حسن عبدالله يحيى الصعدي
٦- أمين إسماعيل الشيباني

ثانيا: اللجنة الإستشارية السياسية، وتشكل من الأخوة التالية أسماؤهم:

١- عبدالملك عبدالله محمد العجري
٢- يحيى محمد السياغي
٣- مجاهد مجاهد القهالي
٤- يونس هزاع الشيباني

ثالثا: اللجنة الإستشارية الإعلامية ، وتشكل من الأخوة التالية أسماؤهم:

١- أحمد محمد يحيى حامد
٢- طارق محمد الشامي
٣- عبدالله علي صالح صبري
٤- أحمد الحبيشي

- ١٣ -

Document 16: Decision to appoint Ahmed Abdulali Ahmed Al-Shami to the Economic Committee of the Houthi militia 2016

The organizational structure of the Houthi Security and Intelligence Service (**HSIS**) is designed to support a range of operations, both domestically and internationally. By appointing key figures such as AbdulWahid Naji Muhammad Abu Ras, Hassan al-Kahlani, AbdulSalam Salah Ahmed Fleita, and Ahmed al-Shami to critical roles, the militia ensures its ability to effectively gather intelligence, manage security threats, and conduct operations that advance its strategic objectives. Understanding this structure is essential to analysing the militia's capabilities and continued influence in the region, particularly in the context of Creating multilateral companies engaged in arms smuggling and illicit activities that undermine regional stability. In addition to influences at various levels in the corridors of the United Nations and its organizations.

3.3. Military promotions to Ensure loyalties

Since the Houthi militia entered Sana'a in 2015 and through its Revolutionary Committee, it has worked to infiltrate the various security and military agencies and through recommendations from the leaders of the Houthi security and intelligence service, many individuals in these bodies have received rapid promotions, illegal or not based on hierarchy and work, which reflects the militia's focus on loyalty and operational effectiveness. These promotions are crucial to maintaining morale and ensuring that loyal individuals and leadersBy directing the security efforts of the militia. The decisions for promotion included hundreds of personalities (attached a number of documents for the decisions of promotions as examples (**documents 17 and 18**) and we mention the main figures who were promoted and introduced to the Security and Intelligence Service and occupy key positions within it as undersecretaries of the service as follows:

- **Tariq Mohammed Ahmed Yahya Al-Hadi**: Al-Hadi was promoted to the rank of major general in 2017. (**Document 19**) His rise in ranks and positions indicates the extent of loyalty to the militia and its importance within the militia's military structure..
- **Mohammed Abbas Abdullah Mohammed Amer**: Amer has been promoted to the rank of brigadier general and has maintained this rank since 2017. (**Document 19**), he is currently the agency's undersecretary for financial and administrative affairs, and his firm position reflects his established role within the militia, indicating that he has significant responsibilities in overseeing various operations..

قرار رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا رقم (٢١٥) لسنة ٢٠١٦م
بالتعيين في القوات المسلحة برتبة المقدم

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا،

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الإعلان الدستوري الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٥/٢/٦م عن اللجنة الثورية العليا.

وعلى القانون رقم(٦٢) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة في القوات المسلحة والأمن.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري بالقانون رقم(٣٣) لسنة١٩٩٢م بشأن المعاشات والتكافات للقوات المسلحة والأمن وتعديلاته.

وعلى عرض القائم بأعمال وزير الدفاع.

قـــــــرر

مادة(١) يعين الأخوة التالية أسماؤهم في القوات المسلحة برتبة المقدم وعددهم(١٢) فرد وهم:

١- زيد علي احمد الحذيفي
٢- احمد عبدالرحمن المزي
٣- احمد محمد حسن محمد عصيوران
٤- إبراهيم عبدالله حسين المؤيد
٥- محمد حسين عبدالله الحمران
٦- حسين محمد احمد الحاكم
٧- فاضل احمد احمد حامد احمد فليته
٨- صالح احمد علي حامس حسين الشرقي
٩- صلاح مهدي محمد مهدي كعيت
١٠- عادل احمد عبدالله عبدالله الكومي
١١- علي احمد احمد حامد فليته
١٢- عقيل محمد عباس احمد المؤيد

مادة(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر بمقر اللجنة الثورية العليا بالقصر الجمهوري – بالعاصمة صنعاء
بتاريخ ٢١/ شـــوال /١٤٣٧هـ
الموافق ٢٦ / يوليـو /٢٠١٦م

Documents 17 and 18: Models of Military Promotion Decisions from the Revolutionary Committee for Houthi Militia Loyalists 2016



قرار رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا رقم (٢٤٧) لسنة ٢٠١٦م
بالتعيين في القوات المسلحة

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا ،

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الإعلان الدستوري الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٥/٢/٦م عن اللجنة الثورية العليا.

وعلى القانون رقم(٦٧) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة في القوات المسلحة والأمن.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري بالقانون رقم(٣٣) لسنة ١٩٩٢م بشأن المعاشات والتكافات للقوات المسلحة والأمن وتعديلاته.

قـــــــرر

مادة(١) يرقى الأخوة التالية أسماؤهم في القوات المسلحة بالرتب الموضحة قرين اسم كل منهم وعددهم (٢٨).

م	الاسم	الرتبة
١	فارس مجاهد احمد الصباري	عميد
٢	احمد احمد عبدالله الشماك	عقيد
٣	عبدالسلام محمد عبدالرحمن محمد القعمري	عقيد
٤	راجح محسن احمد الجرادي	عقيد
٥	عبدالله صالح الظفري	عقيد
٦	حسين يحيى حمود دغيش	رائد
٧	علي ناصر علي الجرنتي	رائد
٨	عمار حسن علي رسام	رائد
٩	شايف ضيف الله صالح مريط	رائد
١٠	عبدالرحمن احمد يحيى الشوري	رائد
١١	احمد صالح احمد علي صبر	رائد



قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٩٣) لسنة ٢٠١٧م
بالترقية بوزارة الداخلية

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى،

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين أنصار الله وحلفائهم والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

وعلى القانون رقم (١٥) لسنة ٢٠٠٠م بشأن هيئة الشرطة.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري بالقانون رقم (٣٣) لسنة ١٩٩٢م بشأن المعاشات والتكافات للقوات المسلحة والأمن وتعديلاته.

قـــــــرر

مادة(١) يرقى الاخوان التالية اسميهما إلى الرتب المحددة قرين اسم كل منهما بوزارة الداخلية.

* العقيد/ محمد عباس عبدالله محمد عامر يرقى إلى رتبة العميد.
* المقدم / طارق محمد أحمد يحيى الهادي يرقى إلى رتبة العقيد.

مادة(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة الجمهورية - بالعاصمة صنعاء
بتاريخ ١٩ / ذي الحجة/١٤٣٨هـ
الموافق ١٠ / سبتمبر /٢٠١٧م

Document 19: Promotion decision for Mohammed Abbas Amer and Tariq Al-Hadi from the Houthi militia 2017

3.4. Kidnapping and coercive tactics

The Houthi militia has gained notoriety for using kidnapping and coercion tactics as tools of repression and control within the territory it occupies. These actions are part of a broader strategy to stamp out dissent, intimidate potential dissent, and instill fear among the population. The militia's tactics are emblematic of its approach to governing in a conflict-torn environment where any opposition or criticism is met with swift and often brutal reprisals.

3.4.1. Abduction of journalists, civil society activists and employees of organizations

The militia has been involved in numerous kidnappings targeting journalists, activists, civil society leaders and even employees of organizations. These individuals are often seen as posing a threat to the Houthi narrative or potential sources of information that could undermine the militia's authority or affect its interests.

1. **Media targeting**: Journalists are particularly vulnerable to kidnapping as the Houthi militia seeks to suppress independent reporting and control the flow of information. By silencing journalists, the militia can shape public perception and limit the exposure of its actions, including human rights violations and abuses. Numerous reports have emerged detailing the arrest of journalists who have written critical reports on Houthi activities, often leading to their detention under harsh conditions.

2. **Activists and civil society leaders**: The militia also targets activists who participate in peaceful protests, human rights advocacy, or celebrations of the proclamation of the republic. Many of these individuals are abducted during demonstrations or raids on their homes, with the intention of silencing voices challenging Houthi authority. The threat of violence against these individuals serves as a deterrent to others who may consider speaking out against the militia. One of the most prominent examples is the kidnapping of several people last September while trying to celebrate the September 26 revolution.

3. **Employees of international and local organizations**: The militia also targeted the employees of local as well as international organizations operating in the areas under its control, and the fact that these kidnappings are not new, but occurred from the end of the year 2020 in light of the silence applied by the organizations whose employees were kidnapped, and the intensity of these kidnappings increased at the end of 2023 as well as in the current year 2024, which led to the exposure of these kidnappings to the world and also began to show the complaint of international organizations about these methods despite their silence about them at the beginning, and this indicates To identify these organizations with what the militia has been doing for years and to remain silent about it, and this in turn encouraged the Houthi militia to practice kidnapping more

3.4.2. The case of Hisham Al-Hakimi as a model

One of the most well-known cases that exemplify the Houthi militia's brutal tactics is **that of Hisham al-Hakimi**. His story highlights the extreme measures the militia is willing to take against perceived enemies:

- **Arrest and detention**: Houthi security and intelligence forces arrested Hisham al-Hakimi, for reasons unknown at first, but with time information began to emerge stating that al-Hakimi opposes many corruption cases within the organization in which he works, which is **Save the Children** , and his criticism of the organization's way of dealing with the militia and the facilities provided to the militia at the expense of needy families, and according to our sources, the director of the organization, called (**Rama Hansra**), is the one who reported him to the Houthi Security and Intelligence Service.[13] of the Child's Rule His arrest was not an isolated incident, but part of a systematic crackdown on dissenting voices within organizations.

- **Torture and ill-treatment**: During his detention, al-Hakimi was subjected to severe torture and inhuman treatment. Reports indicate that he was physically abused, psychologically tortured and other ill-treated designed to extract confessions or intimidate him to silence him. The brutality of his treatment underscores the militia's disregard for human rights and the rule of law.

- **Extrajudicial killings**: Tragically, al-Hakimi's ordeal culminated in his death in custody [14] and is a stark reminder of the dangers faced by those who oppose the Houthi militia. This incident drew significant international condemnation and highlighted the need for accountability for such violations.

3.4.3. Coercive tactics beyond kidnapping

In addition to abduction, the Houthi militia uses a variety of coercive tactics to maintain control over the population, including:

1. **Intimidation**: The militia uses threats and intimidation as tools to deter dissent. Individuals who express opposition to Houthi policies or actions often face harassment, threats of violence, or even kidnapping. This climate of fear stifles political opposition and suppresses civil society participation.

2. **Targeting families**: The militia not only targets individuals, but often expands its coercive tactics to include their families. Arresting or harassing a family member can act as a powerful deterrent to others, forcing them to remain silent out of fear for their loved ones.

3. **Public trials and confessions**: The Houthi militia is known to hold public trials of detainees, using these events as propaganda tools. Coerced confessions are often presented to legitimize the militia's actions and portray opponents as criminals or traitors.

4. **Use of informants**: The militia employs a network of informants to monitor activities within communities. This surveillance creates a culture of mistrust among citizens, as individuals fear reporting their conversations and actions to the authorities.

The Houthi militia's tactics of kidnapping and coercion illustrate a systematic approach to maintaining control and suppressing opponents and critics in Yemen. By targeting journalists, activists, and civil society leaders and employees of organizations, the militia seeks to eliminate any opposition, expose its corruption, or attempt to curb such corruption in relation to international funding.and instilled a climate of fear. Hisham al-Hakimi's case serves as a chilling reminder of the extreme measures the militia is willing to use to silence critics and assert its dominance. Understanding these tactics is critical to understanding the broader implications of the Houthi militia's actions on human rights and political freedoms in Yemen.

Chapter Four

"Structural and Strategic Analysis of Roles and Threats"

4.1. Cover companies and arms smuggling

The Houthi militia, through the **HSIS**, has established a network of companies under the cover of secrecy and camouflage that operate in sectors seen as legitimate, such as spare parts, cosmetics imports, general trade, investment, transportation, and tourism. However, these businesses are often used as fronts for arms smuggling and other illicit activities, allowing the militia to generate revenue while concealing its true operations. This strategy highlights the militia's adaptability and ability to exploit existing economic frameworks to support its military objectives.

4.1.1. Establishment of coverage companies

The militia's approach involves the creation of various companies ostensibly engaged in legitimate business activities. These companies are often strategically designed to deflect scrutiny from authorities, international organizations , and sanctions committees. The main characteristics of such coverage companies include:

1. **Legitimate façade**: By operating in sectors such as cosmetics, textiles, general trading, tourism, and transportation, these companies appear legit on the surface. This interface allows the militia to conduct business without actual oversight, thereby facilitating its operations without major outside interference.
2. **Registration outside Yemen**: Many of these companies are registered outside Yemen, especially in the Sultanate of Oman. This practice serves multiple purposes:
   - **Legal Shield**: Registering companies abroad provides a kind of legal protection and complicates the ability of international authorities to track and prosecute illegal activities.
   - **Evasion of sanctions**: By acting outside the jurisdiction of Yemeni law, the militia can circumvent sanctions against individuals and organizations associated with its activities.
3. **Use of different names**: Companies often operate under different names and are occasionally changed to camouflage and ensure dispersion of follow-up and monitoring, further obscuring their true nature. While they may present themselves as separate entities , many are owned by the same individuals or connected through complex networks , allowing for seamless coordination between them.

4.1.2. Examples of some of the companies that have been monitored:

There are, of course, several companies formed by the militia and through the Security and Intelligence Service and in coordination with Ahmed Shami, the militia's foreign trade coordinator, in order to serve its goals, whether controlling trade in general and oil and gas trade in particular, in addition to using these companies in arms smuggling operations and naming some of them under companies importing cosmetics, spare parts, transportation and general trade. Companies outside Yemen, especially in the Sultanate of Oman and in the Salalah region, are also registered under a new name, and it may be the same name as the owner of the company in Sana'a with the partnership of others or in the name of a new owner who is coordinated with him, who is mainly a loyalist of the militia or worked with them in the security and military services.

4.1.2.1. Mohammed Saleh Al-Shami Import Company

- The company was registered in Sana'a in 2020 in the name of Mohammed Saleh Al-Shami and under the activity of importing accessories, cosmetics, cars and their spare parts **(document 20)**
- Registration is carried out for companies outside Yemen and in particular in the Sultanate of Oman under another name and with the same owner who owns the company in Sana'a with the partnership of others, where Muhammad Saleh Al-Shami established another company (**Sky Line for Transport and Business**) in the Sultanate of Oman in Salalah with **a 1395058 registration number** and was registered in 2021 and in partnership with his brother AbdulHakim and another person. **(Document 21)** Of course, the company, according to its tracking, is engaged in several activities registered in its commercial register **(Document 22),** and it is also clear that the company's register in the Sultanate of Oman has not been renewed, as it ended in August 2024, and this indicates that the militia and its partners may work as a new camouflage for another company under another name to avoid follow-up and accountability.

Mohammed Saleh Mohammed Al-Shami is one of the prominent individuals associated with this network of covered companies. His role in this business is important for several reasons:

- **Ownership and management**: Al-Shami co-owns and manages several companies, providing the militia with a vital operational base. Its connections and knowledge of business operations facilitate the militia's ability to engage in multiple deals while maintaining a veneer of legitimacy.

- **Network expansion**: The use of al-Shami and others like him allows the militia to expand its business network, establishing contacts with suppliers, customers, and international markets. This network is crucial for the militia to acquire weapons and other materials for its operations.

Document 20: Registration of Mohammed Saleh Al-Shami Company in Yemen 2020

Invest Easy استثمر بسهولة
One Stop Shop المحطة الواحدة

شهادة السجل التجاري
Commercial Registration Certificate

Sultanate of Oman

CR Number 1395085
رقم السجل التجاري 1395085

Partnecard Members/Authorized Managers
أسماء الشركاء/أعضاء مجلس الإدارة

Name MOHAMMED SALEH MOHAMMED AL SHAMI
الإسم محمد صالح محمد الشامي
Nationality: Yemen
الجنسية: اليمن
ID Number: 122590874
رقم الهوية: 122590874
Passport No.: 07884684
رقم جواز السفر: 07884684
Designation: Limited Liability Partner
الصفة: شريك محدود المسؤولية
Registration Date: 14-09-2021
تاريخ التسجيل: 14-09-2021
Num. and Perc. Shares: 4450 (89.000%)
عدد ونسبة الحصص: 4450 (89.000%)

Document 21: Registration of Mohammed Saleh Al Shami Company in the Sultanate of Oman in 2021 under the name of Sky Line for Transport and Works





Document 22: Sky Line Company data of Mohammed Saleh Al-Shami in the Sultanate of Oman (the commercial registration that expired in August 2024 was not renewed)

4.1.2.2. Al-Jabri General Trading and Investment Company (Abdulwali Abdo Hassan Al-Jabri) Arms deals and recruitment operations

The Houthi militia is also involved in arms deals and recruitment operations that advance its military objectives. This aspect of the militia's operations highlights its reliance on local and international networks to secure the weapons and personnel needed for its ongoing conflicts.

- **Background**:
  - Abdulwali Abdo Hassan Al-Jabri is a prominent member of the House of Representatives from the session 2003 [15] and a leading figure within the Houthi militia. His influence extends beyond politics, and during the war he was appointed by the Houthi militia as commander of the 115th Infantry Brigade with the rank of brigadier general, which plays a crucial role in the militia's military operations. However, he was sentenced to death in 2020 in absentia by the legitimate government.for his role in militia activities **(Document 23),** indicating the serious legal implications of his involvement.
  - His nephew Jamil Hazza Abdo Hassan al-Jabri was appointed with the same general of operations staff and is currently a member of the Houthi Shura Council.
  - His brother AbdulWahed Al-Jabri was appointed in 2018 by the militia in the Ministry of Interior and was also **promoted (Document 24)** and was a security supervisor in Al-Misrakh in Taiz Governorate and contributed to the introduction of the militia to Taiz, then a security supervisor in Sabr District in Taiz Governorate.
  - Abdulwali al-Jabri then moved to the Sultanate of Oman in coordination with AbdulSalam Fleita, the militia's representative, as well as AbdulMalik al-Ajri and Ahmed al-Shami, the militia's commercial coordinator.
  - According to tracking through open sources, we found that Abdulwali Al-Jabri has two companies registered in Sana'a, one in the name of Abdulwali Al-Jabri for import and the

second in the name of Abdulwali Al-Jabri for Travel and Tourism (**Document 25**), and it seems that their data was hidden from the commercial registration number and the date of establishment by the Houthi militia and they may work at a later stage to delete this data after publishing this report.

- In 2022, Al-Jabri General Trading and Investment Company was established in the Sultanate of Oman in Salalah under a commercial registration number 1450240 (**Document 26**), and the company operates under several diverse commercial activities, all of which are activated according to Document (**Document 27),** and according to our sources, the company focused on working secretly in smuggling weapons and concluding arms deals for the militia with several countries, including Russia.

- **His company's participation**: Al-Jabri Company, **Al-Jabri General Trading and Investment**, is involved in arms deals, showing how business operations can be intertwined with military targets. This company serves as a front for obtaining weapons and military supplies needed for the militia's ongoing campaigns. The involvement of a political figure in the arms trade blurs the lines between governance and military activities, further complicating Yemen's security landscape.
- **Recruitment efforts**: Recently, Al-Jabri was linked to recruitment efforts involving Yemenis in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and a photo of one of the contracts for recruiting Yemenis in this conflict was leaked to the platform via Al-Jabri (**Document 28).** This refers to a strategy in which the militia seeks to take advantage of external conflicts to strengthen its ranks, recruiting individuals who might seek work or venture into military roles.
- The name of Al-Jabri Company has also appeared recently in several international reports, including what was issued yesterday by the Center for Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project **(OCCRP)** in Britain that the company contributed to the recruitment of a number of Yemenis in the Russian-Ukrainian war [(16),] and many videos appeared during the past days of these recruits, who were upset with the situation and talking about that they went as security guards and not to participate in the war and that their dues were not paid as agreed. (This falls under human trafficking.)



قرار جمهوري رقم (٨٠) لسنة ٢٠١٨م
بالتعيين والترقية في وزارة الداخلية

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى:

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين أنصار ...
والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي ...

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م ...
مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

وعلى القانون رقم (١٥) لسنة ٢٠٠٠م بشأن هيئة الشرطة.

وعلى القانون رقم (٢) لسنة ٢٠٠٤م بشأن مجلس الوزراء.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري بالقانون رقم (٣٣) لسنة ١٩٩٢م بشأن العاملين ...
للقوات المسلحة والأمن وتعديلاته.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٥٦) لسنة ٢٠١٦م ...
حكومة الإنقاذ الوطني وتسمية أعضائها وتعديلاته.

وبناء على عرض وزير الداخلية.

قـــــــرر

مادة (١) تعين الأخوة التالية أسماؤهم في وزارة الداخلية ويرقون ...
وعددهم (٦).

١	علي عبده محمد قائد القرشي	٢	عبدالرؤوف أحمد ...
٣	عبدالله حسن أحمد منصور الحريفي	٤	عبدالجليل سرور ...
٥	عبدالواحد عبده حسن الجابري	٦	هوائد هائل محمد ...

١٠٨	عميد/ محمد محمد صالح الطيب	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول الدائرة القانونية
١٠٩	عميد/ عبد الرزاق علي علي الحوثي	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول رئيس مصلحة خفر السواحل
١١٠	عميد/ عبدالولي محمد عبد الله الحمراني	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول رئيس تعليمات المنطقة العسكرية الثالثة
١١١	عميد/ عبد الملك يحيى ناصر الحجري	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول مدير دائرة الإمداد والتموين
١١٢	عميد/ حمود صالح مثال المرانى	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول قائد قوات الأمن الخاصة
١١٣	عميد/ أبو بكر عبد العزيز يحيى الفسراني	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول مساعد وزير الدفاع للشؤون التكتيكية
١١٤	عميد/ رفاق زايد علي علي الأفوع	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول قائد القوات الثاني طيران
١١٥	عقيد/ عبدالله علي عبده الحمزي	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول مساعد الرئيس اليمني
١١٦	عميد/ علي علي شيف عبد الله الحريبي	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول مساعد وزير الدفاع
١١٧	عميد/ محمد حسين محمد الظفاري	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول مدير مديرية الإمداد والنقل بالقوات الجوية
١١٨	عميد/ يحيى عبده علي الزريقان	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول نائب قائد قوات الدفاع الجوي
١١٩	عميد/ أحمد محمد الحمراني	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة مساعد وزير الدفاع للشؤون الموسيقية
١٢٠	عميد/ حسين صالح أحمد ...	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول قائد اللواء ٣١٤ مدرع
١٢١	عميد/ منصور محسن أحمد مجيدي	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول قائد اللواء ٣٥ مدرع
١٢٢	عميد/ يحيى علي مهاقع القسراني	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول قائد المنطقة العسكرية السابعة سابقا
١٢٣	عميد/ ناصر صيفان أحمد المحمدي	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول قائد حرس الحدود
١٢٤	عميد/ محمد أحمد أحمد الحزيزي	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول قائد اللواء النقل الثقيل
١٢٥	عميد/ محمد عباس عبدالله الأمير	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول مدير الأمن والمخابرات للشؤون المالية والإدارية
١٢٦	عقيد/ عبد الله أحمد ...	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة قائد مستشفى تعز العسكري
١٢٧	عميد/ عبد الولي عبده حسن الجابري	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول قائد اللواء ١٢٥ مشاة
١٢٨	عميد/ رفاق حسين علي حسين الفسلاني	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول قائد اللواء الثالث مشاة ميكانيكي
١٢٩	أحمد صالح هادي دهمان	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة مساعد رئيس هيئة الأركان
١٣٠	عميد/ رفاق محمد علي محمد الفسراني	متقاعد	مسئول عضو وصفة مستشار القوة اليمنية
١٣١	عميد/ عبد الرزاق محمد إسماعيل المروري	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول قائد قوات الأمن الخاصة
١٣٢	أحمد صالح علي الله ...	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة قائد اللواء ٢٢ مدرع حرس
١٣٣	منصور عبد الله ناجي ...	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة قائد اللواء ٣٩ مدرع
١٣٤	رضوان محمد محمد صلاح الحسامي	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة قائد اللواء ٢٠١
١٣٥	طلال محمد ذيب العمري	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة قائد اللواء ٣٣ مدرع
١٣٦	محمد علي ...	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة قائد اللواء ١٧ مشاة
١٣٧	عبد الله وصل المقبري	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة قائد اللواء ١٢٥ مشاة
١٣٨	صلاح عبد الرحمن عبد الله ...	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة ورئيس مجلس منطقة تعز
١٣٩	عميد/ أحمد علي أحمد قاسم الشوري	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة نائب قائد اللواء ٣٩ مدرع
١٤٠	عميد/ عبد الخالق محمد أحمد الجنيد	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول مدير ... مرطة - تعز
١٤١	حمزة محسن علي أبو طالب	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة مدير دائرة الدعم اللوجستي بالمنطقة الخامسة
١٤٢	عميد/ زكريا حسن محمد حسن الفسراني	متقاعد	مسئول مسئول مدير عام ... الشؤون الأمنية
١٤٣	علي سعيد ...	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة رئيس مجلس المنطقة العسكرية
١٤٤	... زيد ناصر ...	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة رئيس مجلس المنطقة العسكرية الثالثة
١٤٥	عقيد/ خالد علي حسين الحمراني	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة قائد اللواء ٣١٠ مدرع
١٤٦	عقيد/ عبد الله عيظة مفرح العمري	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة مدير مكافحة الإرهاب وزارة الداخلية
١٤٧	عقيد/ مجاهد حسن عيظة الحوثي	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة مدير عام شرطة محافظة صنعاء
١٤٨	إبراهيم محمد ...	متقاعد	مسئول رئيسة عضو وصفة المدير العام لمصلحة الضريبة

أمين السر (٢) رئيس المحكمة

Document 24: The decision to appoint and promote AbdulWahid Al-Jabri from the Houthi militia in the Ministry of Interior, and he is the brother of Abdulwali Al-Jabri

Document 23: List of those sentenced to death by the military prosecution affiliated with the legitimacy, including AbdulWali Al-Jabri

Document 25: Registration of two companies of AbdulWahid Al-Jabri at the Houthi Ministry of Economy and Industry



Document 26: Registration of Abdulwali Abdo Hassan Al Jabri Company in the Sultanate of Oman in Salalah in 2022

Document 27: The diversified activities of Abdulwali Abdo Hassan Al-Jabri Company registered in the Sultanate of Oman



Document 28: A sample of contracts made by Al-Jabri Company to recruit Yemenis in the Russian-Ukrainian war

4.1.2.3. Companies affiliated with Ali Al Hadi (including Al Mohsen Brothers Company):

- **The owner of Al Mohsen Brothers Company** is the Houthi leader **Ali Mohammed Mohsen Saleh Al Hadi,** who seized the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the capital, Sana'a, in cooperation with the Houthi militia and the Houthi Security and Intelligence Service (**HSIS**). He is one of its important economic arms, and through his company, the directors of the World Food Program (WFP) cooperated with him to enable him to obtain most of the program's contracts in Yemen throughout the war period, as the funding for this program from 2015 to 2024 amounted to 9 billion dollars (**Document 29**), which constituted an important indirect and invisible financial resource for the Houthi militia and also constituted an illicit enrichment for Ali Al Hadi.

Year	Amounts disbursed in US dollars to the World Food Programme (WFP) – Yemen
2015	359,748,135
2016	468,070,276
2017	829,957,276
2018	1,307,253,916
2019	1,717,900,085
2020	923,564,851
2021	949,997,306
2022	1,136,945,812
2023	737,633,446
2024	621,588,930
Total	**9,052,660,033**
Nine billion, fifty-two million, six hundred and sixty thousand, and thirty-three US dollars	
Note: This amount is the amount announced on the OCHA website, and of course, does not include other funding, which is called additional funding and undisclosed funding.	
The main partner with the Food Program is Ali Al-Hadi Company, a Houthi leader designated on the US terrorist lists. Ali Al-Hadi is responsible for purchasing food supplies, most of which do not meet specifications and some of which are spoiled, in addition to storing and transporting them.	

Document 29: Table showing the funding received by the World Food Programme (WFP) in Yemen from 2015 to 2024.

- **Company registration in Sana'a:** Al Mohsen Brothers Company is registered in Yemen under the name Al Mohsen Brothers Trading, Agencies and Contracting Company Limited (**Document 30**)
- **Company registration in the Sultanate of Oman**: Ali Al Hadi's company details in the Sultanate of Oman are registered under the name Al Mohsin Brothers Investment Company, with a capital of 100,000 Omani riyals, equivalent to approximately 260,000 US dollars. (**Document 31**)
- The company details in the Sultanate of Oman are registered under the names of his brothers: Mohsin Mohammed Mohsin Al Hadi, born in 1998 (the youngest of his brothers), and Hazem Mohammed Mohsin Saleh, born in 1988, equally shared between them.

Document 30: Registration data for Al Mohsen Brothers Company at the Ministry of Industry and Trade affiliated with the Houthi militia.

Document 31: Three images showing the registration data of Al Mohsen Brothers Company in the Sultanate of Oman.

- **The World Food Programme (WFP) in Yemen and its relationship with Ali Al-Hadi Company:** The programme and other UN agencies have played a major role in supporting the Houthi militia. It can be said that most of the WFP's contracts go to the Al-Mohsen Brothers Company, in addition to the corruption that pervades these contracts, linked to some programme employees, and corruption related to the quality and quantity of these materials, their distribution methods, and the deprivation of needy families in Yemen at the expense of distributing food to families identified by the Houthi militia in areas under its control. Through this, the militia works to mobilise and recruit members of these families into its forces.
    - The latest tender announcement (**Document 32**) from the World Food Programme (WFP) in Yemen in April 2025, which requests the provision of grain milling and silo storage services in Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman, thus the tender will be implemented in Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman, which indicates a process of manipulation by the World Food Programme, awarding the tender to Ali Al-Hadi Company, thus continuing its support for the Houthi militia through Ali Al-Hadi's Al-Mohsen Company. It appears to be an attempt to cover this up by adding the Sultanate of Oman and facilitating the company's continued acceptance of WFP contracts in Yemen.
    - It is clear from the tender that the largest quantity will be for the southern regions of Yemen controlled by the legitimate government, with an amount of 210 thousand metric tons of wheat, and only 80 thousand metric tons for the northern regions of Yemen controlled by the Houthi militia. So why did the World Food Program not give an opportunity to companies in Aden to be among the bidders?

- **Questions:** This situation raises numerous questions about the contribution of international organizations and UN agencies to financial support, money laundering, the movement of money, and the smuggling of weapons and equipment to the Houthi militia. It also raises questions about financial corruption among contract employees at the World Food Programme in Yemen. This corruption may extend to employees in regional offices affiliated with the programme or even other UN agencies.

Document 32: Tender announcement for the World Food Programme in Yemen in April 2025, requiring the contractor to have the ability to work between the Sultanate of Oman and Yemen.



مناقصة لبرنامج الغذاء العالمي: توفير خدمات الطحن و/أو خدمات تخزين الصوامع

Provision of Milling Services and / or Silo Storage Services

WFP Sana'a Posted on 22 Apr, 2025 Closing on 12 May, 2025

Tender Details

REQUEST FOR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST (EOI)

Ref: WFP/YE/SC/EOI/2025/02

Provision of Milling Services and / or Silo storage services

Closing on 12 May 2025 at 01:00 hrs (Yemen Sana'a Local Time)

A. Background

1. The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) is the leading humanitarian organization saving lives and changing lives, delivering food assistance in emergencies and working with communities to improve nutrition and build resilience across the world.
2. WFP in Yemen Wheat Flour requirements is estimated at 210,000 MT for the South and 80,000 MT for the North. Using an average extraction rate of 85%, this translates to a wheat requirement of approximately 341,000 MT. However, due to the existing uncertain environment, these requirements could fluctuate.

B. Objective

3. WFP seeks reputable and legally registered service providers for Milling services and / or silo storage services.
4. This request for Expression of Interest (EoI) aims to identify qualified service providers to provide Milling services and / or silo storage services. WFP invites eligible service providers to express their interest in providing the requested services in Yemen & Oman.

C. Service Requirement

5. Milling of the wheat flour, inside Country Yemen & Oman.
6. Storage of Wheat grain or Wheat Flour in silos in Yemen & Oman.
7. This request for EoI is the initial step for the shortlisting process.

WFP

Follow this tender

Save (Login required)

4.2. Human trafficking fears

Many international reports have recently talked about human trafficking practices involving companies to recruit Yemenis in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict [(16).] This raises significant moral concerns and highlights the desperate conditions in which some Yemenis may find themselves due to ongoing conflict and economic instability in the region. The militia's recruitment tactics may exploit vulnerable individuals, contributing to broader issues of human rights violations and violations of international law.

The Houthi militia's approach to military promotions and its participation in arms deals, and recruitment illustrates a multifaceted strategy aimed at consolidating power and enhancing military capabilities. Promotions of key figures within the NISS ensure that experienced commanders continue to shape militia operations. At the same time, the links between political figures such as Abdulwali al-Jabri and the arms trade underscore the complex interplay between governance and military activity in Yemen. Understanding these dynamics is critical to understanding the ongoing conflict and challenges to addressing accountability and human rights issues in the region.

4.3. Formatting and Arrangement Operations

Ahmed al-Shami (mentioned at the chapter 3 in paragraph 3.2.2\ 10), who is described as the economic coordinator of these companies and a member of the militia's economic committee, plays a vital role in facilitating arms deals and disguised transactions in the form of legitimate trade. His participation includes:

1. **Strategic Planning**: As the economic coordinator, al-Shami is responsible for developing strategies that allow the militia to maximize profits from these cover-up businesses. This includes identifying lucrative markets, negotiating deals, and managing logistics related to arms procurement and distribution.
2. **Facilitation of transactions**: Al-Shami coordinates the financial aspects of these operations, ensuring that funds are effectively transferred and laundered to support arms smuggling without attracting undue attention. This may involve complex financial maneuvering , including the use of offshore accounts and shell companies.
3. **International Relations**: His role extends to building relationships with international entities that may have been inadvertently involved in militia operations. By presenting these companies as legitimate, Shami can facilitate transactions that enable the militia to obtain weapons and materials while maintaining reasonable deniability.

4.4. Implications for Regional Security

The Houthi militia's use of secret companies to conclude dubious secret deals, whether to purchase equipment, buy weapons, smuggle weapons, or even recruit Yemenis in the Russian-Ukrainian war has major repercussions on regional security:

- **Arms proliferation**: By engaging in arms smuggling, the militia contributes to the proliferation of weapons in a volatile region, exacerbating existing conflicts and undermining efforts to achieve peace and stability.
- **Ambiguous accountability**: The use of legitimate fronts complicates the ability of international authorities to hold the militia accountable for its actions. This challenges efforts to impose sanctions or investigate the illicit arms trade.
- **Economic disruption**: The operation of these covered companies can disrupt legitimate business in the areas where they operate , leading to unfair competition and economic instability.

The Houthi militia's establishment of this type of company is an evolving strategy to facilitate arms smuggling while projecting an official image. By operating in seemingly legitimate sectors and using individuals such as Mohammed Saleh Mohammed al-Shami, al-Jabri, Ahmed al-Shami, and other camouflage names, the militia can effectively conceal its illicit activities. This approach not only supports its military objectives, but also poses significant challenges to regional security and international law enforcement efforts. Understanding these dynamics is critical The importance of addressing the broader effects of the Houthi militia's actions in Yemen and surrounding areas.

4.5. Monitoring and data collection

The Houthi militia has established a robust surveillance and data collection system, which plays a critical role in its efforts to maintain control and monitor the opposition within the territory it occupies. This intensive surveillance device is designed to collect information on both supporters and opponents before the militia entered Sana'a specifically since 2012, allowing the militia to effectively manage and respond to potential threats.

When examining the documents and considering the quality of the data on the basis of which the information was collected, it is clear that there is support and assistance to these militias by international organizations and specialists to determine this quality and to use coding and analysis.

4.5.1. Controls

The Houthi militia uses various methods to conduct surveillance, including:

- **Human Intelligence (HUMINT):** The militia uses informants and undercover agents to gather information from within communities. These individuals often report on residents' activities, loyalties, and feelings, providing the militia with real-time intelligence.
- **Electronic surveillance**: The militia has invested in technology that enables it to monitor communications, including phone calls, messages, and interactions on social media. This capability allows the militia to track opposition activities and collect data on individuals who may pose a threat.
- **Physical surveillance**: Houthi elements conduct surveillance on the ground to monitor individuals and groups deemed suspicious. This can include following individuals, monitoring gatherings, and gathering information about their movements and associations.

4.5.2. Detailed Record Keeping

The militia maintains detailed records of individuals and their political affiliations, which form the basis of its intelligence operations. Important files obtained by the platform FraudWiki from 2013 that the militia worked on to survey a number of governorates reflect this practice:

Names and classifications for the year 2013: This file contains (in Excel format) thousands of names, including a file containing 1919 individuals in the governorates of Amanat Al-Asimah and Sana'a Governorate (**Document 33)** and other files that include hundreds of names in other governorates such as Al-Bayda Governorate **(Document 34),** in addition to various details used to classify them according to loyalty, political orientation and level of effectiveness. Classifications include:

- **Loyalists**: Individuals who support the Houthi cause and can be considered allies.
- **Dissidents**: Those identified as defectors or posing a potential threat to Houthi authority.
- **Neutral parties**: Individuals who do not publicly express support or opposition but can still be monitored because of their activities and affiliations.

The information in this file enables the militia to prioritize surveillance efforts, focusing on the individuals considered most likely to engage in opposition activities. The militia uses coding signals for much of the data to determine the degree of loyalty or not and then analyzes this information.



Document 33: Samples of Excel file for data quality in secret surveys of the Houthi militia in 2013 for the Capital Secretariat and Sana'a Governorate

مسح الشخصيات المؤثرة في محافظة (البيضاء)

الحالة الاقتصادية	الوظيفة الرسمي	الانتماء المذهبي	الانتماء السياسي	الأسر الحاكمة
- يغلب عليها الزراعة في رداع وتجارة في البيضاء. - المغتربون لكثرية كبيرة خاصة في أمريكا والخليج. - مستوى المعيشة متوسط. - التكافل الاجتماعي موجود بقوة.	- أقبل الانتشار والتوظيف العسكري لا رغبة فيه. - التوظيف الرسمي من خارج المحافظة. - هم لا يبلغون (١٠%) من السكان.	• تاريخياً:- ١- شافعية من آل غنيم إلى البيضاء. ٢- زيدية في قضاء رداع. • والحالياً: - (١٠%) شافعية حيث غلبت عليها الوهابية وانتشارها. - السلفية من الوهابية (٥٠%) والطائفية (١٠%). - الصوفية هم من الشافعية (٥%) - الزيدية العامة أصبحت ماضي بسبب الوهابية.	- المؤتمر (٢٠%) - الاصلاحيون لا يزيدون وشعبيتهم تتقلص (١٠%). - الاشتراكي (٣%) وكان قبل ٩١ (الحرب) هو الأكثر. - نسبة المتحزبين من السكان (٢٠%). - الانتماء الحزبي ضعيف ويغلب عليه الولاء القبلي والترابط الأسري. - عشر دوائر انتخابية (٩ مؤتمر+١ مستقل)	- بيت الهدى. - بيت الحمزي. - بيت لخمان. - بيت شرف الدين. - بيت الحطاف. - بيت الجنيدي. - بيت الهدار. - بيت آل الشيخ. - بيت المحضار. - بيت الهيدروس. - بيت الجفري. - بيت آل حامد.

Document 34: Sample quality samples for secret surveys of the Houthi militia in Al-Bayda governorate in 2013

4.5.3. Surveys and intelligence gathering

In addition to keeping detailed records, the Houthi militia conducts surveys in various governorates to collect important data on individuals' loyalties and affiliations. These polls play an important role in identifying potential threats and effectively managing the opposition. It also played an apparent role in imposing the Houthi militia's control over Yemeni governorates in 2015.

4.5.4. Survey methodology

The militia uses systematic methods to conduct surveys, including:

- **Community Engagement**: Surveys are often conducted through direct engagement with community members , sometimes under the guise of public safety initiatives or community development projects. This approach allows the militia to gather information without raising immediate suspicions.
- **Targeted data collection**: The militia focuses on gathering information about political beliefs, social ties, and community engagement. This data is essential to understanding the dynamics of loyalty and opposition within different regions.

It is clear that the process of developing the survey methodology was done through the help of experienced figures in determining the quality of the required data, coding and analyzing it, and also this assistance may have been obtained by the militia through international and local organizations, and as we mentioned, the surveys began practically from 2012 and continuously in the absence and lack of interest by the political parties in Yemen or even from the legitimate government currently.

4.5.5. The main persons of the survey process

Among the prominent figures involved in the survey **and mentioned at the chapter 3 in paragraph (3.2.2 \8) of this report is Qassim Ahmed Qasim al-Hamran**, (**see Documents 14 and 15**), who continued to play

a key role within the militia. His participation highlights the militia's reliance on individuals most loyal to the Houthi leader to oversee intelligence operations and ensure effective data collection efforts.

- **Qasim al-Hamran**'s role: Al-Hamran's position within the militia indicates that it plays an important role in shaping the strategies used for monitoring and data collection. His insight into community dynamics and loyalty patterns is valuable to the militia's decision-making processes.
- **Involvement in covert operations**: Al-Hamran is also believed to be involved in covert operations aimed at suppressing dissent. His understanding of the local landscape enables the militia to carry out targeted actions against individuals identified as threats based on the data collected.

The Houthi militia's extensive surveillance and data collection efforts are an integral part of its strategy to maintain control and management of the opposition in Yemen. By conducting comprehensive surveillance, maintaining detailed records, and using surveys to gather intelligence, the militia can effectively monitor the loyalties and affiliations of individuals within its territory. This approach not only helps identify potential threats, but also helps the militia consolidate its power and stifle dissent. Understanding these tactics is essential to understanding the broader implications of Houthi militia governance and its impact on human rights and civil liberties in the region.

Here, we renew the warning to the legitimate government authorities in the areas under their control to pay attention to the surveys carried out by the organizations and their partners, and it has previously been published about suspicious and security surveys of the European Institute for Peace and its advisers Huda Al-Salahi and Hisham Al-Omeisy [(17),] **and it is also important to review the legitimacy and investigate with its affiliates, which may have officials who facilitated and enabled the continuation of such surveys.**

4.6. The role of international organizations and civil society institutions in Yemen

It is clear that there is a hidden role for some international organizations in Yemen as well as civil society institutions to provide various support to this militia, whether previously, and it is clear from the quality of the data found in the surveys of the Houthi militia in 2013, this work is not the work of the Houthi militia, but it appears that it was done through the help and support of organizations and intelligence that provided services to them and still do. Or whether this support is currently evident through facilitating the access of funds to the Humanitarian Relief Council (**SCAMCHA).**) affiliated with the militia or by exerting pressure through

organizations to stop decisions against the militia, including classifying it as a terrorist group at the end of Donald Trump's rule in 2020, or even what happened recently from the pressure exerted by the United Nations and its UN envoy in stopping the decisions of the Central Bank in Aden and pressuring the legitimate government under the pretext of human suffering and the economy.

4.6.1. The role of international organizations in Yemen:

Some international organizations in Yemen have played a role in supporting the Houthi militia by facilitating the access of international funds to and from them and their control over most of the projects implemented by these organizations and the common corruption between them, which contributed to harnessing many of the funding funds in the interest of the militia and the various security and military agencies, in addition to the reports and false information issued by some organizations, not to mention the silence of these organizations in the face of the kidnappings of their employees since 2020, and we cite there some of these international organizations with examples of what they have done:

- **The Coordination Council for Humanitarian Affairs in Yemen (OCHA):** It lists the security incidents to which UN organizations in Yemen and their employees are exposed, and shows that most of the security incidents by 95% occur in areas under the control of the legitimate government in 2022 (an analytical report by Frodwiki on the report of security incidents of organizations) [(18),] ignoring the forced abductions of the organization's employees carried out by the Houthi militia since 2020 until now.
- **The United Nations Development Program (UNDP):** It has handed over tens of millions of dollars of demining funds [(19)] to the Houthi militia, which plants mines, and contributed to providing them with equipment and four-wheel drive vehicles that were used by the militia in the war or to enhance the capabilities of its security and military services. [(20),] an investigation was also conducted by the Public Prosecution into the program's support for the Houthi militia in the demining program and reached the conclusion that it supports the militia with other United Nations programs (**annex to document 35 of** the investigation, which consists of 10 pages in 2023).
- **The World Food Program (WFP):** Through the billions of dollars in funds it received during the war, all of which were managed by the militia, and food was also found under the program's seal in the front positions of the Houthi militia. [(21)]

- **World Health Organization (WHO):** Through the funds he received, which are hundreds of millions of dollars during the war, they were all managed through the militia, in addition to that it handed the militia many four-wheel drive vehicles such as ambulances, which the militia used to support its war fronts and security services and to transport its soldiers, and it roamed the streets of the capital, Sana'a , (22) in front of the eyes and ears of this organization.
- **UNICEF Children's Fund (UNICEF): The** organization received billions of dollars in assistance to Yemenis during the war period and the organization occupies the second place through the volume of funding it received after the World Food Organization **(WFP)** in Yemen, the organization contributed to supporting the Houthi militia, in particular through the emergency cash transfers project for vulnerable families in Yemen, funded by the World Bank, whose funding amounted to more than $ 4.5 billion for the period from 2017 to 2023, as the organization manipulated the currency rate. Exploited the currency exchange difference between the areas controlled by the legitimate government and the areas controlled by the Houthi militia and looted the rights of these families through the game of banking at rates of more than 50% and up to hundreds of millions of dollars, not to mention the operational budgets and in partnership with the militia and with surprising silence from the legitimate government (23, 24 and 25), and this of course enabled the militia to seize funds to support and continue its war in Yemen and support its various agencies.

٩-طلب بإصدار أمر الحجز التحفظي على أموال مشروع نزع الألغام المودعة حسابات برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإغاثي عدد (١) ورق موقع من مقدم البلاغ وعدد من الناكثين.

١٠-مشروع مكون من (٣٠) ورقة لما يسمى بمشروع نزع الألغام الطارئ في اليمن المرحلة الأولى باللغة الإنجليزية قدمه المبلغ، وعدد (٩) ورق مرفقات، افاد المبلغ بأنه استخرجه من موقع الأمم المتحدة، وعليه ختم برنامج الأمم المتحدة.

١١-مشروع نزع الألغام الطارئ المرحلة الثانية عدد (٧١) ورقة، افاد المبلغ بأنه استخرجه من موقع الأمم المتحدة، وعليه الختم باللغة الانجليزية، وارفق به عدد (٥) صفحات باللغة العربية يوضح فيه المنظمات الشريكة في تنفيذ المشروع.

١٢-عدد (٢) تقارير طبية وصور بطاقة شخصية لعدد (٢) من الضحايا الذين تم اخذ اقوالهم عدد (٥) صفحات.

١٣-عدد (٧) صور منشورات واخبار تفيد تسلم بعض الجهات الأمنية لمذكرة مولدا والبرنامج الاغاثي للأمم المتحدة وغيرهم عدد من السيارات والمبالغ المالية.

١٤-صورة لمذكرة تفاهم بين المنسق للشئون الإنسانية للأمم المتحدة مع المتحدث باسم وزير الخارجية المدعو/هشام شرف لانشاء جسر جوي لنقل ما يسمى حالات طبية ورقة واحدة.

١٥-صورة قرار صادر لحكم بوضع متحدث باسم رئيس الجمهورية لدى مليشيات الحوثي صالح الصماد، بتعيين المدعو/علي عبدالله صبرة نائبا لرئيس اللجنة الوطنية لنزع الألغام، للاستدلال به على تعامل منظمة الأمم المتحدة مع الحوثيين ورقة واحدة.

***الحيثيات والرأي -**

ومما تقدم يتضح أن الوقائع المنسوبة للمنظمات التابعة للأمم المتحدة وهي (البرنامج الإنمائي للأمم المتحدة undp) ومنظمة الطفولة – يونسف، ومنظمة الصليب الأحمر، والمجلس الدنماركي للاجئين (DRC)، وبعثة الأمم المتحدة لدعم اتفاق الحديدة أو تمها (unMHA) ، ومكتب المفوضية لشئون اللاجئين ، ومنظمة الصحة العالمية، ومنظمة الأمم المتحدة للأغذية والزراعة (الفاو) ، تشكل جريمة تمويل الإرهاب المجرمة بنص المادة(٤) من قانون غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب رقم(١٥) لسنة ٢٠١٠م وتعديلاته، والتي نصت فيها نصت عليها على أنه يعد مرتكبا لجريمة تمويل الإرهاب كل من" يجمع أو يقدم أموالاً أو يؤمن الحصول عليها أو ينقلها عمداً وبإرادته بأي وسيلة كانت بطريقة مباشرة أو غير مباشرة وسواء كانت من مصادر مشروعة أو غير مشروعة بنية استخدامها أو مع علمه بأنها ستقدم لمنظمة إرهابية، أو هيئة أو جمعية إرهابية أو لإرهابي أو لفعل إرهابي، ويمكن استنتاج العلم من الظروف الواقعية الموضوعية وتبقى المسئولية الجنائية قائمة سواء استخدمت هذه الأموال كليا أو جزئيا...الخ)

Document 35: Document from an investigation carried out by the Public Prosecution in Marib 2023 on demining funds provided by the United Nations Development Programme and other organizations to the Houthi militia

4.6.2. The role of some civil society institutions in Yemen

While this report sheds light on a serious issue represented in the roles and threats of the Houthi security and intelligence service, it also reveals the roles of some civil society institutions in Yemen in covering the crimes of this apparatus, beautifying its members with a twisted limb, and bringing them to the decision-making centers of UN organizations.

Previous reports also revealed the role of these institutions in transferring a large part of the international funds directed to support Yemen during the conflict period to the hands of the Houthi militia (previous reference 20), as there is cooperation and partnership, as well as the existence of a conflict in the roles between the officials of some international organizations and civil society institutions operating in Yemen, and some of them receive large funds without properly acknowledging them, and some documents indicate possible links between some of these organizations with the Houthi group.terrorist and providing various services to this militia, whether by beautifying it in the West or by attracting leaders from it and enabling it to attend international meetings and weave relations with UN officials and Westerners and show them as neutral individuals or to the extent of mobilizing efforts to stop any decisions that may be taken against the militia, whether such as decisions to classify it as a terrorist group or decisions related to the Yemeni economy, which may play a role in stopping the Houthi militia's control over the economy, in addition to that some of these institutions play a role in covering the crimes of the militia The Houthis are represented by kidnappings, torture and killings, and they issue suspicious reports against the legitimate government to divert attention from the militia's actions against humanitarian law. Our report stresses the need for in-depth investigations to review the performance of these institutions, hold long-handed accountable, and recover wasted or financial funds.

4.6.2.1. Role of Mwatana

Mwatana is a non-governmental organization run by Radhya Al-Mutawakel, and this institution identifies with the Houthi militia and falsely claims neutrality and work to promote democracy and human rights, but unfortunately it did not play any role to expose the Houthi militia's abductions, torture and killings inside prisons for the Security and Intelligence Service and remained focused only in its roles and reports on distorting the legitimate government.

Mwatana receives tens of millions of dollars in grants, for example, a grant of 1.4 million euros in 2021 (26)

These funds reflect the extent of international support for the soft power of the Houthi terrorist militia. Which did not disclose in any way the fate of the funds received and the ways in which they were used.

4.6.2.2. Role of the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies

Sana'a Center for Studies was established in 2014, and it is an independent research center as it defines itself, this center plays a role in keeping pressure away from the Houthi militia, and this was represented in its position during the classification of the Houthi militia as a terrorist group during the era of Donald Trump in 2020, where it mobilized efforts, held meetings, and raised statements with many of their activists and affiliated with other institutions such as **Resonate Yemen** and **DeepRoot** to work to cancel this classification under the pretext of the humanitarian crisis and the deteriorating economic situation (27, 28 and 29)

The center also receives tens of millions of dollars in grants, for example, $ 4 million to hold a peace forum in the Netherlands in 2023 (30), where it brought figures from the leaders of the Houthi militia as peace activists and neutrals, including Jamal Amer, who was recently appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Houthi militia (31)

Given the history of the center's formation and presence in Sana'a in 2014, questions arise about: "Did the Sana'a center secretly contribute to supporting and assisting the Houthi militia in conducting the surveys that took place in the period before the militia entered Sana'a through its advisors, some of whom show no opposition to the Houthis or are loyal to different percentages?"

4.6.2.3. Role of DeepRoot Foundation, Hikma Program and Resonate Yemen

Raafat al-Akhali and his wife Abeer al-Mutawakel own the DeepRoot foundation and the Hikam program and resonate Yemen Which he shares with Alaa Qassem, **and Raafat al-Akhali and his wife** Abeer al-Mutawakel **have emerged** as prominent figures in shaping the international narrative surrounding the Houthi militia. They have played important roles in presenting Houthi intelligence elements as neutral and development-oriented actors in various global forums. By sharing these elements with **DeepRoot** and the Hikma Fellowship Program and Resonate Yemen, They facilitated the inclusion of Houthi leaders as advocates of peace and development

and neutral individuals, despite their direct links to the militia. In addition, Al-Akhali played a role in mobilizing efforts with the Sana'a Center to stop the decision to designate the Houthis as a terrorist group in 2020.

Recently, through the Development Champions Forum and an institution called **CARPO,** Al-Akhali worked to hold a workshop in Jordan in June 2024 entitled "Steps to de-escalate the economy" against the measures of the Central Bank in Aden [(32),] and this played a role in enabling the UN envoy to exert pressure on the legitimate government to stop the decisions, which would have contributed to these measures if implemented in stopping the influence of the Houthi militia on the Yemeni economy and stopping the manipulation of currency exchange differences.

- This DeepRoot Foundation and Hikma serve as platforms to promote Houthi interests under the guise of humanitarian and development work, transitional justice and peace. By leveraging these entities, Al-Akhali and Al-Mutawakel were able to cultivate relationships with international stakeholders, including NGOs, governmental organizations and humanitarian agencies.
- Portraying Houthi leaders as neutral defenders allows them to gain credibility on the international stage, potentially rallying support or sympathy for their cause. This strategy is particularly effective in environments where Yemen's humanitarian crisis is a focal point, as it enables the militia to distance itself from its more violent activities.
- The activities of Raafat al-Akhali and his wife come against the backdrop of serious allegations related to his portrayal of Houthi leaders as individuals, neutral activists and peace advocates, which enabled these individuals to reach and establish relations with UN agencies and reached to provide and enable leading Houthi figures to attend international meetings and meet with speeches at the Human Rights Council, and this figure is accused of war crimes, such as **Abdul Qadir Al-Murtada**.
- **Ahmed AbdulAli Ahmed Al-Shami**: This institution and program (DeepRoot & Hikam) presented him in more than one international forum and until attending a meeting in 2021 with the US envoy to Yemen as the director of a human rights organization (the Arab Organization for Human Rights "ARWA") Attached is the picture of the meeting [(33),] which is Ahmed Shami, as we mentioned at the beginning of this report in paragraph 2.2, one of the Houthi leaders, a member of the militia's economic committee, and the commercial coordinator of Houthi transnational companies that are active in illegal activities such as arms smuggling

- **Amir al-Din Jahaf**: This institution and the program (DeepRoot & Hikam) also presented him in more than one international forum as a human rights activist [(34),] and he is rather a Houthi leader [(35)] and owns an institution called the Human Foundation that works ostensibly to defend human rights, but it is in fact one of the institutions created by the militia apparatus to beautify its image in the West and push the Houthi narrative at the forefront in front of UN agencies, and this is what was explained in my report and the secret organization of the Houthis in international organizations and funds **(previous reference 3)**
- Through the roles of Al-Akhali and Al-Mutawakel, which we mentioned, Ahmed Al-Shami, Amir Al-Din Jahaf and their institutions were able to reach the corridors of the United Nations, and even Al-Shami became known as working near the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Yemen [(36),]
- At a later stage, they worked (Al-Shami and Jahaf, with the help of Muhammad Reda Al-Wazir and through their institutions) to enable one of the security elements of the Houthi militia, **AbdulQader Al-Murtada,** who is in charge of Houthi prisons and accused of torturing prisoners in prisons, for the Houthi militia, to deliver an online speech at the Human Rights Council in Geneva in 2019[(37)] This situation raises moral concerns about the participation of individuals with such serious allegations in high-level international platforms.
- The facilitation of Murtada's participation in this event was organized through **the Arab Organization for Human Rights (ARWA**), led by **Muhammad Reda Al-Wazir** and Ahmed **Al-Shami**, as well as the **Ensan Organization**, affiliated **with Amiruddin Jahaf**. This link highlights how militias can leverage organizations that claim to defend human rights to advance their agenda.

Photo from April 2021 meeting organized by **DeepRoot** and Hikma Fellowship Program with U.S. Envoy And attended by Ahmed Shami as an activist and neutral

4.6.3. Accountability problems

The involvement of institutions such as the Sana'a Center, Mwatana, **DeepRoot**, and Hikma in facilitating the visibility of Houthi leaders in international forums raises important questions regarding accountability:

- **Access to international platforms**: There are pressing concerns about how these institutions can access influential international platforms. Their ability to present Houthi figures as advocates of peace and development while ignoring their direct involvement in human rights abuses reflects a troubling dynamic in international diplomacy.
- **Lack of accountability**: The failure to hold these institutions accountable for their roles in advancing Houthi interests under the guise of humanitarian action is deeply troubling. It highlights a broader issue of accountability within the international community, where actors with questionable human rights records can manipulate perceptions in their favour.
- **Open threats and impunity**: The situation is further complicated by the fact that these figures like Abdulqader El Murtada have publicly threatened individuals like Fathi bin Lazraq on social media [(38).] These actions demonstrate a blatant disregard for accountability and the rule of law, particularly given their involvement in serious human rights violations. The ability of Houthi leaders to act with apparent impunity is sounding alarm bells regarding the effectiveness of international mechanisms aimed at protecting human rights and promoting accountability.
- **Non-compliance with the law**: Also, figures such as **Raafat Al-Akhali** claim to abide by the law and receive funds related to law and justice, but they are far from that, but they flout the law and refuse to obey it, and recently Al-Akhali was tried wisely by Marib Court and sentenced against him as a fugitive from the face of justice and 4 months in prison with enforcement and referral of his institution for investigation [(39).]

The roles of Mwatana, Sana'a Center, Hikma Program, and DeepRoot **in shaping the narrative about the Houthi militia illustrate the complexities of international relations in the context of the conflict. By leveraging** organizations and civil society organizations that offer a humanitarian interface, it enables the militia to engage with international stakeholders while obscuring its most violent and repressive actions. Showing Houthi leaders as neutral individuals, mobilizing efforts to stop international resolutions against the Houthi militia, as well as facilitating The participation of figures such as Abdulqader Al-Murtada in international human rights meetings and the broader implications of their actions highlight the urgent need for scrutiny and accountability within the international community regarding its interactions with human rights violations. Understanding these dynamics is essential to address the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Yemen and ensure that efforts to achieve peace and stability are truly effective and inclusive.

Conclusion

The complex dynamics of Houthi militia operations reveal a multifaceted approach to governance, security, and international relations. The establishment of the **HSIS** has enabled the militia to effectively consolidate its power while using extensive surveillance and data collection strategies to monitor supporters and opponents alike. Key figures within the militia, such as AbdulWahid Naji Muhammad Abu Ras, Hassan al-Kahlani, and AbdulSalam Salah Ahmed Fleita, play critical roles in coordinating intelligence activities and managing military operations, strengthening the militia's grip on the militia.The Authority, in addition to its various abductions, torture and killings inside Yemen

The militia's use of clandestine companies through the Ahmed al-Shami commercial coordinator for arms smuggling and recruitment operations reflects its ability to adapt to a complex conflict environment. These operations not only enhance the militia's military capabilities, but also pose significant challenges to regional security and stability. The involvement of political figures such as Abdulwali Abdo Hassan al-Jabri in illicit arms deals underscores the complexity of governance and military actions within the Houthis.

Moreover, the abductions of activists, media workers and employees of international organizations, methods of torture and multiple malicious charges, which may also be a kind of partnership to cover up corruption, raise a broad question about the accountability and effectiveness of international mechanisms designed to support human rights, which in turn raises the question of the role of some civil society institutions in Yemen in presenting some Houthi militia leaders as neutral and development-oriented figures in international forums. This complicates the narrative surrounding the militia. Their engagement with institutions such as the Sana'a Center, **DeepRoot,** the Hikma Fellowship Program and Resonate Yemen raises important questions about accountability and the effectiveness of international mechanisms designed to track and investigate such cases.

As the situation in Yemen continues to evolve, understanding these dynamics is essential to understanding the broader implications of the Houthi militia's actions. The interplay between military promotions, surveillance tactics, arms deals, and international relations highlights the urgent need for the international community to address the ongoing humanitarian crisis and ensure that efforts to achieve peace and stability are real, effective and inclusive. **The challenges posed by the Houthi militia underscore the complexity of the conflict in Yemen and the critical importance of holding all actors accountable for their actions.**

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Part Three

Chapter Five

Legitimizing the Houthi Militia By "Peace" Lobbies and Directed Researches

International Narrative Engineering in Yemen

Introduction:

Since 2015, Yemen has faced an escalating humanitarian catastrophe due to prolonged conflict, resulting in deteriorating economic and social conditions, rising poverty rates, and critical shortages of food and medicine. In response, international funding has emerged as a primary tool for crisis mitigation. However, its effectiveness has been severely undermined by corruption, mismanagement, lack of transparency, and the diversion of aid to specific institutional networks aligned with narrow agendas.

Between 2015 and 2024, donors channeled approximately 32 billion dollars into Yemen through international organizations and UN agencies. Additional hundreds of millions of dollars were funneled through the European Union to handpicked institutions under thematic umbrellas such as peace, justice, and the rule of law, often nothing more than superficial slogans lacking implementation.

Amidst this, a network of research and human rights organizations surfaced, presenting themselves as independent while serving as soft instruments for legitimizing the Houthi project. These entities have played a key role in reframing the group internationally as a legitimate political actor while concealing its true identity as an Iranian-backed coup militia. They submitted reports that portrayed the Houthis as a persecuted entity, ignoring their role in dismantling the Yemeni state and seizing its institutions.

As the war intensified, these research centers evolved into an international lobbying apparatus that rebranded Houthi actions and embedded their narratives within diplomatic systems. This led to monopolization of international discourse on Yemen, marginalizing independent Yemeni voices and elevating Houthi-aligned individuals under the false pretense of neutrality. These reports distorted facts and granted the Houthis an unjustified political shield.

Consequently, the international community has become complicit, persistently advocating for a negotiation process that grants the Houthis power-sharing opportunities while overlooking their function as a tool of Iranian regional ambitions. These policies have empowered the Houthis further and weakened the legitimate state. In this reengineered reality, international reports increasingly rely on sources affiliated with lobbying networks sympathetic to the Houthis.

Now labeled as the de facto authority, the Houthis are legitimized while the recognized government and the coalition are blamed for the humanitarian catastrophe. This undermines genuine efforts to reestablish the state

and emboldens actors with vested interests to manipulate narratives and recycle political legitimacy for the militia.

Simultaneously, authentic national actors striving to restore the Yemeni state are sidelined while millions of dollars are funneled into hollow peace initiatives that merely serve lobbying interests rather than building institutional capacity. This has entrenched militia control over political decision-making and reduced peace to a superficial reproduction of the existing power structure.

The international community is no longer an impartial observer, it has evolved into a contributor to the crisis by financing efforts that reinforce the status quo and institutionalize impunity.

This report seeks to unpack the concept of **international narrative engineering** and illustrate how the international community, alongside peace advocacy networks and politicized research, has contributed to legitimizing the Houthi militia, thereby obstructing state-building, governance, and transitional justice in Yemen.

We define **international narrative engineering** as the strategic shaping and manipulation of discourse and narratives by international actors including governments, NGOs, and media that determine global understanding of the Yemeni conflict. These narratives either bolster or undermine the legitimacy of the Houthi militia.

To explore this, the report addresses several critical questions across interrelated themes, drawing on documented case studies and evidence:

- How do research centers function as tools for legitimizing the Houthi militia at the expense of the Yemeni state
- How are independent Yemeni voices displaced in favor of actors aligned with foreign agendas that disregard principles of governance and transitional justice
- What role does international discourse play in redefining political legitimacy in Yemen according to foreign interests rather than the Yemeni people's will
- How are reports by the UN and international organizations instrumentalized to justify Houthi practices and sustain their influence, thereby obstructing paths to state-building and good governance

5.1. The Role of Directed Researches and International Organizations

Some international organizations use research to influence policies in favor of groups like the Houthi militia. This undermines governance in Yemen and often reflects private agendas, not state-building or justice.

Key points:

- Peace over justice: The international community prioritizes peace and counterterrorism, even if it weakens institutions and ignores Houthi violations.
- UN pressure in 2024: The UN pushed the Central Bank in Aden to suspend its decisions [(1)]. There were even threats to transfer funds by air to Houthi areas if the legitimate government insisted on its policies (**Attach 1**).



- UN Agencies to explore options of paying their suppliers/Implementing Partners/Responsible Parties to their bank accounts either in Aden or their offshore bank accounts in neighboring countries (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Dubai ... etc.)
- UN Agencies to explore options to pre-position cash for 3 -5 months in KIB or other AML/CFT compliant banks in the North. This requires a comprehensive assessment of the risks involved in view of the current banking liquidity crisis.
- UN Agencies to consider the compensation mechanism (Humanitarian Exchange Facility) with local importers similar to the one implemented in Afghanistan. No movement of cash would be needed in this instance.

If KIB is unable to remote cash from South to North due to restrictions either from CBY Sana'a or CBY Aden, UN Agencies to consider purchasing and moving hard currency by air to the northern part of Yemen (similar to the experience in Afghanistan). This option is quite complex and will also have significant cost implications. Given the continued escalation and the recent directive from CBY Aden to the sanctioning banks escalation that will have a huge impact in northern part of the country, extensive consultation should be made with the UN Financial Agency HQs and key development partners to secure the necessary approvals and put the necessary agreements in place for the purchase and movement of banknotes into the northern part of Yemen.

3. Staff Wellbeing, Safety, and security

- Considering the current financial liquidity challenges in the country, UNDSS to send regular security advisory to staff urging for heightened vigilance and precautions to ensure their personal safety and security and that of their dependents. This should include minimizing cash holdings, ensuring secure storage if cash is kept at home, etc.

ترجمة النص بالمربع

تدرس وكالات الأمم المتحدة شراء ونقل العملة الصعبة عن طريق الجو إلى الجزء الشمالي من اليمن على غرار التجربة في أفغانستان. هذا الخيار معقد للغاية وسيكون له أيضا آثار تكلفة كبيرة. نظرا للتصعيد المستمر والتوجيه الأخير من البنك المركزي اليمني في عدن بإلغاء تراخيص ستة بنوك، وهو التصعيد الذي سيكون له تأثير كبير في الجزء الشمالي من البلاد، فيجب إجراء مشاورات مكثفة مع وزارة الخزانة التابعة للأمم المتحدة والمقار الرئيسية للوكالات والشركاء الإنمائيين الرئيسيين لتأمين الموافقات اللازمة ووضع الاتفاقيات اللازمة لشراء ونقل الأوراق النقدية إلى الجزء الشمالي من اليمن

6/8/2024 Page 5



Ask Copilot 4 of 6

Implications to UN Agencies and Preparedness

UN agencies currently operate its financial transactions with IBY and Al Kuraimi Islamic Bank, which was established in Aden in 2008. KIB is not among the sanctioned banks by the two CBY. As a result of the liquidity crisis in IBY, most of the UN agencies have switched their financial transactions to KIB as of April/May 2024.

UNDP, on behalf of the UN system in the country issued a Request for Proposal for banking services, which should be finalized soon. Diversifying banking services will allow UN agencies to operate with five banks i.e., IBY, Yemen Kuwait Bank, Amal Bank and two banks that are not sanctioned by both CBY i.e. KIB and Yemen Commercial Bank, which will intensify pressure on one of the banks in view of any liquidity challenges. However, the recent crisis has resulted in the sanctioning of three of the five banks.

Below is a risk matrix table listing emerging issues, their probability and suggested mitigation actions.

S.#	Risks to the UN	Probability	Mitigation Measure
1.	Adverse impact on UN operations in the northern part and inability to reach most needy population of humanitarian assistance	High	a) RC/HC and OSESGY to pursue discussion with both parties and establish a platform for dialogue to de-politicize the economy and monetary policies. b) Explore alternate ways to ensure banks' compliance with international standards without undermining their operations.
2.	Lack of access of SWIFT gateway by Sana'a based commercial banks if not comply with shifting their Head Offices to Aden	High	
3.	Halt in-country financial transactions between south and north	Low	In-country transactions don't require SWIFT gateway. However, transactions cost might be higher.
4.	Inability of KIB to remote funds to other commercials banks in the north and vice versa due to restrictions of CBY Aden	Moderate	UNCT to explore this option with CBY Aden to allow channeling of funds between banks that are compliant with AML/CFT to reduce exposure on KIB
5.	Inability of KIB to route funds from South to the North due to restriction of CBY Sana'a or the authorities in the north.	High	Consider purchase and movement of hard currency to the northern part of Yemen
6.	Bankruptcy of IBY as a major banker to the UN Agencies in Yemen (IBY has been managing more than 20% average monthly transactions for UN operations in Yemen)	Low	UN agencies to recall or pay out the cash balances they have with IBY, if any until the situation improves.

Way Forward/Mitigation Measures

Attachment 1: Memorandum on the measures to be taken by the UN envoy and UN organizations against the decisions of the Central Bank in Aden

- Security alliances have been exploited by the Houthis to appear as partners in counterterrorism (e.g., Al-Bayda & Rada'a events in 2024).[(2)]

- Political elites often engage in fake dialogues while actually polishing the image of the militias, using the humanitarian crisis as a tool.
- UN manipulation: The influence of certain NGOs within the UN system has prevented accountability for war crimes in Yemen.
- Hosting sanctioned figures: Abdulqader Al-Murtadha spoke at the UNHRC in Geneva (2020) [(3)], (**Attach 2**), He is currently on the US sanctions list [(4)]. This hosting was arranged by:
    - Insan (Ameer Al-Din Jahaf)
    - Arwa (Ahmed Al-Shami, Mohammed Reda Al-Wazir)

  And promoted through [(5 &6)]:

    - DeepRoot (Rafat Al-Akhaly, Alaa Qasem)
    - Resonate Yemen (Rafat Al-Akhaly, Alaa Qasem)
    - Hikma Fellowship (Abeer Al-Mutawakil, wife of Rafat)



Attachment 2: Hosting of Abdulqader Al-Murtadha as a speaker at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva 2020

- Focus on Narrow Solutions:

The international community often focuses on political solutions between the internationally recognized government and the Houthi militia, while neglecting genuine political actors and qualified national voices. This makes any sustainable peace agreement difficult.

(Examples include **the 2018 Stockholm Agreement** on Hodeidah, which prevented the entry of legitimate forces into the city and handed the port over to the Houthi militia, as well as the alternative **ship Nautica** which was handed to the militia, in addition to the continued presence of **the Safer ship** in 2023, allowing the Houthis to possess two threats and maintain environmental risk.) [(7)]

- Weak Justice Mechanisms:

The global legal system fails to provide a clear path to hold the actors responsible for the harm caused to the Yemeni people. Unfortunately, some research centers play a role in distorting the concept of transitional justice and exaggerating the role of organizations in the humanitarian aid provided to Yemen.

- Reconciliation Challenges:

Yemen's complex social fabric, consisting of sectarian, tribal, and local dynamics, has eroded due to conflict. Systematic violations of human rights and international law have widened the gap between power centers in different communities.

How does Directed Researches contribute to this?

Directed researches may contribute to undermining state-building, governance, and transitional justice in Yemen through:

- **Shaping Policy:**

Directed researches may be used to influence international strategies and policies related to Yemen, which could result in prioritizing certain interests at the expense of state-building, justice, and good governance.

This is where funding and grants are given to specific civil society centers and institutions, which in turn produce or direct reports and research to serve the interests of the funders.

Examples include funding from **Open Society Foundations**, owned by Jewish businessman George Soros, providing annual grants of up to $200,000 to each of the following:

  - Mwatana Organization led by Radhya Al-Mutawakkil [(8)]

- Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies led by Majed Al-Madhaji and Farea Al-Muslimi [9]

Additionally, other institutions connected to the Yemen file include the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) [10], where Farea Al-Muslimi works as a researcher, and which receives average funding of $1 million annually.

Have these funds been used to direct specific policies and produce reports in line with donor agendas? These entities are known for actions that serve the Houthi militia, polish its image in the West, block any international decisions against the group, and justify their efforts under the cover of the humanitarian and economic crisis.

- **Ignoring Local Voices:**

Directed researches may ignore or downplay Yemeni voices and their needs, leading to ineffective and unsustainable solutions.

- **Misleading Public Opinion:**

Directed researches may be used to spread misleading or distorted information about the situation in Yemen, making it more difficult to achieve peace and justice.

It also leads to greater investment in prolonging the war or maintaining the current state of affairs, which results in what is called the bleeding of funds allocated for peace or humanitarian relief, and the creation of a dependent society. [11]

5.2. Research Centers as Tools for Narrative Production

- **Narrative Production**:

Some research centers are used to generate narratives that legitimize the Houthi militia's control, by highlighting specific issues while ignoring others.

(Examples include Mwatana's efforts to whitewash Houthi crimes, and the Sana'a Center's obstruction of international efforts to classify the Houthis as a terrorist group. The center's role was evident in 2020 and 2021 after President Trump's decision, as it opposed the terrorist designation [12]. This role has re-emerged in 2025 following the latest designation, again using the humanitarian and economic crisis as a justification [13].

- **Selective Analysis:**

Certain analytical approaches are adopted to support specific narratives, strengthening the Houthi position at the expense of the state.

How do research centers become tools for producing narratives that legitimize Houthi control over the Yemeni state?

- **Conditional Funding:**

Some centers receive funding from donors with special interests in Yemen, including those who directly or indirectly support the Houthis. Such funding can influence the type and outcome of research, leading to narratives that serve the Houthi agenda.

- **Selective Focus:**

Some studies selectively emphasize certain aspects of Yemen's situation, such as historical grievances or mistakes by the legitimate government, while ignoring or minimizing Houthi violations.

An example is the abduction of UN staff, aid workers, and activists, which started in 2020. International organizations and rights-based CSOs remained silent until 2024 and even then, issued only weak statements.

- **Amplifying Houthi Narratives:**

Certain research centers magnify the Houthis' narrative, portraying them as representatives of the people, fighters of corruption, or as an oppressed minority without any critical analysis.

- **Hosting Pro Houthi Analysts**:

Some centers host analysts or researchers known for their pro Houthi leanings, offering them platforms to promote their views. In some cases, individuals or platforms are financially supported to host these figures under the guise of neutrality. Examples:

  - One TV program appears to have become dedicated to guests nominated by a specific center. A similar pattern is followed by a particular media platform. [14, 15, 16]

- Notable Interventions: Nadia Al Sakkaf, former minister, and Abdullah Sultan Shaddad, Director of the Legal and Social Peace Foundation, participated in a recent peace forum in Jordan organized by the Sana'a Center. [17, 18, 19]

Nadia's speech was a striking example of narrative manipulation. At the International Yemen Forum, she addressed donors in English only, with no live translation, clearly signaling that Yemenis were not her real audience but international decision makers whose money she was encouraging regardless of how it would be used. She used emotional metaphors, comparing children before 2014 and after 2015. (**Attach 3**)

Meanwhile, Abdullah Sultan Shaddad, at the same forum, forgot that he represents a neutral civil society organization. He began speaking on behalf of the Houthi militia, praising their "responsiveness," indirectly blaming the other side for being uncooperative. (**Attach 4**)

Attachment 3

Attachment 4

- Farea Al Muslimi, former director of the Sana'a Center and now a researcher at Chatham House, regularly publishes analyses and posts, some bordering on political blackmail.

Farea Al Muslimi is one of those who built influence at the expense of the Yemeni people's suffering. He opposed classifying the Houthis as a terrorist group in 2020. When Canada made the designation, he mocked it in a post asking, "Will the designation prevent Houthis from chanting slogans on Montreal's subway" [20, 21] (**Attach 5**).



Attachment 5: Examples from tweets by Farea Al-Muslimi, former director of the Sana'a Center and researcher at Chatham House

- Khaldoun Bakhail's Report: A report by Khaldoun Bakhail (consultant at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces DCAF), published through the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), claimed that the security sector is inconsistent and largely outside Houthi control. However, he placed blame on the legitimate government and its forces for recruiting minors. (**Attach 6**) [22]. In the same report, the term "militia" was used more than 15 times, all referring to government-aligned forces.



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ISPI ITALIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STUDIES

RESEARCH WORLD PUBLICATIONS ISPI SCHOOL EVENTS CORPORATE PROGRAMME INSTITUTE

well as procedures related to evidence collection and judicial processes. The IRG and STC are also working to incorporate more women into police and security forces at all levels.

SSR remains inconsistent and limited in most areas outside of Ansar Allah control. The fragmented nature of the PLC and even of the IRG hinders comprehensive and coordinated approaches to SSR. However, progress and lessons learned could be built upon if all of Yemen's warring parties agree on a path to peace.

Yemen's layered war is likely to continue to thwart domestic and international efforts to combat youth recruitment and widespread recruitment into Yemen's militias as well as comprehensive SSR. With few economic prospects, **Yemen risks losing an entire generation of boys and young men to a deadly mix of formal and informal armed groups**. Given that all sides in Yemen anticipate an imminent return to widespread conflict, even the modest efforts to combat recruitment by the IRG, STC, and other members of the PLC are at risk of being upended. However, localized SSR and recruitment prevention programs by the IRG and STC offer hope of what may be possible if relative stability returns to Yemen.

Khaldoon Bakhail
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, DCAF

YEMEN

Introduction

Attachment 6: Excerpt from Khaldoun Bakhail's ISPI report

- Additionally, there are multiple publications by Khaldoun Bakhail attempting to reduce pressure on the Houthi militia. In some, he alleged the spread of unknown diseases in Houthi-controlled areas, warning of famine. [23], Such claims are often marketed under the banner of the "humanitarian crisis" using journalists or media platforms to promote the narrative. It appears Bakhail exploited his position at DCAF to facilitate the attendance of specific individuals or media outlets at conferences held in Europe. This contributes to the exclusion of genuine Yemeni voices and experts. He has also communicated with other activists to promote this narrative, and some of these communications were later revealed. [24], One of his tweets appeared shortly after U.S. President Trump reclassified the Houthi militia as a terrorist organization in January 2025. (**Attach 7**).

Post

Khaldoon Bakahail - خلدون باكحيل
@KBakahail

هناك مرض غير مفهوم يتفشى في بعض مناطق شمال اليمن ويفتك بالكثير، هناك مجاعة ستضرب البلاد بشهر مايو القادم بسبب موسم الشتاء القارس الذي قضى على محاصيل المزارعين وتضرر ميناء الحديدة و تفاقم الأزمة الإقتصادية. كل هذه التحديات تطلب وقفة مسؤولة وعاجلة من الجميع !!

Translate post

7:08 PM · Jan 31, 2025 · 51.7K Views

67 26 208 11

Attachment 7: Screenshot of Khaldoun Bakhail's tweet in January 2025 spreading Houthi health-related propaganda to counter the terrorist designation

- **Exclusion of Local Experts:**

Local expertise on Yemen's political, economic, or environmental conditions is often ignored. This vacuum is exploited by a select group of organizations that monopolize funding for peace, justice, law, and rights. These institutions rotate roles among each other, including Mwatana (Radhya Al-Mutawakkil), the Sana'a Center (formerly led by Farea Al-Muslimi, currently by Majed Al-Madhaji), DeepRoot, Resonate Yemen (Rafat Al-Akhaly and Alaa Qasem), and the Hikma Fellowship (Abeer Al-Mutawakkil). They have transitioned from human rights and peace grants to climate finance, promoting select individuals repeatedly and sidelining genuine experts.

Recently, these institutions have turned toward climate funding, showcasing individuals with no real connection to climate work. This undermines national expertise and risks wasting funds, as seen with previous humanitarian, peace, and legal projects.

Example: On November 27, 2024, the Sana'a Center organized a climate financing workshop in Jordan with the EUinYEMEN. [25]

The event included participants with no real background in climate, who had previously been promoted by DeepRoot, Resonate Yemen, or Hikma Fellowship. These same institutions then positioned themselves to capture climate-related grants, despite lacking the qualifications, echoing previous misuse of peace and humanitarian funds.

DeepRoot's Role: In each funding cycle, DeepRoot promotes certain figures through the Hikma Fellowship, labeling them as "development leaders." Some include Houthi-aligned individuals presented as neutral, such as Ahmed Al-Shami. This was revealed in prior reports. [26]

In the current cycle, DeepRoot promoted Ghadir Al-Tairah, branding her as a climate expert. However, she has been accused of taking control of a Yemeni climate foundation's website, stealing ideas, and misusing others' data. A formal complaint has been filed in Yemen. Al-Tairah and her colleague Ruqayya Al-Ghuli have refused to respond to legal proceedings or return the site. She appeared in Hikma's third cohort [27], later in a meeting

with the former UN envoy arranged by Hikma, and was then promoted in climate finance discussions by the Sana'a Center. [P. 25] (**Attch 8**).

Sana'a Center's Partnerships: The center has included individuals previously involved in discrediting Yemen during global climate conferences. At COP26 in the UK (2021), Ammar Al-Awlaqi, then head of Yemen's Environment Authority, in coordination with current Minister Tawfiq Al-Sharjabi, enabled individuals with no government affiliation or environmental background to attend the summit. This was reportedly done to facilitate their entry into the UK and apply for asylum. This act is described as "human smuggling."

Attachment 8: Example of promoting unrelated individuals in international climate forums

- **Exclusion of Victims**:

Victims of the conflict are often excluded from political dialogue and decision-making processes, denying them their voice in transitional justice discussions.

- **Exploitation of Humanitarian Needs:**

Some international organizations exploit Yemenis' urgent needs to push political agendas or empower specific individuals at the expense of others.

5.3. International Discourse and the Reshaping of Political Legitimacy

- **Interests of Power Players:**

Political legitimacy is being reshaped based on the interests of international powers rather than the will of the Yemeni people. This weakens efforts to build the state, eliminate militias, and uphold transitional justice.

- **Negative Impacts:**

Such discourse may undermine any efforts to build a political system that reflects the aspirations of the Yemeni people.

What role does international discourse play in reshaping political legitimacy in Yemen according to the interests of powerful actors, rather than the will of the Yemenis?

- **Implicit Recognition of the Houthi Militia:** By focusing on dialogue with the Houthis as a main party to the conflict, there is an implicit recognition of their legitimacy, despite the fact that they did not come to power through free and fair elections.
- **Ignoring International Legitimacy:** Some international powers overlook UN Security Council resolutions related to Yemen, which support the internationally recognized legitimate government. This is evident in the funding provided by certain European Union countries, especially the Netherlands, to entities that support the Houthi militia. Additionally, the United Nations in Yemen

channels funding through institutions affiliated with the Houthis, such as the Houthi-run Supreme Council for Humanitarian Affairs, while major UN organization offices remain in Sana'a.

- **Focus on "Realistic Solutions":** Support for the Houthis or overlooking their violations is often justified on the grounds that they are a "de facto" power on the ground, and that a political solution requires engagement with them.
- **Redefining "Legitimacy":** There is an attempt to redefine the concept of legitimacy in Yemen based on territorial control or administrative capacity rather than adherence to the constitution and rule of law. This trend must be closely monitored.

5.4. The Use of United Nations Reports

- **Interpretation of Reports:** UN reports are used to justify the practices of the Houthi militia, undermining efforts to build a state based on good governance. For example, OCHA's security incident reports in Yemen in 2022 and 2023 often contradict reality. Many incidents affecting organizations and their staff in Houthi-controlled areas are omitted or selectively reported. [28]
- **Impact of International Organization Reports:** These reports may serve as political tools to provide certain actors with legitimacy or justify the continuation of the current situation, often under the pretext of the humanitarian crisis and economic deterioration to ensure ongoing funding.

How are UN and international organization reports used to justify Houthi practices and organizational corruption in humanitarian funding, while weakening any potential path toward building a state based on good governance?

- **Bias in Data Collection:**

There may be bias in how data and information are gathered for UN and international organization reports, leading to inaccurate or distorted representations of the situation in Yemen. As previously mentioned with security incidents [P. 28], another example is population and IDP data. In 2020 and 2021, organizations published reports on Yemen's food insecurity phases, including population breakdowns by governorate. The WASH Cluster report by UNICEF is a clear case of data manipulation, enabling aid mismanagement and casting

doubt on the effectiveness of assistance, while weakening efforts to build a governance-based state. For example, reports listed Marib's population as 495,000 and IDPs at 300,000.

To expose this manipulation, a map based on Google Earth imagery of Al-Jufaina camp in Marib was created. The camp's area was 2,138,695 square meters (red-dotted boundaries). According to international Sphere standards, each IDP requires 3.5 sqm. This means the camp alone would hold around 611,055 individuals, contradicting the official reports that the entire Marib governorate hosts only 300,000 IDPs. This wide discrepancy is strong evidence of deliberate data manipulation. (**Attach 9**)

تعداد السكان وفق تقارير المنظمات باليمن 2020

تعداد النازحين والسكان بمحافظة مارب وفق تقارير المنظمات 2020

خريطة من صورة قوقل 2020 تظهر أحد مخيمات النزوح في محافظة مارب هو **مخيم الجفينة** و تظهر الكثافة السكانية ومساحة الجفينة (النقاط الحمراء حدود المخيم)

Attachment 9: Example exposing manipulation and misinformation regarding IDP and population data in Marib

- **Focus on Government Mistakes and Distortion of Facts:**

Some reports excessively highlight government shortcomings while minimizing or justifying Houthi violations. An example is a statement issued by the "Accountability for Human Rights" foundation concerning the suicide of Rashid Alawi Al-Hattam in the Political Security Prison in Marib. (**Attach 10**) [29]. The statement, dated February 12, 2025, concluded torture and murder without evidence or awaiting investigation outcomes.

Governor of Marib formed an investigative committee including security officials and a family representative. The committee (headed by Brig. Gen. Dr. Abdulhamid Al-Hammadi from the Ministry of Interior) announced its findings on February 22, 2025, confirming suicide with no external foul play. [30]

That same day, Marib's Public Prosecution Office published an official statement affirming it is the only authorized body to investigate and issue findings. [31]

On March 10, 2025, Decision **No. (30)** in Case No. (**16**) of 2025 was issued by the Public Prosecution in Marib, confirming the incident was a suicide with no criminal involvement.

This example shows how some civil society organizations distort facts and rush to publish unsubstantiated statements, highlighting the need for oversight and accountability.

Attachment 10: Statement by the Accountability for Human Rights foundation on the Marib suicide case (falsely claimed torture and murder without evidence)

- **Euphemistic Language:**

Some reports use softened terminology to describe Houthi practices, such as "de facto authorities" instead of "Houthi militias."

- **Unrealistic Recommendations:**

Some reports include impractical or inapplicable recommendations, given the current context in Yemen, weakening any potential roadmap for building a stable, democratic state.

5.5. What Can Be Done?

- **Reassessing International Priorities:** The legitimate government must reassess the situation and develop its own plans for managing funds. The international community must also reconsider its priorities in Yemen by placing greater focus on state-building, justice, human rights, and good governance alongside counterterrorism. A clear vision for genuine peace should be adopted, and funding should be channeled through the Central Bank in Aden and transformed into development-oriented support.
- **Supporting Institutional Reform:** The international community must support efforts to reform Yemen's institutions and strengthen the foundations of a functioning state.
- **Holding Perpetrators Accountable:** The international community must ensure that those responsible for war crimes and human rights violations in Yemen are held accountable, regardless of their affiliations or political identities.
- **Inclusive Peace Process:** The international community should ensure the participation of all Yemeni stakeholders in a genuine peace process, including political actors, civil society, and national experts. It must stop relying on the same individuals who have dominated the scene for over a decade and who, unfortunately, have contributed to the exclusion of others. These individuals must also be held accountable for the funding they have received.

- **Supporting Transitional Justice Mechanisms:** The international community must help develop inclusive and effective transitional justice mechanisms in Yemen. These should include fair trials, accountability for perpetrators, and compensation for victims.
- **Empowering Local Civil Society and Communities:** The international community must empower local Yemeni civil society to play a real role in peace and transitional justice processes and in the implementation of both humanitarian and development projects. This means prioritizing local civil society organizations within governorates, and not empowering or importing individuals or institutions from outside who falsely claim local ties yet lack real knowledge of the region's customs, culture, needs, and priorities.
- **Supporting Independent Media:** Support should be extended to independent Yemeni media outlets and journalists who report on the conflict with fairness and integrity.
- **Amplifying Independent Yemeni Voices:** Give space to independent Yemeni voices that reflect the diverse perspectives of the Yemeni people.
- **Verifying Information:** Ensure that information published about Yemen is verified through multiple reliable and credible sources.
- **Pressuring International Organizations and Enhancing Oversight and State Authority:** There must be pressure on international organizations to guarantee that their reports and operations are neutral and objective, and that they do not serve specific political agendas. A comprehensive review, auditing, and accountability process for past and future funding must be established.
- **Focusing on Good Governance:** The international community must focus on building a Yemeni state rooted in the principles of good governance, including the rule of law, accountability, transparency, and civic participation.

Conclusion

Local and international factors are deeply intertwined in shaping Yemen's future, with research and studies increasingly used as political tools that influence governance and transitional justice. It is essential to amplify local voices and uphold the core principles of justice to ensure a more stable and inclusive future.

In short, building the state, achieving good governance, and implementing transitional justice in Yemen require addressing conflicting international priorities, overcoming the double standards of political elites, ensuring accountability for crimes, compensating victims, and holding those who have manipulated international funding and projects accountable.

This also involves the meaningful inclusion of all national actors, local experts, and independent voices that truly represent the Yemeni people and have long been marginalized.

The solution also lies in exposing these lobbying networks, revealing their ties to the Houthis, and redirecting international efforts to support legitimate institutions through national expertise. At the same time, corrupt figures within the government and affiliated entities must be held accountable. It is crucial to reinforce the principles of governance and transparency, empower independent Yemeni voices, and urge the international community to distance itself from global corruption that perpetuates crises rather than resolving them.

Any settlement that does not center on restoring the state, dismantling militia power, and ensuring accountability for all parties will only reproduce the current status quo.

Chapter Six

Detailed analytical model: Security Incidents Data for Organizations: Balancing Reality and Distortion of Legitimate Government Image (Analysis, Classification, Risks, and Procedures)

Introduction:

The leaked security incident data, which appear to depict incidents occurring between 2022 and 2023, are a source of concern for the legitimate government in Yemen. Analysis and classification of these data indicate that the main purpose of their publication is to tarnish the image of legitimacy and justify the continued presence of certain organizations in specific areas under the authority of the Houthi militia.

FraudWiki obtained these reports (annexed), which are detailed data in an Excel file prepared by organizations in Yemen (UN for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - OCHA) that includes 404 security incidents that organizations claim to have been exposed to during the period (2022-2023), and it seems that such reports were submitted annually without the knowledge of the legitimate government or without reviewing them and verifying the validity of the listed information, and thus working to verify and correct it and work to take protection measures and coordination between legitimate government agencies and organizations, Also, hold these organizations accountable in the event that this information is false, misleading, fabricated and distorts the situation in the areas controlled by the legitimacy.

It is observed that this data aligns with numerous reports submitted by organizations or entities working with them, including organizations and institutions operating in the field of peace, training on peace concepts, and fostering a peace-promoting environment in the legitimate territories. These reports portray the Houthi militia as ready for peace, asserting they require no additional training. They present Houthi-controlled areas as characterized by security and stability, contrasting with the situation in the legitimate areas. Consequently, we find that these peace-oriented initiatives, benefiting specific institutions and a select few individuals, are primarily directed towards regions under the control of the legitimate government. This sends a message to the world, especially the Western audience, suggesting that these areas are not conducive to peace and are grappling with chaos, insecurity, and instability, necessitating further training and conditioning. This implies a diversion of funds to specific entities. The report presented here conducts an analysis and categorization of the leaked data, elucidates associated risks, and proposes a series of measures.

6.1. Analysis and Classification of Data:

Through the leaked data and the process of its analysis and classification, the following findings were obtained:

- All the governorates listed are under the authority of the legitimate government, and the majority of the incidents are classified within directorates under its authority. However, some mentioned directorates fall under the authority of the Houthi militia in the governorates of Hodeidah, Al-Bayda, and Taiz..
- The largest percentage of accidents, up to 95%, occurred in directorates under the authority of the legitimate government.
- Accidents are distributed among the following governorates:
  - Taiz with 112 security incidents (95% of which are in districts under the authority of the legitimacy).
  - Hodeidah with 69 security incidents (80% of which are in districts under the authority of the legitimacy).
  - Lahj with 56 security incidents, all in areas under the authority of the legitimacy.
  - Marib with 46 security incidents, all in areas under the authority of the legitimacy.
  - Aden with 41 security incidents, all in areas under the authority of legitimacy.
  - He was involved in 33 security incidents, all of them in areas under the authority of the legitimacy.
  - Abyan with 20 security incidents, all in areas under the authority of the legitimacy.
  - Hadramout with 11 security incidents, all in areas under the authority of legitimacy.
  - They resembled 3 security incidents, all in areas under the authority of the legitimacy.
  - Al-Mahra has only one security incident.
  - Al-Bayda with 11 security incidents in areas under the authority of the Houthi militia.

Security incidents can also be classified into 11 main categories, under which according to the data detailed classifications fall, as follows:

1. Threats against humanitarian workers in 30 incidents.
2. Abduction or abduction of humanitarian equipment/workers in 75 incidents.
3. Movement restriction with 60 incidents.
4. Activities suspended with 13 incidents.

5. Looting of humanitarian goods in 5 incidents.
6. Restriction of population movement in 3 incidents.
7. Confiscation of goods in 2 incidents.
8. Mines or unexploded ordnance in 40 incidents.
9. Shelling (military operations that impede humanitarian work) with 125 incidents
10. Damage to humanitarian goods or buildings in 11 incidents.
11. Crimes that may include car theft or shooting in 40 incidents.

6.2. Risks to the Legitimate Government:

These reports and confidential data being submitted by organizations, depicting legitimate areas as chaotic, convey a message implying that these legitimate areas are unstable, experiencing conflicts, looting, and hindrance of organizational operations. This is utilized to justify the retention of their main offices by the Houthi militia, as well as to keep financial transfers away from the central bank in Aden and to avoid activating monitoring and accountability.

Furthermore, this volume and nature of security incidents inevitably lead to significant financial expenses, which come at the expense of the share allocated to needy Yemeni families. Organizations may not hesitate to register and allocate these expenses, essentially providing meager aid or even deducting from it. Operational budgets are calculated at more than 50%, and in some projects, they reach up to 70%. Registering this number of incidents may be a target for fund diversion, again at the expense of aid to Yemenis.

Analysis of this data also indicates alignment with peacebuilding programs, which singularly target areas under legitimacy. This narrative implies that residents of these areas reject peace, in contrast to the Houthi-controlled regions that are perceived as ready for peace. Consequently, millions of dollars in funding are directed through a number of institutions such as the European Institute for Peace, the Sana'a Center for Studies, Deep Root, and its program Jusoor. These institutions are primarily focused on the areas under legitimacy, and a majority of their programs involve webinars and external participations by individuals who interchange roles to serve the Houthi militia and distort the image of legitimacy, depicting these areas as chaotic and in need of a deeper understanding of the meaning of peace. Additionally, this aims to weaken the image of the legitimate

government in the Western world and globally. It is noteworthy that these funds are seized by a limited number of institutions, aligning with UN organizations, agencies in Yemen, and the European Union, yet failing to truly benefit the people.

6.3. Actions Needed:

It is crucial to conduct an investigation to ascertain the veracity of all these incidents and determine the extent of their occurrence. This investigation should also inquire about the involvement of security agencies, both within the legitimate government in Aden and at the provincial level. Are the security agencies aware of these incidents, and do they possess information that contradicts or refutes these reports? Are there statistics or records available to challenge these reports? Additionally, it's important to investigate if the security agencies have details regarding data from previous years and whether organizations are mandated to provide any data or reports for review.

The observer of this data is profoundly shocked upon reading it, as it signifies the actual presence of chaos and instability. It starkly highlights the severity of the situation, revealing, on average, that these organizations face a security incident every two days. This underscores the urgent need to verify the accuracy of the data and implement robust monitoring, accountability, and event tracking measures. These measures should not be limited to areas under legitimacy but should encompass the entire Yemeni territory. Therefore, the recommended actions are as follows:

1) Resetting the relationship with international organizations and UN agencies
2) Activating mechanisms for coordination, monitoring, and accountability for these organizations and the entities operating under them.
3) Mandating that all international funding be channeled through the Central Bank in Aden and highlighting its positive effects on the national economy.
4) Reactivating the electronic monitoring and oversight system for projects that were operational before the war, linking the Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, organizations, and project executive units in the provinces.
5) Not releasing any reports or data from organizations without first reviewing and approving them by the relevant legitimate government authorities.

6) Holding accountable government officials in the legitimate government and making changes with qualified personnel who are nationally committed to reforming the situation and directing funding in a way that benefits Yemenis.
7) Holding international organizations and UN agencies accountable, inquiring about previous amounts, which have reached 25 billion dollars since 2015, and requesting all previous reports on security situations and others for review and verification.
8) Enforcing control over both local and internationally registered institutions operating in the relief and peace projects sector in Yemen, as well as engaging with international organizations or funders for training purposes. This involves mandatory registration, comprehensive reporting, and holding them accountable for past fund utilization. Any actions that have negatively impacted Yemeni society, damaged the image of legitimacy globally, or exploited the suffering and challenges faced by Yemenis for personal gain must be thoroughly investigated. Furthermore, there is concern about potential fund manipulation through role exchanges among a limited number of entities.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this report sheds light on the importance of addressing the risks associated with the manipulation of security incident data by organizations, posing a threat to the legitimate government. These risks include tarnishing the image of the legitimate government and undermining the confidence of international donors, thereby strengthening the Houthis' justification for maintaining their offices and operations without oversight and accountability.

A range of effective measures are recommended to mitigate these risks, including restructuring relations with international organizations and UN agencies to enhance coordination and transparency. Coordination, follow-up, monitoring and accountability mechanisms for relevant organizations and institutions should also be activated. All international funding should be required to be deposited in the Central Bank of Aden to strengthen financial management. The electronic project control and follow-up system should also be reactivated. Moreover, reports or statements from organizations should only be submitted after reviewing them and obtaining Approval of the legitimate government. Officials must be held accountable and changes in government cadres must be made. International organizations and UN agencies must also be held accountable and the amounts that have reached $25 billion since 2015 must be restored. Clear controls and standards

should be established for local and external institutions working in the field of relief and development in Yemen, with careful monitoring and effective accountability. These measures aim to enhance transparency and accountability and ensure optimal access to humanitarian assistance for Yemenis.

Annexes: 20 lists of 404 security incidents for the period 2022-2023



الكشف رقم 1: حوادث امنية تدعي المنظمات تعرضها لها بمناطق الشرعية

Incident D	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
3/1/2022	Taizz	Al Wazi'iyah	YE15	YE1515	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
1/6/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Arah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Workers/Equipm
1/6/2022	Lahj	Tur Al Bahah	YE25	YE2511	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Workers/Equipm
2/17/2022	Taizz	Mawza	YE15	YE1507	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Workers/Equipm
2/27/2022	Aden	Al Buraiqeh	YE24	YE2404	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Workers/Equipm
3/21/2022	Lahj	Tuban	YE25	YE2515	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities
4/17/2022	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities
4/24/2022	Hadramaut	Al Mukalla	YE19	YE1926	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Workers/Equipm
5/29/2022	Taizz	Dhubab	YE15	YE1506	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities
4/14/2022	Aden	Al Mansura	YE24	YE2403	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities
5/16/2022	Taizz	Al Ma'afer	YE15	YE1521	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities
6/1/2022	Aden	Dar Sad	YE24	YE2401	Suspension of Activities	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities
6/1/2022	Taizz	Mawza	YE15	YE1507	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Workers/Equipm
6/12/2022	Al Hudaydah	Al Khawkhah	YE18	YE1820	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities
6/13/2022	Taizz	Al Mukha	YE15	YE1505	Suspension of Activities	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities
6/23/2022	Al Dhale'e	Ad Dhale'e	YE30	YE3006	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
6/27/2022	Al Hudaydah	Al Khawkhah	YE18	YE1820	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Workers/Equipm
6/21/2022	Al Hudaydah	Al Khawkhah	YE18	YE1820	Suspension of Activities	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities
6/12/2022	Taizz	Al Mukha	YE15	YE1505	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities



الكشف 2

Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
OCHA	6/20/2022	Al Hudaydah	Al Khawkhah	YE18	YE1820	Suspension of Activities	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
OCHA	7/6/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Arah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
OCHA	7/4/2022	Taizz	Dhubab	YE15	YE1506	Suspension of Activities	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
OCHA	7/1/2022	Lahj	Tur Al Bahah	YE25	YE2511	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
OCHA	6/8/2022	Aden	Dar Sad	YE24	YE2401	Looting of Humanitarian C	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises
OCHA	7/27/2022	Taizz	Dhubab	YE15	YE1506	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
OCHA	7/7/2022	Taizz	Al Mukha	YE15	YE1505	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
OCHA	7/4/2022	Aden	Al Mansura	YE24	YE2403	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
OCHA	8/16/2022	Lahj	Tuban	YE25	YE2515	Looting of Humanitarian C	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises
OCHA	8/6/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Arah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
OCHA	8/7/2022	Al Hudaydah	Al Khawkhah	YE18	YE1820	Suspension of Activities	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
OCHA	8/31/2022	Taizz	Al Mukha	YE15	YE1505	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
OCHA	6/29/2022	Taizz	Al Ma'afer	YE15	YE1521	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
OCHA	9/11/2022	Taizz	Dhubab	YE15	YE1506	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
OCHA	9/25/2022	Taizz	Al Mukha	YE15	YE1505	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
OCHA	9/29/2022	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Denial of Population Mov	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
OCHA	9/22/2022	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Denial of Population Mov	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
OCHA	9/15/2022	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Denial of Population Mov	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
OCHA	12/7/2022	Abyan	Rasad	YE12	YE1206	Looting of Humanitarian C	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises
OCHA	10/18/2022	Aden	Khanfir	YE12	YE1211	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work



	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
41	OCHA	11/7/2022	Aden	Al Buraiqeh	YE24	YE2404	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
42	OCHA	10/24/2022	Al Hudaydah	Al Khawkhah	YE18	YE1820	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
43	OCHA	11/1/2022	Lahj	Tuban	YE25	YE2515	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
44	OCHA	10/19/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Arah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
45	OCHA	10/17/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Arah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
46	OCHA	11/8/2022	Lahj	Tuban	YE25	YE2515	Confiscation of Goods	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
47	OCHA	11/2/2022	Lahj	Al Maqatirah	YE25	YE2512	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
48	OCHA	11/7/2022	Lahj	Tur Al Bahah	YE25	YE2511	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
49	OCHA	11/17/2022	Taizz	Ash Shamayatayn	YE15	YE1514	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
50	OCHA	11/8/2022	Lahj	Tuban	YE25	YE2515	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
51	OCHA	11/28/2022	Taizz	Mawza	YE15	YE1507	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
52	OCHA	12/3/2022	Al Hudaydah	Al Khawkhah	YE18	YE1820	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
53	OCHA	12/12/2022	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Suspension of Activities	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
54	OCHA	10/1/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
55	OCHA	10/1/2022	Al Dhale'e	Al Husha	YE30	YE3009	Shelling	Shelling
56	OCHA	10/1/2022	Taizz	As Silw	YE15	YE1513	Shelling	Shelling
57	OCHA	10/1/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
58	OCHA	10/1/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
59	OCHA	10/1/2022	Taizz	Sabir Al Mawadim	YE15	YE1510	Shelling	Shelling
60	OCHA	10/1/2022	Taizz	Salh	YE15	YE1519	Shelling	Shelling



	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
61	OCHA	10/1/2022	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
62	OCHA	10/2/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
63	OCHA	10/2/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
64	OCHA	10/2/2022	Al Dhale'e	Al Husha	YE30	YE3009	Shelling	Shelling
65	OCHA	10/2/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
66	OCHA	10/2/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
67	OCHA	10/2/2022	Taizz	Sabir Al Mawadim	YE15	YE1510	Shelling	Shelling
68	OCHA	10/2/2022	Taizz	Salh	YE15	YE1519	Shelling	Shelling
69	OCHA	10/4/2022	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
70	OCHA	10/4/2022	Abyan	Lawdar	YE12	YE1204	Shelling	Shelling
71	OCHA	10/9/2022	Abyan	Mudiyah	YE12	YE1202	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
72	OCHA	10/15/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
73	OCHA	10/30/2022	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
74	OCHA	10/22/2022	Al Bayda	Az Zahir	YE14	YE1405	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
75	OCHA	10/23/2022	Al Bayda	Nati'	YE14	YE1402	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
76	OCHA	10/19/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
77	OCHA	10/19/2022	Lahj	Al Had	YE25	YE2501	Shelling	Shelling
78	OCHA	10/23/2022	Al Hudaydah	Bayt Al Faqiah	YE18	YE1817	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
79	OCHA	10/24/2022	Al Hudaydah	Ad Durayhimi	YE18	YE1814	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
80	OCHA	11/4/2022	Abyan	Al Mahfad	YE12	YE1201	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs



	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
81	OCHA	11/5/2022	Al Bayda	Na'man	YE14	YE1401	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs
82	OCHA	11/9/2022	Al Hudaydah	Al Hawak	YE18	YE1821	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs
83	OCHA	11/1/2022	Aden	Al Buraiqeh	YE24	YE2404	Shelling	Shelling
84	OCHA	11/1/2022	Al Hudaydah	Ad Durayhimi	YE18	YE1814	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs
85	OCHA	11/1/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
86	OCHA	11/1/2022	Aden	Al Buraiqeh	YE24	YE2404	Shelling	Shelling
87	OCHA	11/1/2022	Al Hudaydah	Ad Durayhimi	YE18	YE1814	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs
88	OCHA	11/1/2022	Taizz	Al Qahirah	YE15	YE1518	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs
89	OCHA	11/1/2022	Al Hudaydah	Ad Durayhimi	YE18	YE1814	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs
90	OCHA	11/1/2022	Aden	Al Buraiqeh	YE24	YE2404	Shelling	Shelling
91	OCHA	11/2/2022	Al Hudaydah	Ad Durayhimi	YE18	YE1814	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs
92	OCHA	11/5/2022	Lahj	Al Had	YE25	YE2501	Shelling	Shelling
93	OCHA	11/3/2022	Lahj	Al Qabbaytah	YE25	YE2510	Shelling	Shelling
94	OCHA	11/3/2022	Taizz	As Silw	YE15	YE1513	Shelling	Shelling
95	OCHA	11/3/2022	Taizz	As Silw	YE15	YE1513	Shelling	Shelling
96	OCHA	11/4/2022	Al Bayda	Na'man	YE14	YE1401	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs
97	OCHA	11/5/2022	Lahj	Al Qabbaytah	YE25	YE2510	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs
98	OCHA	11/5/2022	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
99	OCHA	11/6/2022	Lahj	Al Musaymir	YE25	YE2509	Shelling	Shelling
100	OCHA	11/6/2022	Taizz	Dhubab	YE15	YE1506	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs



	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
101	OCHA	11/6/2022	Taizz	Dhubab	YE15	YE1506	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs
102	OCHA	11/6/2022	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
103	OCHA	11/9/2022	Lahj	Al Maqatirah	YE25	YE2512	Shelling	Shelling
104	OCHA	11/10/2022	Al Bayda	Az Zahir	YE14	YE1405	Shelling	Shelling
105	OCHA	11/11/2022	Lahj	Al Qabbaytah	YE25	YE2510	Shelling	Shelling
106	OCHA	11/16/2022	Lahj	Al Qabbaytah	YE25	YE2510	Shelling	Shelling
107	OCHA	11/18/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
108	OCHA	11/19/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
109	OCHA	11/19/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
110	OCHA	11/20/2022	Al Hudaydah	Bayt Al Faqiah	YE18	YE1817	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs
111	OCHA	11/22/2022	Aden	Dar Sad	YE24	YE2401	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs
112	OCHA	11/22/2022	Al Hudaydah	Al Hawak	YE18	YE1821	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs
113	OCHA	11/22/2022	Aden	Dar Sad	YE24	YE2401	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs
114	OCHA	11/23/2022	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
115	OCHA	11/25/2022	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
116	OCHA	11/28/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
117	OCHA	11/29/2022	Al Hudaydah	Ad Durayhimi	YE18	YE1814	Presence of Mines or UXI	Presence of Mines or UXOs
118	OCHA	4/30/2022	Al Bayda	As Sawma'ah	YE14	YE1404	Shelling	Shelling
119	OCHA	4/29/2022	Al Dhale'e	Ad Dhale'e	YE30	YE3006	Shelling	Shelling
120	OCHA	4/29/2022	Al Dhale'e	Al Husha	YE30	YE3009	Shelling	Shelling



	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
121	OCHA	4/29/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
122	OCHA	4/29/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
123	OCHA	4/29/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
124	OCHA	4/29/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
125	OCHA	4/29/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
126	OCHA	4/29/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
127	OCHA	4/30/2022	Al Dhale'e	Ad Dhale'e	YE30	YE3006	Shelling	Shelling
128	OCHA	4/30/2022	Al Dhale'e	Al Husha	YE30	YE3009	Shelling	Shelling
129	OCHA	4/30/2022	Taizz	As Silw	YE15	YE1513	Shelling	Shelling
130	OCHA	4/30/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
131	OCHA	4/30/2022	Taizz	Salh	YE15	YE1519	Shelling	Shelling
132	OCHA	4/30/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
133	OCHA	9/2/2022	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
134	OCHA	9/2/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
135	OCHA	9/2/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
136	OCHA	9/2/2022	Taizz	Al Qahirah	YE15	YE1518	Shelling	Shelling
137	OCHA	9/2/2022	Al Dhale'e	Al Husha	YE30	YE3009	Shelling	Shelling
138	OCHA	9/2/2022	Taizz	As Silw	YE15	YE1513	Shelling	Shelling
139	OCHA	9/2/2022	Al Bayda	Az Zahir	YE14	YE1405	Shelling	Shelling
140	OCHA	9/2/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling



	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
141	OCHA	9/2/2022	Al Bayda	Nati'	YE14	YE1402	Shelling	Shelling
142	OCHA	9/2/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
143	OCHA	9/2/2022	Taizz	Sabir Al Mawadim	YE15	YE1510	Shelling	Shelling
144	OCHA	9/2/2022	Taizz	Salh	YE15	YE1519	Shelling	Shelling
145	OCHA	9/2/2022	Taizz	Sabir Al Mawadim	YE15	YE1510	Shelling	Shelling
146	OCHA	9/16/2022	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
147	OCHA	9/16/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
148	OCHA	9/16/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
149	OCHA	9/16/2022	Al Dhale'e	Al Husha	YE30	YE3009	Shelling	Shelling
150	OCHA	9/16/2022	Taizz	As Silw	YE15	YE1513	Shelling	Shelling
151	OCHA	9/16/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
152	OCHA	9/16/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
153	OCHA	9/16/2022	Taizz	Sabir Al Mawadim	YE15	YE1510	Shelling	Shelling
154	OCHA	9/16/2022	Taizz	Salh	YE15	YE1519	Shelling	Shelling
155	OCHA	9/23/2022	Taizz	As Silw	YE15	YE1513	Shelling	Shelling
156	OCHA	9/23/2022	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
157	OCHA	9/23/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
158	OCHA	9/23/2022	Al Dhale'e	Al Husha	YE30	YE3009	Shelling	Shelling
159	OCHA	9/23/2022	Taizz	As Silw	YE15	YE1513	Shelling	Shelling
160	OCHA	9/23/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling



	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
161	OCHA	9/23/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
162	OCHA	9/23/2022	Taizz	Sabir Al Mawadim	YE15	YE1510	Shelling	Shelling
163	OCHA	9/23/2022	Taizz	Salh	YE15	YE1519	Shelling	Shelling
164	OCHA	9/23/2022	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
165	OCHA	9/28/2022	Taizz	Sabir Al Mawadim	YE15	YE1510	Shelling	Shelling
166	OCHA	9/28/2022	Lahj	Al Had	YE25	YE2501	Shelling	Shelling
167	OCHA	9/28/2022	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
168	OCHA	9/28/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
169	OCHA	9/28/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
170	OCHA	9/28/2022	Al Dhale'e	Al Husha	YE30	YE3009	Shelling	Shelling
171	OCHA	9/28/2022	Taizz	As Silw	YE15	YE1513	Shelling	Shelling
172	OCHA	9/28/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
173	OCHA	9/28/2022	Al Bayda	Na'man	YE14	YE1401	Shelling	Shelling
174	OCHA	9/28/2022	Al Bayda	Nati'	YE14	YE1402	Shelling	Shelling
175	OCHA	9/28/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
176	OCHA	9/28/2022	Taizz	Sabir Al Mawadim	YE15	YE1510	Shelling	Shelling
177	OCHA	9/28/2022	Taizz	Salh	YE15	YE1519	Shelling	Shelling
178	OCHA	9/30/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
179	OCHA	9/30/2022	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
180	OCHA	9/30/2022	Al Dhale'e	Al Husha	YE30	YE3009	Shelling	Shelling



	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
181	OCHA	9/30/2022	Taizz	As Silw	YE15	YE1513	Shelling	Shelling
182	OCHA	9/30/2022	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
183	OCHA	9/30/2022	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling
184	OCHA	9/30/2022	Taizz	Sabir Al Mawadim	YE15	YE1510	Shelling	Shelling
185	OCHA	9/30/2022	Taizz	Salh	YE15	YE1519	Shelling	Shelling
186	OCHA	10/26/2022	Taizz	Mawza	YE15	YE1507	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
187	OCHA	10/25/2022	Taizz	Dhubab	YE15	YE1506	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
188	OCHA	12/24/2022	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
189	OCHA	10/9/2022	Taizz	Jabal Habashy	YE15	YE1508	Looting of Humanitarian G	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises
190	OCHA	10/20/2022	Shabwah	Hatib	YE21	YE2111	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
191	OCHA	12/4/2022	Aden	Al Buraiqeh	YE24	YE2404	Suspension of Activities	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
192	OCHA	1/17/2023	Taizz	Al Wazi'iyah	YE15	YE1515	Suspension of Activities	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
193	OCHA	1/22/2023	Aden	Al Buraiqeh	YE24	YE2404	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
194	OCHA	1/25/2023	Taizz	Al Wazi'iyah	YE15	YE1515	Suspension of Activities	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
195	OCHA	3/5/2023	Taizz	Al Mukha	YE15	YE1505	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
196	OCHA	3/9/2023	Al Dhale'e	Ash Shu'ayb	YE30	YE3004	Damage to Humanitarian	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises
197	OCHA	4/2/2023	Abyan	Khanfir	YE12	YE1211	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
198	OCHA	4/3/2023	Taizz	Al Mukha	YE15	YE1505	Looting of Humanitarian G	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises
199	OCHA	4/3/2023	Taizz	Al Mudhaffar	YE15	YE1517	Shelling	Shelling
200	OCHA	4/10/2023	Al Dhale'e	Qa'atabah	YE30	YE3003	Shelling	Shelling



	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
201	OCHA	4/10/2023	Taizz	Al Mukha	YE15	YE1505	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
202	OCHA	4/18/2023	Taizz	Al Mudhaffar	YE15	YE1517	Shelling	Shelling
203	OCHA	4/19/2023	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
204	OCHA	4/25/2023	Taizz	Sabir Al Mawadim	YE15	YE1510	Crime	Crime
205	OCHA	5/4/2023	Hadramaut	Wadi Al Ayn	YE19	YE1919	Crime	Crime
206	OCHA	5/4/2023	Hadramaut	Ash Shihr	YE19	YE1915	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
207	OCHA	5/5/2023	Marib	Harib	YE26	YE2609	Confiscation of Goods	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
208	OCHA	5/9/2023	Al Hudaydah	Ad Durayhimi	YE18	YE1814	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
209	OCHA	5/16/2023	Al Hudaydah	Ad Durayhimi	YE18	YE1814	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
210	OCHA	5/24/2023	Taizz	Al Mukha	YE15	YE1505	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
211	OCHA	5/29/2023	Al Hudaydah	Ad Durayhimi	YE18	YE1814	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
212	OCHA	6/7/2023	Taizz	Dhubab	YE15	YE1506	Crime	Crime
213	OCHA	6/18/2023	Al Hudaydah	At Tuhaytah	YE18	YE1826	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
214	OCHA	6/17/2023	Lahj	Tuban	YE25	YE2515	Damage to Humanitarian	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises
215	OCHA	6/17/2023	Abyan	Mudiyah	YE12	YE1202	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
216	OCHA	6/14/2023	Al Hudaydah	At Tuhaytah	YE18	YE1826	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
217	OCHA	6/26/2023	Al Hudaydah	At Tuhaytah	YE18	YE1826	Suspension of Activities	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
218	OCHA	6/22/2023	Abyan	Mudiyah	YE12	YE1202	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
219	OCHA	6/26/2023	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
220	OCHA	6/26/2023	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling



	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
221	OCHA	6/27/2023	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
222	OCHA	6/6/2023	Taizz	Dhubab	YE15	YE1506	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
223	OCHA	6/1/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Denial of Population Mov	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
224	OCHA	6/7/2023	Taizz	Ash Shamayatayn	YE15	YE1514	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
225	OCHA	6/13/2023	Marib	Marib	YE26	YE2613	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
226	OCHA	7/26/2023	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
227	OCHA	7/25/2023	Taizz	Dhubab	YE15	YE1506	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
228	OCHA	7/5/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Crime	Crime
229	OCHA	7/25/2023	Shabwah	Ataq	YE21	YE2113	Forced Entry into Premise	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
230	OCHA	7/21/2023	Taizz	At Turbah	YE15	YE1509	Attempted Killing or Killing	Attempted Killing or Killing of Humanitarian Wo
231	OCHA	8/5/2023	Taizz	Al Mukha	YE15	YE1505	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
232	OCHA	7/3/2023	Abyan	Mudiyah	YE12	YE1202	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
233	OCHA	7/5/2023	Taizz	Al Qahirah	YE15	YE1518	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
234	OCHA	7/8/2023	Abyan	Lawdar	YE12	YE1204	Shelling	Shelling
235	OCHA	7/23/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
236	OCHA	7/30/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
237	OCHA	7/23/2023	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
238	OCHA	7/28/2023	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
239	OCHA	7/30/2023	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
240	OCHA	7/30/2023	Al Hudaydah	At Tuhaytah	YE18	YE1826	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs

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	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
241	OCHA	7/17/2023	Taizz	Mawza	YE15	YE1507	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
242	OCHA	8/22/2023	Taizz	Mawza	YE15	YE1507	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
243	OCHA	8/28/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Suspension of Activities	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
244	OCHA	8/28/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Suspension of Activities	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
245	OCHA	8/29/2023	Taizz	At Turbah	YE15	YE1509	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
246	OCHA	8/31/2023	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
247	OCHA	7/9/2023	Aden	Al Buraiqeh	YE24	YE2404	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
248	OCHA	8/21/2023	Aden	Al Buraiqeh	YE24	YE2404	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
249	OCHA	9/1/2023	Aden	Al Buraiqeh	YE24	YE2404	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
250	OCHA	8/1/2023	Al Hudaydah	Ad Durayhimi	YE18	YE1814	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
251	OCHA	8/2/2023	Al Hudaydah	At Tuhaytah	YE18	YE1826	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
252	OCHA	8/4/2023	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
253	OCHA	8/10/2023	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
254	OCHA	8/12/2023	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
255	OCHA	8/15/2023	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
256	OCHA	8/16/2023	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
257	OCHA	8/18/2023	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
258	OCHA	8/18/2023	Al Hudaydah	At Tuhaytah	YE18	YE1826	Shelling	Shelling
259	OCHA	8/18/2023	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
260	OCHA	8/19/2023	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling

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كشف 14

	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
261	OCHA	8/19/2023	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
262	OCHA	8/23/2023	Al Hudaydah	Ad Durayhimi	YE18	YE1814	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
263	OCHA	8/24/2023	Taizz	Maqbanah	YE15	YE1504	Shelling	Shelling
264	OCHA	8/25/2023	Al Hudaydah	Ad Durayhimi	YE18	YE1814	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
265	OCHA	8/26/2023	Al Hudaydah	Hays	YE18	YE1819	Shelling	Shelling
266	OCHA	8/31/2023	Al Bayda	Az Zahir	YE14	YE1405	Shelling	Shelling
267	UNDSS	1/8/2022	Lahj	Tur Al Bahah	YE25	YE2511	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
268	UNDSS	1/9/2022	Hadramaut	Wadi Al Ayn	YE19	YE1919	Damage to Humanitarian	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises
269	UNDSS	1/12/2022	Taizz	Mawza'	YE15	YE1507	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
270	UNDSS	2/10/2022	Hadramaut	Al Qaff	YE19	YE1903	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
271	UNDSS	2/11/2022	Abyan	Mudiyah	YE12	YE1202	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
272	UNDSS	2/13/2022	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Forced Entry into Premise	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
273	UNDSS	2/17/2022	Taizz	Mawza'	YE15	YE1507	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
274	UNDSS	2/21/2022	Shabwah	Ataq	YE21	YE2113	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
275	UNDSS	2/27/2022	Aden	Al Burayqah	YE24	YE2404	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
276	UNDSS	3/4/2022	Taizz	Mawiyah	YE15	YE1501	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
277	UNDSS	3/5/2022	Hadramaut	Al Abr	YE19	YE1906	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
278	UNDSS	3/8/2022	Hadramaut	Al Mukalla City	YE19	YE1927	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
279	UNDSS	3/15/2022	Taizz	Mawza'	YE15	YE1507	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
280	UNDSS	3/17/2022	Al Maharah	Haswin	YE28	YE2809	Damage to Humanitarian	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises

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	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
281	UNDSS	3/18/2022	Taizz	Ash Shamayytayn	YE15	YE1514	Attempted Killing or Killing	Attempted Killing or Killing of Humanitarian Wo
282	UNDSS	3/29/2022	Lahj	Tur Al Bahah	YE25	YE2511	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
283	UNDSS	3/30/2022	Lahj	Tur Al Bahah	YE25	YE2511	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
284	UNDSS	4/3/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
285	UNDSS	4/4/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
286	UNDSS	4/7/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
287	UNDSS	4/15/2022	Lahj	Tur Al Bahah	YE25	YE2511	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
288	UNDSS	4/17/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
289	UNDSS	4/22/2022	Taizz	Al Wazi'iyah	YE15	YE1515	Robbery	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises
290	UNDSS	4/24/2022	Taizz	Mawza'	YE15	YE1507	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
291	UNDSS	4/26/2022	Lahj	Tur Al Bahah	YE25	YE2511	Robbery	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises
292	UNDSS	4/28/2022	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
293	UNDSS	5/11/2022	Lahj	Tur Al Bahah	YE25	YE2511	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
294	UNDSS	5/14/2022	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Forced Entry into Premise	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
295	UNDSS	5/23/2022	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
296	UNDSS	5/24/2022	Abyan	Khanfar	YE12	YE1211	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
297	UNDSS	5/24/2022	Abyan	Khanfar	YE12	YE1211	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
298	UNDSS	5/24/2022	Abyan	Khanfar	YE12	YE1211	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
299	UNDSS	5/24/2022	Taizz	Al Wazi'iyah	YE15	YE1515	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
300	UNDSS	5/25/2022	Taizz	Al Wazi'iyah	YE15	YE1515	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers

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كشف 16

	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
301	UNDSS	5/25/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
302	UNDSS	6/1/2022	Taizz	Al Makha	YE15	YE1505	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
303	UNDSS	6/1/2022	Taizz	Mawza'	YE15	YE1507	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
304	UNDSS	6/1/2022	Taizz	Mawza'	YE15	YE1507	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
305	UNDSS	6/3/2022	Al Hudaydah	Al Khukhah	YE18	YE1820	Crime	Crime
306	UNDSS	6/6/2022	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
307	UNDSS	6/11/2022	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Forced Entry into Premise	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
308	UNDSS	6/16/2022	Al Hudaydah	Al Khukhah	YE18	YE1820	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
309	UNDSS	6/18/2022	Taizz	Al Makha	YE15	YE1505	Damage to Humanitarian	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises
310	UNDSS	6/27/2022	Taizz	Al Makha	YE15	YE1505	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
311	UNDSS	6/28/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
312	UNDSS	7/6/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
313	UNDSS	7/16/2022	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Forced Entry into Premise	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
314	UNDSS	7/23/2022	Taizz	Al Qahirah	YE15	YE1518	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
315	UNDSS	7/24/2022	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Robbery	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises
316	UNDSS	7/28/2022	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
317	UNDSS	8/1/2022	Lahj	Tuban	YE25	YE2515	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
318	UNDSS	8/3/2022	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
319	UNDSS	8/6/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
320	UNDSS	8/7/2022	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers

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كشف 17

	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
321	UNDSS	8/8/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
322	UNDSS	8/17/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
323	UNDSS	8/23/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
324	UNDSS	8/25/2022	Hadramaut	Al Mukalla City	YE19	YE1927	Forced Entry into Premise	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
325	UNDSS	8/29/2022	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
326	UNDSS	8/29/2022	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
327	UNDSS	9/5/2022	Lahj	Tuban	YE25	YE2515	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
328	UNDSS	9/10/2022	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
329	UNDSS	9/11/2022	Taizz	Dhubab	YE15	YE1506	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
330	UNDSS	9/13/2022	Hadramaut	Al Abr	YE19	YE1906	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
331	UNDSS	9/18/2022	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
332	UNDSS	9/25/2022	Taizz	Dhubab	YE15	YE1506	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
333	UNDSS	9/29/2022	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
334	UNDSS	9/29/2022	Hadramaut	Al Abr	YE19	YE1906	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
335	UNDSS	10/3/2022	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Forced Entry into Premise	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
336	UNDSS	10/4/2022	Taizz	Al Makha	YE15	YE1505	Forced Entry into Premise	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
337	UNDSS	10/10/2022	Hadramaut	Al Abr	YE19	YE1906	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
338	UNDSS	10/11/2022	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Safety Incident	Safety Incidents
339	UNDSS	10/12/2022	Aden	Al Burayqah	YE24	YE2404	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
340	UNDSS	10/18/2022	Abyan	Khanfar	YE12	YE1211	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke

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كشف 18

	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
341	UNDSS	10/25/2022	Taizz	Dhubab	YE15	YE1506	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
342	UNDSS	10/26/2022	Taizz	Mawza'	YE15	YE1507	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
343	UNDSS	11/7/2022	Lahj	Tur Al Bahah	YE25	YE2511	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
344	UNDSS	11/8/2022	Lahj	Tuban	YE25	YE2515	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
345	UNDSS	11/13/2022	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Crime	Crime
346	UNDSS	11/13/2022	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
347	UNDSS	11/19/2022	Al Hudaydah	Al Khukhah	YE18	YE1820	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
348	UNDSS	12/7/2022	Abyan	Russud	YE12	YE1206	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
349	UNDSS	12/9/2022	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
350	UNDSS	12/19/2022	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
351	UNDSS	12/18/2022	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
352	UNDSS	12/25/2022	Abyan	Zinjibar	YE12	YE1210	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
353	UNDSS	1/5/2023	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
354	UNDSS	1/14/2023	Lahj	Tur Al Bahah	YE25	YE2511	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
355	UNDSS	1/15/2023	Lahj	Tur Al Bahah	YE25	YE2511	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
356	UNDSS	1/22/2023	Aden	Al Burayqah	YE24	YE2404	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
357	UNDSS	1/26/2023	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
358	UNDSS	1/26/2023	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
359	UNDSS	1/28/2023	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking of	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Worke
360	UNDSS	2/3/2023	Taizz	Al Makha	YE15	YE1505	Robbery	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises

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كشف 19

	Source	Incident Di	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category
361	UNDSS	2/19/2023	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
362	UNDSS	2/19/2023	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
363	UNDSS	2/22/2023	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
364	UNDSS	2/26/2023	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
365	UNDSS	2/27/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
366	UNDSS	3/8/2023	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
367	UNDSS	3/20/2023	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
368	UNDSS	3/22/2023	Abyan	Khanfar	YE12	YE1211	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
369	UNDSS	3/29/2023	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
370	UNDSS	4/2/2023	Taizz	Mawza'	YE15	YE1507	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
371	UNDSS	4/2/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
372	UNDSS	4/6/2023	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
373	UNDSS	4/17/2023	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Safety Incident	Safety Incidents
374	UNDSS	5/2/2023	Al Dhale'e	Ad Dale'	YE30	YE3006	Threats Against Humanita	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers
375	UNDSS	5/9/2023	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Work
376	UNDSS	5/17/2023	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Presence of Mines or UX	Presence of Mines or UXOs
377	UNDSS	5/21/2023	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Crime	Crime
378	UNDSS	5/28/2023	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
379	UNDSS	5/29/2023	Al Dhale'e	Ad Dale'	YE30	YE3006	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits c
380	UNDSS	6/7/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Safety Incident	Safety Incidents

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كشف 20

	Source	Incident D	Governorate	District - Exact Loc. of Constraint	Admin1_code	Admin2_code	Unified Sub_Category	Unified Category	
381	UNDSS	6/13/2023	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Workers/Equipment	Crime
382	UNDSS	6/14/2023	Abyan	Lawdar	YE12	YE1204	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Workers/Equipment	Crime
383	UNDSS	6/15/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Crime	Crime	Hazard
384	UNDSS	6/18/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities	Civil Unrest
385	UNDSS	6/20/2023	Aden	Al Burayqah	YE24	YE2404	Threats Against Humanitar	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers	Crime
386	UNDSS	6/21/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities	Civil Unrest
387	UNDSS	7/9/2023	Taizz	Al Makha	YE15	YE1505	Presence of Mines or UX(	Presence of Mines or UXOs	Hazard
388	UNDSS	7/16/2023	Al Hudaydah	Al Khukhah	YE18	YE1820	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities	Civil Unrest
389	UNDSS	7/17/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Workers/Equipment	Crime
390	UNDSS	7/21/2023	Taizz	Ash Shamayytayn	YE15	YE1514	Attempted Killing or Killing	Attempted Killing or Killing of Humanitarian Workers	Terrorism
391	UNDSS	7/24/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities	Civil Unrest
392	UNDSS	7/25/2023	Taizz	Dhubab	YE15	YE1506	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities	Crime
393	UNDSS	7/26/2023	Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	YE25	YE2513	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Workers/Equipment	Crime
394	UNDSS	7/26/2023	Abyan	Lawdar	YE12	YE1204	Damage to Humanitarian (	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises	Crime
395	UNDSS	7/28/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Environment	Environmental	Hazard
396	UNDSS	7/30/2023	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Threats Against Humanitar	Threats Against Humanitarian Workers	Crime
397	UNDSS	8/6/2023	Aden	Khur Maksar	YE24	YE2408	Damage to Humanitarian (	Damage to Humanitarian Goods or Premises	Crime
398	UNDSS	8/6/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities	Civil Unrest
399	UNDSS	8/8/2023	Lahj	Radfan	YE25	YE2507	Safety Incident	Safety Incidents	Hazard
400	UNDSS	8/11/2023	Abyan	Mudiyah	YE12	YE1202	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Workers/Equipment	Terrorism
401	UNDSS	8/24/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Crime	Crime	Hazard
402	UNDSS	8/28/2023	Marib	Marib Al Wadi	YE26	YE2613	Kidnapping or Hijacking o	Kidnapping or Hijacking of Humanitarian Workers/Equipment	Crime
403	UNDSS	8/30/2023	Taizz	Al Wazi'iyah	YE15	YE1515	Movement Restriction	Delay or Intervention with Humanitarian visits or activities	Crime
404	UNDSS	9/13/2023	Marib	Marib City	YE26	YE2612	Safety Incident	Safety Incidents	Hazard
405									
406									

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25	https://x.com/EUinYemen/status/1861745487608529380?t=NiD2Yt_7RwMSWNvkvLYVUA&s=19

26	https://x.com/ejaznetwork/status/1885772645225939296?t=A5aXG0csjp-w9LffwJralw&s=19
27	https://www.hikmafellowship.org/ar/cohorts/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A9/fellows
28	https://www.fraudwiki.net/en/security-incidents-data-for-organizations-balancing-reality-and-distortion-of-legitimate-government-image-analysis-classification-risks-and-procedures_3922/
29	https://www.musaala.org/ar/articles/statements-and-calls/killing-of-detainees-in-yemen
30	https://sabanew.net/viewstory.php?id=124917&fbclid=IwY2xjawJXmzBleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHX0uU99ZIhTeoTFbhSRJs34B9G-oicTyqs5Gv3wHmejymXdBW-X4m9ZpqA_aem_RxortTga5Tyxlzc4N7gPkQ
31	https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1Ty9VsJFii/

General Conclusion

The importance of the reliable information and data presented in this book is evident in its ability to change societal awareness and even influence national policies. The previous reports and analyses included in this book have contributed to the adoption of many effective measures at the international level. Sanctions have been imposed by the Security Council on individuals linked to the Houthis, along with U.S. sanctions that reflect the seriousness of the international community in addressing these challenges.

The book reveals the infiltration of individuals connected to Houthi leadership into key positions within international humanitarian and financial organizations, undermining the principles of independence and neutrality. This situation raises doubts about these institutions' ability to make objective decisions regarding Yemen and threatens to normalize a terrorist militia by exploiting international programs. It also raises questions about the protection of the vulnerable Yemeni population and the extent to which political agendas influence humanitarian priorities. Urgent investigations and strong reforms are required to close gaps and prevent future infiltration. The legitimate government should review its representatives in these organizations to ensure no negative impact on its legitimacy. Restoring credibility requires serious measures to maintain integrity and trust in humanitarian work.

This analysis also highlights the harmful roles played by individuals within international organizations in facilitating the Houthi militia's agenda, thereby undermining the integrity of these institutions. Instead of maintaining neutrality, some have exploited their positions to obscure Houthi violations, casting doubt on the priorities of humanitarian work. Financial manipulation reveals gaps in oversight and strengthens the Houthis' position through deliberate infiltration of international mechanisms. The lenient stances of UN agencies have allowed this infiltration to continue, harming the effectiveness of aid. It is crucial to take tangible steps to restore neutrality and accountability, focusing on the interests of the Yemeni people as a priority. Those government entities and civil organizations that support the Houthis and work to rescind their designation as a terrorist group must be held accountable.

The complex dynamics of Houthi militia operations reveal a multifaceted approach to governance, security, and international relations. The establishment of a security and intelligence apparatus has bolstered its authority through comprehensive monitoring strategies of supporters and opponents. Key figures such as Abdul Wahid Naji Muhammad Abu Ras and Hassan al-Kahlani play critical roles in coordinating intelligence activities and military operations, enhancing their grip on power. The militia's use of shell companies, such as those coordinated by Ahmad al-Shami, or those managed by Abdul Wali al-Jabri, and Ali al-Hadi, reflects its ability to adapt in a complex conflict environment.

Regional security challenges persist through the involvement of political figures in illicit arms deals. Acts of kidnapping and torture against activists and international organization staff raise questions about accountability and the effectiveness of international human rights mechanisms. Furthermore, the involvement of some civil society institutions (Like **DeepRoot** and the **Hikma Fellowship** and **Resonate Yemen**) in presenting Houthi leaders as neutral figures hinders the true narrative of the Houthi militia.

As the situation in Yemen continues to evolve, understanding these dynamics is essential for grasping the Houthis' impact on the conflict. International community efforts must address the humanitarian crisis comprehensively and effectively, emphasizing the importance of holding all parties accountable for their actions.

Local and international factors intersect in shaping Yemen's future, as research is used as a political tool influencing governance and transitional justice. It is crucial to amplify genuine local voices and uphold the fundamental principles of justice to ensure a stable and inclusive future. Building the state requires addressing conflicting international priorities and ensuring accountability for crimes while compensating victims.

Lobbying groups that exploit peace and justice funding to beautify and empower the Houthi militia and contribute to obstructing international sanctions must be exposed, and their connections to the Houthis must be exposed (such as the **Mwatana Foundation** and the **Sana'a Center** for Studies), with a redirection of international efforts to support legitimate institutions. Additionally, corrupt individuals should be held accountable, and principles of governance and transparency must be enhanced. Any settlement that does not focus on state restoration and dismantling militia power will only perpetuate the status quo.

The analytical model highlights the risks of misinformation in security incident data threatening the legitimate government, such as damaging its image and diminishing donor trust. To mitigate these risks, restructuring relationships with international organizations to enhance coordination and transparency is advised. Monitoring mechanisms on relevant institutions should be activated, and all funding should be deposited in the Central Bank in Aden. Furthermore, organization data should be reviewed before publication and approved by relevant government entities. Responsible officials should be held accountable, and government personnel should be replaced with qualified individuals who have a national allegiance, working to improve the situation and better direct funding for the benefit of Yemenis.

Proposed Actions:

1. **Resetting Relationships**: Adjust relationships with international organizations and UN agencies to effectively serve humanitarian work and transition to developmental projects.
2. **Activating Monitoring Mechanisms**: Enhance coordination and accountability for UN agencies, international organizations, and relevant institutions, holding them accountable for previous amounts that reached $32 billion and reviewing their reports.
3. **Funding Deposits**: Enforce the deposit of all international funding into the Central Bank in Aden, contributing to national economic improvement and limiting support for the Houthi militia.
4. **Activating the Electronic System**: Reactivate the monitoring and follow-up system for projects linking the Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, UN agencies, international organizations, and executive project units in the governorates.
5. **Report Review**: No reports or data should be published by organizations without prior review and approval from relevant government entities.
6. **Accountability of Officials**: Work to hold accountable government officials affiliated with legitimacy and make changes with qualified personnel who have a national allegiance, working to repair the situation and better direct funding for the benefit of Yemenis.
7. **Regulating Local and International Institutions**: Require local institutions working in human rights, relief, and training to submit detailed reports and hold them accountable for funds received, with

monitoring and review of their reports. Also, institutions registered outside Yemen working in relief or peace projects with international organizations or donors must provide detailed reports and be held accountable for previously received funds and any actions that have harmed the community in Yemen or the legitimacy's image globally or exploited the suffering of Yemenis for personal gain, including collusion among a limited number to control funding.

8. **Opening Dialogue Channels**: Strengthen dialogue among all parties involved, including civil society, to ensure all voices are heard in decision-making processes. Additionally, empower genuine Yemeni voices to reach international platforms, encourage research and studies that neutrally highlight violations and provide effective solutions, thereby raising public awareness and prompting the international community to take action.

In conclusion, any settlement that does not focus on state restoration, dismantling militia power, and holding all parties accountable will merely reproduce the status quo.

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